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iEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Within the past few years, reductions in air pollutant emissions and
fuel consumption of the U.S. passenger car fleet have become important
public policy goals. The automobile manufacturers have responded to
government regulation or changing market pressures in these areas by
modifying the internal combustion engine (ICE), the powerplant which has
dominated the passenger car application for almost sixty years. There are,
however, alternatives to the ICE which may offer substantial improvements
in emissions and fuel economy, but to many people the industry appears
reluctant to deal seriously with them, and a Federally sponsored research
and development (R & D) program has been called for. This report examines
the question: Is it appropriate for the Federal Government to support R & D
on alternative automotive powerplants?
This issue is highly controversial. Some argue that emissions
regulations and the high level of importance given to fuel economy by car
buyers give the manufacturers strong and clear incentives for improvements
in these areas. Others argue that without substantial Federal R & D support,
potentially attractive alternative engine technologies will not receive the
attention they deserve.
In addressing this question, we relied on our experience and knowledge
in the area, the available literature (technical publications, Congressional
hearings, trade journals, etc.) and on interviews with personnel in the
industry, government, and academic organizations involved. We have
focussed on questions of public policy since the relevant technology has
been adequately addressed elsewhere. The study was divided into four areas:
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a definition of the central issue and a set of underlying issues; a review
of the technology; an examination of the relevant societal goals and the
possible role of R & D in meeting them; and a review of the government and
industry experience with alternative powerplants. As a result of this
analysis, we have reached the following conclusions:
1) The question is controversial in part because attitudes to
several underlying issues--the future of the ICE, the relative weighting
of different engine attributes, the risks the automobile manufacturers
can reasonably be expected to assume, the nature of the process by which
an alternative engine might be substituted for the ICE--influence expecta-
tions of appropriate R & D activities in industry and government.
2) Because of uncertainties in the future technological characteristics
of alternative engines, the development potential of the ICE, and the
marketplace requirements and government regulations which will have to be
met, one cannot now forcast whether the optimum passenger car powerplant of
the last decades of this century will be the ICE, an alternative, or whether
it will even be a single engine for all passenger cars.
3) This uncertainty regarding the future attractiveness of the more
promising alternatives can only be resolved through future research and
development efforts. Since the passenger powerplant has such a large
influence on national air pollution and energy problems, it is important
that economically justifiable efforts towards attaining the optimum be
pursued.
4) However, only certain objectives and certain levels of effort are
appropriate for Federally supported R & D in this area. The most important
objectives are providing information to support regulation and policy
development, and advancing the state-of-the-art. The former is clearly
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the responsibility of the Federal Government, and a sounder framework for
such R & D needs to be developed. Depending on industry activities,
Federal R & D can play an important role in the latter objective in the
earlier stages of the hardware development process where manufacturing and
consumer acceptance considerations are not overriding.
5) The incentives to the automobile manufacturers are not sufficient
to cause them to perform all the alternative powerplant R & D which can be
justified on the basis of potential social benefits from reduction in
emissions. The primary reason for this is that the emission standards in
the Clean Air Act are in reality coupled to the available technology--the
ICE. In the area of fuel economy the incentives and national goals are
less clear, but there may be a divergence here as well.
6) Industry programs on a number of alternative powerplants are sub-
stantial, but they leave significant gaps. They reflect a reasonable allo-
cation of internal funds to this area, given the current potential of
alternative engines and the uncertainty in future regulations which now
exists. However, there are projects which industry is not now supporting
which appear to be economically justifiable from a public policy standpoint.
7) The principal government program in this area has been the
Advanced Automotive Power Systems Program. The program has not contributed
significantly to advancing the state-of-the-art, but this was never a major
program goal. It has been of significant value in providing a focus for
alternative powerplant activities and exchange of technical information,
and it has contributed to long-range policy planning. Industry R & D
activities could not have served these important functions.
8) There is therefore convincing justification for Federal support
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for R & D on alternative automotive powerplants. Some alternative engine
technologies are not receiving adequate attention within the automobile
industry for sound reasons which are unlikely to change; a government
program can support projects which are justifiable from a public stand-
point but not a private one. Such a program can make substantial contri-
butions to national air pollution abatement and fuel conservation goals
by advancing the state-of-the art of selected engine technologies and by
producing the technical data necessary for developing regulations and
other policies. A rough estimate of number of projects and project costs
suggests that a two to five-fold increase above current alternative
powerplant funding--to between $15 and $35 million annually--would be
required. The overall goals of such a program would be to reduce the
risks inherent in developing and introducing those alternative engines
which may have long-term economic and public benefits and which are not
now receiving adequate attention, by reducing the current technological
and regulatory uncertainty to the point where normal market decision-making
mechanisms would be in better alignment with social objectives.
VPREFACE
The National Science Foundation's Office of Energy R & D Policy is
funding a one-year program in the Energy Laboratory at MIT to provide
guidance for evaluating proposed Federal programs of research and development
in the area of alternative automotive power systems. This study, which
started in June, 1974, is divided into two phases. This report describes
the work completed in phase I. Past and current industry and government
programs on alternative automotive power systems have been examined, the
critical issues laid out, and the potential role for Federal R & D as a
policy tool for meeting national goals has been analyzed. The objective
of this report is not a technological evaluation of alternative automotive
engines; rather we describe the context within which the development of the
more attractive of these engines is occurring and seek to define appropriate
objectives for Federal R & D, if any, within this context. The scope of
our study has been limited to proposed efforts on alternative powerplants;
we have not dealt with the areas of alternative fuels, advanced concepts
for the internal combustion engine, safety, or any other area, although
the methodology we have developed may be appropriate in these other areas
as well. In phase II of the study, we will examine in detail a number of
powerplant issues to which we could not give adequate attention here.
The data sources used in the preparation of this report have
included the available literature -- from government, industry and
academic sources -- and extensive interviews with industry and government
officials involved in the planning and execution of R & D on alternative
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power systems. In the following pages, public documents will be referenced
where appropriate; interview data will not be referenced, however. Interviews
are subject to a number of difficulties which, with the time and resources
available for this study, we were sometimes unable to resolve. Chief
among these is the fact that the automobile manufacturers and government
agencies involved in this very controversial area are under pressure to
say and do the "right" things. Other complications we encountered in
information gathering and analysis include the difficulty in determining
the underlying basis of agency or corporate policies, the proprietary
nature of many industry data, and the difficulty in making generalizations
about the "Big Three" automobile manufacturers when there are significant
differences among them. We were not always able to test these data to the
extent we would have liked; some of our findings cannot be stated in an
unqualified manner. On the whole, however, we are confident of our judgments
and conclusions.
We are indebted to a number of people who have contributed significantly
to this study. Dr. Leonard Topper, Office of Energy R & D Policy, National
Science Foundation, initiated the program and has been actively involved as
contract monitor. Professor David G. Wilson and Mr. Richard S. Morse,
M.I.T., contributed useful comments at various stages. The authors inter-
viewed a large number of individuals in industry, government and academia.
The time and ideas generously contributed by all these individuals are
much appreciated.
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11. THE CRITICAL ISSUES
1.1 The Role of the Federal Government in Alternative Automotive
Powerplant R & D.
The automobile and its role in modern American society have been
the subject of much attention and many publications. In particular, within
the past decade the air pollutant emissions, and, later, the fuel consumption
of the American passenger car fleet have had impacts on our society which
have made the technological characteristics of the powerplants in these
vehicles the subject of extensive controversy. Federal regulation of
emissions levels has been instituted, and the automobile manufacturers
have responded by modifying the internal combustion engine (ICE), which
has been the dominant passenger car powerplant for almost sixty years.
There are, however, alternatives to the ICE which may offer substantial
improvements in emissions and fuel economy, but to many people the industry
appears reluctant to deal seriously with them, and a Federally-sponsored
research and development (R & D) program has been called for. This, then,
is the central question we have examined: Is it appropriate for the Federal
Government to support R & D on alternative automotive powerplants?
With the possibility of substantial reductions in the air pollutant
emissions and fuel consumption of the passenger car fleet, why should a
moderately funded (tens of millions of dollars annually) Federal R & D program
in this area be controversial at all? In fact these proposals, and the modest
R & D program the Government has presently underway, have been very
2controversial indeed. The principal logic for opposing a Federal role has
been the following: the air pollutant emissions regulations and the high
level of importance given to fuel economy by automobile buyers have given
the manufacturers clear incentives for improvements in these areas; the
"'Big Three" manufacturers (GM, Ford and Chrysler) have vast financial
resources (total 1973 sales were over $70 billion) and technical talent
available for development of automotive power systems; and the traditionally
intense sales competition among the Big Three (and the imports) will drive
them toward a least cost, optimal system; thus, it is argued, there is no
need for a Federal R & D program.
In an attempt to address this issue, we have conducted an examination
of the available technologies, the relevant societal goals and the possible
policies for meeting them, and government and industry experience in dealing
with automotive powerplants. In order to deal effectively with the central
issue, we have made two key assumptions. First, we have assumed that the
basic structure of the Clean Air Act will remain intact, i.e., there will
continue to be legally mandated emission standards. Second, we have
assumed that the passenger car will remain the principal form of personal
transportation for the next several decades. We do not consider these
assumptions particularly limiting.
While gathering the data for this study we encountered a wide variety
of strongly held opinions on the central issue. These opinions are
based in part on deeply felt political beliefs on the proper relation-
ship between government and industry. We also found a number of other,
more technical, issues which underlie opinions on the central issue. There
are widely divergent opinions on these underlying issues within the industry,
government and academic circles involved with alternative automotive powerplants.
3These issues are important because, to a significant degree, attitudes on them
determine expectations of what the automobile industry "should" be doing
in its alternative engine development programs. Expectations of what
industry should be doing in turn influence judgments of the appropriate
R & D role for the Federal Government. In the remainder of this Section,
therefore, we lay out these underlying issues in detail and describe
the various attitudes on them.
1.2 The Future of the ICE
In the last seventy years hundreds of millions of spark-ignition
engines have been produced and operated. Massive production facilities now
exist, many of which are relatively new. Mass production methods and the
required machine tools have been developed to a high level of sophistication.
An enormous amount of experience relating to the design and manufacture
of the ICE has been accumulated within the automobile industry. An extensive
service industry -- with facilities, trained mechanics, tools and equipment --
has been built up. It is paralleled by a spare parts industry and distribution
system. Millions of automobile owners have gained confidence in the ICE,
and have developed high and continually increasing expectations of engine
performance and reliability. The industry has built up an impressive record
of steady improvements in engine design and performance. However, many factors
now make the future of the ICE less secure than it has appeared at any time
since it came to dominate the market sixty years ago. The general reasons
for this change ate well known: the magnitude of the automobile air pollution
problem, particularly in the larger urban areas, and the concern over petroleum
availability and cost. The major uncertainties concerning the future performance
4of the ICE are presented in terms of emission control, fuel economy,
complexity and cost, in Section 2.
In the face of these uncertainties, there now exists a wide spectrum
of opinions on the continued viability of the ICE. At one extreme, there
is a school of thought which contends that the ICE is certainly doomed,
probably within the next decade. Members of this school feel that, even
if the ICE's inherently high emissions can be brought to acceptable levels
(i.e. the original 1976 standards), it will be done with complicated and
expensive add-on devices which carry with them unacceptable cost and fuel
economy penalties. They assert that the ICE has had over seventy years of
development for the passenger car application, that its potential has been
pretty well realized, and that one or more of the available alternative
systems should displace it as soon as possible. Thinking along these
lines tends to be found in some government, academic and environmental
circles and in companies with a stake in alternative powerplants, and is
usually associated with advocacy of substantial government R & D programs
on alternative powerplants.
At the other extreme, there is a school of thought that holds that
the ICE has adapted itself to changing constraints in the past and will
continue to do so in the future. Advocates of this school point out that
each proposed alternative to the ICE has at least one major defect. This
line of thinking is found primarily within the automobile industry, although
it also exists in government.
Advocates of these divergent schools of thought are not hard to find,
and there are a large number of individuals and groups whose opinions cover
the spectrum in between. These attitudes to the long-term future of the ICE,
and their attendant expectations, obviously influence judgments as to the
"adequacy" or "seriousness" of industry and government efforts in the
alternative power systems area. It is our judgment that in the face of
the high degree of technological uncertainty concerning each alternative
engine, it is not possible at this time to prove that one or more of these
alternative power systems would be broadly superior to the ICE. We will
address this issue further in Section 2.
1.3 Relative Attribute Weightings
Many engine attributes or characteristics must be compared in making
a systematic evaluation of alternative powerplants. Although emissions and
fuel economy are often singled out as the characteristics of greatest public
concern, other aspects of powerplant design are usually more important
to the vehicle manufacturer and individual purchaser. People do not buy
minimum emissions maximum fuel economy vehicles. In any assessment of
alternative engines in comparison with the ICE, a large number of powerplant
characteristics must be evaluated and then compared. Table 1.1 lists those
attributes which are normally considered by the manufacturer in such a
powerplant evaluation. Some of these attributes are readily quantifiable,
many are not.
While such a list is essential in any systematic powerplant evaluation,
the relative weighting given each attribute significantly affects the final
ranking obtained. This is because most of the alternative engines have
some characteristics which are superior to the ICE, and some which are
inferior. Different groups, depending on their point of view, give
substantially different weightings to these attributes, and these weightings
change with time (e.g. there has been a rapid rise in the importance of
6Table 1.1
KEY ATTRIBUTES OF AUTOMOTIVE POWERPLANTS1
Emissionsa
Noisea
Fuel economyb' c
Safetyc
Costc
Starting easec
Driveabilityc
Performancec
Response to abuse and neglectc
Design horsepower versatilityd
Control eased
Producibilityd
Sized
Weightd
Ability to be integrated in vehicled
The attributes are marked to distinguish their major significance as follows:
a
Government regulations now in effect or expected and must be met.
bPotential area for future regulation or government intervention to
increase relative importance of this attribute.
CConsumer generally identifies these as important engine attributes
influencing his choice of vehicle.
dContributes to the ability of the manufacturer to sell engines that
satisfy the consumer (usually by way of reducing cost).
1 From [1], modified.
7fuel economy). Within the constraints of regulation, the manufacturer weights
these attributes in terms of their effect on sales and profits. Presumably
the manufacturer's weighting correlates with that of vehicle purchasers,
though individual buyers rarely articulate their needs in as organized a
fashion. On the other hand, many within government agencies or public
interest groups emphasize one or a few attributes above all others. The
broader needs of the individual vehicle buyer, sometimes even his very
existence, are often ignored.
It is clear, however, that market forces will dictate the relative
weighting of these attributes. Once the manufacturer, in his evaluation
of alternatives, has determined that an engine has the potential for
meeting anticipated government regulations, he will weight the different
attributes in accordance with his experience and expectation of customer
demands. To expect any other basis for weighting in a consumer product
industry is unrealistic. In this report we will stress the fact that ours
is a market system, and that, although the automobile industry is hardly
a model of perfect competition, it is dominated by forces of supply and
demand within the constraints imposed by the government.
1.4 The Substitution Process
The process by which a substantial change in engine technology might
occur within the automobile industry is also an issue, primarily because the
nature of this process is not well understood and expectations of the rate
of change are sometimes unrealistic. Almost all technological innovations
in "mature" industries like the automobile industry follow a similar pattern.
New products are first developed to the point where they can be introduced
8in mass production on a small scale. If performance expectations are fulfilled
in actual use, and the demand exists for the new or improved product, then
the innovation gradually starts to penetrate the market. In this second
stage, the substitution of one product for another occurs in a series of
steps of increasing commitment of resources. In this way the risk to the
innovator is carefully controlled; commitments of resources follow as
uncertainty concerning product performance decreases and increasing demand
for the new product is evident. Once the performance in actual use of a
new product or technology as been successfully demonstrated (almost always
on a scale small compared with the total market) sutstitution of the new
technology in production, for the old, can begin on a large scale. This
substitution normally occurs relatively slowly, and the replacement
of one technology by another in the automobile industry has typically taken
10 to 25 years.
The public interest in change in automotive engine technology concerns
the impact of that change on the average characteristics of the total U.S.
automobile population (or some large subpopulation). A third stage in this
substitution process is therefore important. Not only must the new technology
penetrate the market, it must then be produced in very large volume for
several years, during which old vehicles are retired and replaced by the
new ones, before any significant impact occurs. This third stage is
controlled by the average life expectancy of new automobiles and adds an
additional five years or so, after very large volume production is achieved,
for a significant impact to occur. Thus the total time before substitution
of a new engine might affect aggregate emissions or fuel consumption is
very long indeed.
9The length of the first stage in this process -- the bringing of
a new engine technology into limited mass production -- depends on the
current state of development of the engine technology and the degree to
which it represents a substantial change from the ICE. For the simpler
stratified charge engines this process might take two to three years. For
the gas turbine it would take much longer -- say four to eight years.
The longest stage in this substitution process has historically
been the second, i.e., market penetration. To quote a prior study of
such processes in large and complex industries:
"The speed with which a substitution takes place is not a simple
measure of the pace of technical advance, or of manufacturing, marketing,
distribution, or any other individual substitution elements. It is,
rather, a measure of the unbalance in these factors between the competitive
elements of the substitution. When a substitution begins, the new product,
process, or service struggles hard to improve and demonstrate its advantages
over the dominant product, process or service. As the new substitution
element becomes recognized by commanding a few percent of the total market,
the threatened element redoubles its own efforts to maintain or improve
its position. Thus, the pace of technical innovation effort -- indeed,
the competitive pace of all aspects of the substitution -- may increase
markedly during the course of the substitution struggle.
"The rate at which a given substitution proceeds seems to be
determined by the complex interplay of economic forces responding to
the inherent superiority of a new method." [2]
Thus, this second stage in the substitution process has historically been
controlled by market forces. Recently, air pollution regulations have
forced this step into a single year, but the new components introduced to
meet regulations have been modest in comparison with a new engine technology.
nWhile the oxidizing catalytic converter has been forced into about C
percent production i a single year, this new technology has a limited impact
on other aspects of vehicle design. Furthermore, since the vehicle is not
affected by loss in activity of the catalyst, a much higher failure rate than
is normal in an automotive component can be tolerated. Introduction of a new
engine is not a comparable process.
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The length of this entire process under normal circumstances is often
not appreciated, nor are the three distinct stages which must occur before
a new engine technology could significantly affect the automobile air
pollution problem or total U.S. gasoline consumption. With as substantial
a change as conversion to an alternative engine, the entire substitution
process from the engine prototype stage through to significant impact on
the characteristics of the automobile population (say 25 percent of the
cars on the road with the new engine technology) is likely to be very long
indeed -- at best some 10 to 20 years depending on the degree of change
from the ICE. Clearly Federal (or industrial) R & D can only play a role
in the first stage of this three-stage process -- the development to
small-scale mass production.
To many this description of the way a new engine would be likely
to penetrate the market is not controversial. To others, whose technological
expectations have been conditioned by the Manhattan and Apollo projects it
appears unacceptably "passive." The dominant role of Federal R & D in
achieving the technical goals in these projects has lead many to believe
similar Federal efforts could result in a "clean and efficient" automobile
engine. But in these projects there was no production conversion phase,
nor was there a need to replace an existing technology in a stock of in-
use products. Thus, in our judgment, the differences between the Apollo
type of project, where Federal R & D was used to support procurement of
advanced technology for programs with well defined objectives managed and
operated by the Federal government, and the problem we are addressing, are
so great that such expectations cannot reasonably be fulfilled.
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1.5 Acceptable Levels of Risk
A crucial issue which will come up repeatedly in the remainder of
this report is the question of the level of risk an automobile manufacturer
should be willing to assume in any attempt to capture the gains of
developing and introducing an alternative powerplant which is potentially
more attractive than the ICE. The Big Three have been criticized as
exercising "undue conservatism" in their approach to alternative powerplants,
especially for not introducing a stratified charge or diesel engine to
meet the original 1975 emission standards. [4] However, the investment
in development, tooling, inventory, marketing, etc. required to bring a
new powerplant into initial mass production could be up to several hundred
million dollars; even firms the size of the Big Three cannot readily absorb
losses of this size. We have divided the risks faced by the industry in
development or introduction of an alternative powerplant into three separate
aspects: the risk stemming from technological uncertainty, the risk stemming
from uncertainty in future requirements, and the risk stemming from the
incompatibility of the regulatory structure of the Clean Air Act with the
normal substitution process.
The risk stemming from technological uncertainty is simply the
usual risk associated with an R & D program; in this case it is the possibility
that the program will be unsuccessful in developing a powerplant with the
attribute levels that the company has set as its goals. We will deal with
the difficulty in establishing goals next, but even with fixed goals the
alternative powerplants offer a substantial challenge to the R & D planner.
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The alternatives are all at different stages of technology development.
The data bases available on each alternative vary significantly in extent
and thus reliability. It is the long-term potential of each of the alternatives
that is important, not the current status. Estimates of this long-term
potential are necessarily based on judgments of the extent to which current
development problems can be overcome at acceptable cost.
Furthermore, the ICE technology of today is not static; it can be
expected to continue to improve in response to changing requirements.
Improvements in emission control, fuel economy, driveability, maintain-
ability and relative costs of the ICE are being eagerly sought and will
probably be obtained. Indeed the challenge presented by the continued
development of alternative engines is likely to intensify the efforts made
to improve the existing ICE technology. Thus "a challenger must be not
merely as good -- it must in all probability be quite a bit better to
justify that cost and trauma of replacement " [3, p. 1] and it may in
fact be the correct technological choice to emphasize continued ICE
development.
It is not at all surprising that in the face of this high degree of
technological uncertainty, a wide range of opinions exists as to the
attractiveness of the different alternative engines in comparison to the
ICE. It is not possible to prove that one or more of the alternatives is
"superior" at this time. This is reflected in the diversity of present
industry and government programs seen in Section 4, and means that there
is substantial probability that an investment in an alternative powerplant
R & D program will never result in any return.
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The second area of risk stems from difficulty in forecasting
future requirements. For those attributes which are not government-mandated,
this problem is the usual one faced by the industry in forecasting consumer
demands. White develops at some length the thesis that the difficulty of
forecasting these demands even over the three-to-four year lead time required
for the annual model change is a significant determinant in industry behavior.
[5] With respect to air pollutant emission standards, along with the
expected noise standards and potential fuel economy standards, the industry
planner must forecast the results of a complicated political, bureaucratic,
and technological interaction. Furthermore, he must do it over the time-frame
necessary to develop and produce an alternative powerplant: a decade, at
least, for the radical alternatives. And, of course, he must forecast
consumer demands and other conditions over this time frame as well.
This aspect of risk has been hotly disputed. To an automobile
manufacturer, this uncertainty makes further development of the familiar
ICE much more attractive than a substantial investment in the development
of an alternative engine of approximately equal performance, with which
the manufacturer feels unsure. This uncertainty acts as an even greater
deterrent as the investment increases for engine introduction into mass
production. In practice, no automobile manufacturer would commit the
resources required for the production of an alternative engine until it
was clear that the engine would be able to meet regulatory requirements,
whatever they may be, for a sufficient period to justify its investment.
With the ICE, no comparable risk exists. Given the present regulatory
structure for emissions control (all cars must meet the standards in any
14
model year) and the enormous economic importance of the automobile industry,
as long as there is a dominant entrenched ICE technology the standards will
have to be adjusted to a level the dominant technology can achieve.
In contrast, those groups with a special interest in or responsibility
for one powerplant attribute see little development effort being expended
on alternatives with high promise in that particular area, because it
is unclear that regulations or future requirements in other areas can be
satisfied. The diesel engine is a current example where uncertainties in
future requirements for NOx, particulate and odor emissions inhibit
any significant development efforts to take advantage of its attractive
fuel economy characteristics.1
Finally, the third aspect of risk is the increased risk in the
substitution process due to the incompatibility between the length of
time required to build up production of an alternative powerplant and
lIt is generally assumed that if the diesel engine were mass produced
domestically, then emission standards would be issued by EPA in order to
ensure that the particulate emissions from these engines would not become
a public health hazard. However, no such standard has yet been proposed,
and, given the pressures of more urgent business, might not be until
domestic diesel mass production was imminent or had begun. Depending
on the stringency of the standard, and the timing, the manufacturer might
be faced with major design changes, or even a shutdown of assembly lines,
shortly after initial production. The uncertainty over future NO emission
standards creates a similar situation for the diesel. Introduction of an
engine for which the NO control technology is similar to that of the ICE,
such as the Wankel, does not add to the risk level in this respect because
the new engine will rise or fall with the ICE. With the diesel, however,
for which NOx control technology is relatively independent of that of the
ICE, introduction with uncertainty in the standard adds a new element
of risk.
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the required single-year changes in emission levels under the Clean Air
Act. This incompatibility strongly inhibits the introduction of an
alternative powerplant with emissions characteristics (or fuel economy, if
regulated) superior to those of the ICE. Consider a manufacturer who begins
mass production and marketing of a new engine which meets, say, the NOx
standard for 1978 of 0.4 g/mile, while the ICE does not. Accepting normal
levels of risk, the manufacturer would expand production gradually when and
if the new engine proves itself a more attractive product than the ICE.
However, in this situation government pressures to increase the rate of
penetration of the new engine would be enormous. Responding to these
pressures, which to some degree would be inevitable, could result in,
among other things, a substantial disparity between production and demand
for the ICE and the alternative, perhaps causing substantial financial
losses.
The principal controversy over risk level can be easily summarized:
the question is what level of risk the manufacturers should be willing to
accept in their investments on alternative powerplant R & D production.
Congress, EPA and environmental groups have felt that the benefits of
clean air and reduced fuel consumption require a greater degree of risk-
taking than the manufacturers have been willing to exercise. But the
negative impact of failure falls primarily on the company, while the primary
beneficiaries of success would be the urban public at large. This issue
is one which will not be readily resolved. It surfaces at several points in
this report, for-it underlies industry decisions and public expectations
regarding alternative powerplant development.
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2. AUTOMOTIVE ENGINE TECHNOLOGIES
A consideration of the role of Federal R & D in the automotive
powerplant must necessarily include, as a first order of business, a review
of the relevant technologies. In this section we will briefly discuss
the technical characteristics of ICE and the alternatives to provide the
background for subsequent discussions of government and industry programs.
The major advantages and disadvantages, and critical development problems
for each of these engines will be described. Wle have not carried out a
detailed technical evaluation of these engines, however, since comprehensive
and up-to-date evaluations of this type can be found elsewhere. [1,6]
The alternative powerplants are competing to take the place of an
entrenched technology. The conventional reciprocating spark-ignition
engine, commonly called the internal combustion engine or ICE, has been
the dominant automobile engine since the early 1900's. During this period,
several hundred million of these engines have been manufactured in the
United States alone. Massive facilities now exist for producing the ICE,
and there is extensive experience with and understanding of the engine
design and manufacturing processes, its operation in actual use, and
maintenance and service requirements. Over the past decade, however,
powerplant design criteria have been changing in response to Federal
emission standards. Modifications have been made and components have been
added to the ICE, increasing its cost and complexity; these changes have
degraded engine performance, fuel economy and driveability. More recently,
indeed within the last year, fuel shortages and higher gasoline prices have
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upgraded the relative importance of vehicle fuel economy in comparison with
other design characteristics. In the longer term, fuel economy regulation
and changing fuel composition may lead to even greater changes in desired
engine characteristics.
It is unclear at this time whether the ICE can be adapted to meet long-
term national environmental quality and energy consumption goals. Even if
it can satisfactorily meet these demands, it still may not be the optimum
automobile powerplant when all the necessary attributes are considered.
Many alternative types of automobile engines have been under investigation
for some time, though at different levels of effort. One of these alter-
natives may offer the individual car owner the desired transportation services,
within environmental and energy-constraints, at a lower overall cost.
All alternative engines must compete against this "baseline" of the
conventional reciprocating spark-ignition engine (the ICE)- which dominates
the market. Moreover, they must compete against the ICE not as it is today,
but as it continues to be developed in attempts to meet changing market
requirements and regulations.
Some of the alternatives are quite close conceptually to the ICE; some
are already in mass production though they constitute only a small fraction
of the market. Thus there is a range of options, both in extent of
change from the ICE and in stage of technology development. For the purpose
of this study, we classify all engines other than the ICE as "alternatives."
Those alternative engines already in mass production we term "available
alternatives;" those alternative engines not now in mass production we term
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"radical alternatives." Table 2.1 lists the engines which are discussed in
this study in these three categories.
These engines are at various stages of development. In Section 3
(Table 3.2) we define a sequence of stages which occur in the development
of a new technology, namely: applied research, exploratory development,
advanced development, engineering development and product improvement.
Table 2.2 gives the present stage of the most advanced development program
for passenger car usage, for each of the engines described in this section.
A detailed description of government and industry programs and where they
are being carried out is given in Section 4 and Appendix B.
2.1 The Baseline ICE
The conventional automobile engine is a carbureted reciprocating
spark-ignition engine operating on a four-stroke cycle. It is often
called the Otto cycle engine, or the internal combustion engine (ICE),
though these titles are not sufficiently definitive to separate this engine
from some of the other alternatives. The engine, as now produced (model
year 1975), is equipped with emission controls -- engine, carburetor,
and intake modifications, an exhaust gas recycle system and an oxidizing
catalytic converter. The fuel economy, engine performance and driveability
of the engine have been steadily decreasing since emission controls were
first introduced in 1968. The introduction of the catalytic converter in
1975 model year has apparently reversed this trend. The engine now, however,
requires unleaded gasoline and the compression ratio has been reduced so
engines will operate on 91 research octane number fuel.
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Table 2.1
ENGINE CLASSIFICATION
Baseline
* Conventional reciprocating spark-ignition engine
(usually termed the internal combustion engine or ICE)
Available Alternatives
* Wankel spark-ignition engine
* Carbureted prechamber stratified charge spark-ignition engine
* Heavy-weight diesel engine
Radical Alternatives
* Fuel-injected open-chamber stratified charge engine
* Light-weight diesel engine
* Gas turbine engine
* Rankine cycle engine
* Stirling cycle engine
* Battery-powered electric system
* Heat engine hybrid system
Table 2.2
AUTOMOTIVE POWERPLANT DEVELOPMENT STATUS
Status1
Product improvement
Available Alternatives
Wankel spark-ignition
Prechamber stratified charge
Heavy-weight diesel
Radical Alternatives
Open-chamber stratified charge
Light-weight diesel
Gas turbine
Rankine cycle
Stirling cycle
Battery-powered electric
Heat engine hybrid
Product improvement
Product improvement
Product improvement
Engineering development
Exploratory development
Advanced development
Advanced developed
Exploratory development
Applied research
Applied research
1The status listed refers to the status in the most advanced development
program for automotive use.
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Powerplant
Baseline
ICE
a-
21
Many factors now combine to make the future of the ICE less secure
than it has appeared at any time since it came to dominate the market
sixty years ago. The major uncertainties are:
* whether the ICE can achieve sufficient control of hydrocarbons (HC)
and carbon monoxide (CO) emissions to meet the original 1975 (now
1977) standards;
* whether the ICE can meet whatever long term oxides of nitrogen
(NOx) emission standard is eventually chosen;
* whether the catalyst technology which has been developed for HC
and CO, and may be developed for NOx, will be sufficiently durable
and maintainable in actualy use;
* how significant special problems associated with this catalyst
technology -- e.g. sulphate and particulate emissions -- prove to be;
* whether engine fuel economy losses, which have resulted from emission
controls and the change to unleaded gasoline, will continue as emissions
are further reduced;
* whether the steady deterioration in vehicle driveability which has
occurred as vehicle emissions have been reduced can be halted;
* whether sufficient improvements in vehicle fuel economy can be
obtained without also obtaining significant improvements in engine
fuel economy.
Two points are especially important to our subsequent discussion. First,
the ICE is the dominant automobile engine technology, and it is firmly
entrenched in that position. Secondly, substantial development effort is
being devoted to the ICE to reduce further its emissions levels, and to
improved its fuel economy, performance, and driveability. Potential
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improvements in the following areas are being sought:
* Mixture preparation: improved carburetion, early fuel evaporation
manifolds, fuel injection with exhaust composition feedback controls,
quick acting chokes, etc.
* Ignition systems: high energy and long duration spark electronic
systems.
* Exhaust gas recycle: improved matching of EGR rate with engine
operating conditions for NO control with lower fuel economy penalties.
* Catalytic converters: improved oxidation catalysts for HC and CO,
reduction catalysts for NO , three way catalysts for HC, CO and NOx,
improved secondary air flow control.
* Engine design: low emissions combustion chamber geometries.
On the time scale comparable to that required for developing alter-
native engines--5 to 10 years--reasonable progress in at least some of these
areas can be expected. While the ICE is currently having difficulties
in responding to rapidly changing requirements, it still has considerable
development potential remaining.
2.2 Alternatives Now in Mass Production
(a) Wankel spark-ignition engine
An alternative spark-ignition engine technology--the Wankel
rotary combustion engine--is primarily being developed for its poten-
tial manufacturing cost reduction. The engine design employs a three-
lobed rotor moving in an eccentric path within a stationary housing.
The smaller engine size than the ICE, lighter weight, smaller
number of engine parts, and possible redesign of the vehicle to take
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advantage of these different engine characteristics could all contribute
to this cost reduction. Current production versions of this engine show
adequate durability but poor fuel economy and high hydrocarbon emissions
compared with the ICE. Engine developments now underway indicate that
the fuel economy penalty relative to the ICE can be significantly reduced.
Because its operating characteristics are so similar to the ICE, the emission
control technology developed for the ICE can be easily incorporated. In terms
of better meeting public policy goals, this alternative has no advantages
relative to the ICE.
(b) Carbureted Prechamber Stratified Charge Engine
This engine concept is not new, but has recently been developed by
Honda into an engine with low HC and CO emissions, moderate NOx emissions,
and equivalent fuel economy to the ICE. The concept uses a small prechamber
around the spark plug and a dual carburetor and dual intake system to prepare
a stratified mixture. A fuel-rich mixture is admitted to the prechamber via
a small intake valve. The burning jet issuing from the prechamber after
spark plug discharge ensures good ignition of the lean mixture in the main
chamber. The Honda version of the engine uses additional emission controls --
spark retard and an exhaust manifold reactor. The potential advantages of
this engine are:
* Control of HC and CO to the original 1975 levels without a catalyst.
* Lower cost of the engine, compared with the ICE and its emission
controls, at the same emission levels.
The disadvantages appear to be:
* Limited potential for NOx control much below about 2 g/mile in ax
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standard size car, and 1 g/mile in a subcompact car, without
significant fuel economy penalties.
* Limited potential for improved engine fuel economy relative to
the ICE at the same emission levels.
(c)- Heavy-Weight Diesel Engine
Diesel engines differ from the gasoline ICE in their method of
combusting the fuel. Fuel is injected into the air in the combustion
chamber at the end of the compression stroke and ignites spontaneously.
Since the fuel can be fully burned with excess air, HC and CO emissions
are low. Since throttling is not required, and the compression ratio is
much higher than in the ICE, engine fuel economy is as good as or better
than any other potential automotive engine.
Automobiles with diesel engines are currently marketed in limitedquan-
tities in Europe by Daimler-Benz, Peugeot and Opel. Theee vehicles have met
the original 1975 HC and CO standards with NOx emissions of about 1.5 g/mile;
they exhibit excellent fuel economy compared with ICE vehicles of equivalent
weight with, however, substantially inferior performance characteristics.
These current production diesel engines, which are of the prechamber type, have
significantly higher cost and weight than an equivalent ICE and have problems
with odor, smoke and noise emissions.
The present automotive diesel engine--which we term heavy-weight--
is thus not a suitable powerplant for general automotive use, though it
may find greater usage in special applications such as taxis, light-
duty trucks and vans. It is not generally recognized that the current heavy-
weight diesel engine requires extensive further development before it can
be considered as a potentially attractive alternative powerplant in the
American market.
25
2.3 Radical Alternatives
(a) Fuel-Injected Open-Chamber Stratified Charge Engine
This stratified charge engine concept combines some features of the
diesel with some of the conventional spark-ignition engine. Fuel (usually
gasoline) is injected into the combustion chamber during the compression
stroke and the fuel-air mixture is ignited by a spark plug discharge.
A number of different concepts of this type are being developed with
additional emission controls (EGR, retarded timing, throttling at light
load, an oxidation catalyst); emission levels below the original
1976 standards have been obtained with experimental vehicles. Because
the fuel octane rating is less important in this type of engine,
higher compression ratios can be used. For this and other reasons
improved fuel economy relative to the conventional ICE has been
demonstrated. The system is still in the developmental stage. Whether
currently demonstrated operating characteristics, and any potential
improvements, can be realized in mass production engines of this type
is not yet clear. Potential advantages of this concept are:
* Improved fuel economy compared with the ICE at the same emission
levels.
* Better control of NO than is achieveable with the ICE without
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a durable reduction catalyst.
* Possible tolerance to a range of fuel characteristics.
Potential disadvantages with this concept are:
* High cost of the fuel injection system plus almost full range of
ICE emission controls.
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* May not be able to meet 0.4 g/mile NOx standard in actual use.
* Possible problems with particulate and aldehyde emissions.
(b) Light-Weight Diesel
A complete redesign of the current heavy-weight automotive diesel
specifically for passenger car use offers the possibility of sub-
stantially reduced engine weight and cost. At the same time, new
developments in diesel engine technology show some potential for
reducing emission levels below those of current diesel engines. Such
changes would substantially improve the relative position of the
diesel engine compared with the ICE. This improved diesel engine
concept is generally referred to as a light-weight diesel. The
major advantages the light-weight diesel might offer are:
* Improved fuel economy in comparison with the ICE.
* Reduced maintenance requirements.
* Good control of HC and CO emissions without add-on emission
controls, and moderate control of NOx.
The major problem areas would be similar to those currently evident
with the heavy-weight diesel, but less severe, namely:
* Ability to meet 0.4 g/mile NOx standard is still questionable.
* Potential problems with odor, smoke and particulate emissions.
* Higher cost due to heavier engine and fuel injection system.
* Engine noise.
(c) Gas Turbine
The gas turbine operates by drawing air from the atmosphere through a
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compressor into a burner where heating by combustion with the fuel occurs,
and then expanding the hot high pressure gases in a turbine. In automotive
applications a regenerator is generally used to transfer energy from the
exhaust gases to the air leaving the compressor. All these processes
occur continuously, in contrast to the intermittent operation of spark-
ignition and diesel engines.
There is a considerable development history of the automotive gas turbine.
Current major areas of uncertainty relate to the need for ceramic components
to significantly improve fuel economy, especially at part load, and to
reduce manufacturing costs. The development of suitable ceramic components
is one of the major technological barriers. The potential performance
characteristics of the engine depend significantly on whether success in
developing such ceramic components is assumed. The major potential advantages
of the gas turbine are:
* Control of HC and CO emissions below the original 1975 standards,
with less certain but probable control of NOx emissions below the
original 1976 standard.
* Ability to burn a wide range of petroleum fuels.
* Reduced maintenance costs.
The major problem areas are:
* Part-load fuel economy -- a major problem with metallic components,
a lesser problem with ceramic components.
* High manufacturing costs -- a major problem with metallic components,
a lesser problem if techniques for fabricating suitable ceramic
components are developed.
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(d) Rankine Cycle Engine
The Rankine cycle engine is an external combustion engine. Fuel is burnt
with atmospheric pressure air in a burner-boiler to evaporate and heat
the working fluid -- water or an organic fluid -- to high pressure and
temperature. The fluid is expanded in either a reciprocating or turbine
expander to supply work to the shaft, then condensed and recirculated to the
boiler. The Rankine cycle engine's clear advantage over the ICE is its
ability to meet the HC, CO and NO standards originally set for 1976, by
suitable burner design. Stability of emissions control is, therefore,
excellent. It has, however, the following potential disadvantages:
* Higher cost due to larger size and weight, more components, and
greater complexity.
* Poorer fuel economy compared with the ICE (though the Rankine
cycle has excellent fuel versatility).
* Complexity of controls which results from need to maximize
fuel economy and to obtain good vehicle driveability.
* Problems of engine integration into smaller sized vehicles.
(e) Stirling Cycle Engine
The Stirling Engine derives its power output by using heating
and cooling to vary the pressure of a fluid within a closed volume;
the pressure variations are transmitted via the piston to the shaft.
The engine is a closed system using hydrogen or helium as the working
fluid. The engine contains, as a minimum, one power piston and
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one displacer piston per cylinder, one regenerator, one heater (a burner),
and one cooler. The ideal Stirling cycle efficiency is that of the
Carnot cycle--the maximum attainable between the highest and lowest
cycle temperatures. The Stirling engine only approximates the ideal cycle,
so actual efficiencies are lower. Relatively limited testing of Stirling
engines for automobile applications has occurred to date. Thus considerable
engineering development would be required before the engine can be evaluated
as a viable automotive powerplant. The long-term potential attractions
of the Stirling engine appear to be:
* Fuel economy at least equal to and perhaps better than any other
contender, plus excellent fuel versatility.
* Ability to meet original 1976 standards for HC, CO and NO 
The major problem areas currently apparent include:
* Design problems--notably in compact heat exchanger area, and
engine seals to contain adequately the working fluid.
* Higher cost due to greater complexity and increased weight
compared with the ICE.
* Response to normal abuse and neglect may be inadequate; thus
engine maintenance may be costly.
(f) Battery-Powered Electric Systems
Electrically driven battery-powered vehicles provide freedom from
emissions and from high energy conversion losses at the vehicle location;
however, these problems are merely transferred to the location of the
electricity generating plant. Thus, the overall desirability of electrically
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driven vehicles to the general public depends on policy choices that go
far beyond the scope of this report.
The limiting factors relating to technical and eccnomic feasibility
of electric vehicles are the weight of the system and the operating
characteristics of the power source -- the battery. Electric drive systems
with excellent operating characteristics have been demonstrated. The
development of optimal electric drive systems is not considered to be a
significant technical problem, though the weight of the electric motor
and controls is likely to be in the 200 to 400 lb. range. There is extensive
experience with one battery system -- the lead-acid battery. While this
battery is rugged, efficient, reliable and can respond quickly to changes in
load, its energy storage density is too low for it to be viable in normal
automobile use. Presently available special-purpose vehicles powered by lead-
acid batteries can provide ranges of up to 50 miles with modest acceleration,
at a high cost. Other currently available rechargeable batteries such as
zinc-silver oxide and cadmium-nickel oxide, while superior in some respects,
are inherently unsuitable for vehicular applications because of cost and
materials availability limitations.
A number of advanced batteries are now under active development. The
most promising of the advanced battery systems are sodium-sulfur and lithium-
sulfur batteries, which operate at temperatures in the range 300-4000 C. These
batteries are expected to have adequate energy and power densities to permit
the design of electric vehicles with normal automobile performance and range
capabilities. Single prototype vehicles are in process of preparation. Should
these or other batteries prove attractive -- and an estimated eight year
development program would be required, at a minimum -- then the electric
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vehicle would become a possible alternative to the conventional vehicle.
The cost, however, would likely be significantly higher than an ICE-powered
vehicle. But the characteristics of electric vehicles are sufficiently
different, and the energy supply implications are so substantial, that
evaluation of electric vehicles goes beyond the straightforward comparison
of different engine attributes. Public policy goals for the long term are
an equally important factor.
(g) Heat Engine Hybrid System
A number of hybrid engines which combine a heat engine (often a small
ICE) with an energy storage device ( e.g. a battery, or flywheel) have been
examined, sometimes with modest hardware development. In principle, this
combination allows the heat engine to operate at constant speed and optimum
conditions at all times. It has been claimed that this system offers
flexibility, efficiency and low emissions. These potential advantages must
be larger than the weight, cost and inefficiencies of the energy storage
unit and the associated transmission and controls for the concept to be
attractive. The hybrid systems built to date have been heat engine, battery
and electric drive systems. These have been complex and heavy, with
disappointingly high emissions and fuel consumption. There is little interest
in hybrid systems at this time, apparently because of a general consensus
that such systems are not attractive candidates.
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2.4 Conclusions Concerning the Technology
At this point it is appropriate to draw some conclusions which will
have a strong bearing on the remainder of our analysis. First, it is clear
that there are a number of potentially attractive alternatives to the ICE.
For example, the Rankine and Stirling cycle systems stand out with low
emission levels resulting from the use of external combustion; the diesel,
Stirling and open-chamber stratified charge systems offer potentially substantial
fuel economy improvements with their high thermal efficiencies, and the
Wankel offers compactness and light weight.
However, each of the alternative engines appears now to be significantly
inferior to the ICE in at least one important attribute. For example, the
Wankel has high fuel consumption and hydrocarbon emissions, the diesel emits
odor and particulates, and the Stirling cycle engine is expensive to manufacture.
Most of the deficiencies are in areas ultimately related to consumer acceptance.
No one powerplant can now be confidently projected as broadly superior to the
ICE.
Furthermore, the ICE itself is the subject of extensive development
programs to improve its fuel economy and lower its emission levels while
preserving its other attractive features. Advances in mixture preparation,
ignition, exhaust gas recycling systems, catalytic converters, and basic
engine design can be expected.
We have therefore concluded that whether the optimum powerplant for
the last two decades of this century will be the ICE, an alternative,
or whether it will even be a single system for all passenger cars, cannot
now be confidently forecasted. What is clear, however, is that the potential
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for major gains in ambient air quality and aggregate fuel consumption
makes continued development programs in this area worthwhile. Thus we are
led back to the central issue: Is it appropriate for the Federal Government
to support part of this effort?
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3. THE ROLE OF R & D IN OVERALL FEDERAL POLICY
Federally sponsored research and development on automotive power systems
is only one of several government activities related to the automobile industry,
and thus an evaluation of R & D programs must take account of other policy
measures that are being carried out at the same time. A broad perspective
is particularly important in the case of automotive research because at times
Federal R & D efforts have been viewed less as worthy activities on their
own merit than as aids in the implementation of other policies and programs.
In the search for criteria for evaluating R & D expenditures, we begin
with a brief review of the context in which the automotive industry has been
operating in recent years, with particular attention to the escalation of
public goals for the performance of the industry and the Federal regulatory
programs designed to achieve these goals. These regulatory activities in the
areas of safety, air pollutant emissions, noise, and (potentially) energy
consumption are an important influence in the recent life of the industry and
in the evolution of its technology. In this context, we formulate a set of
four goals that R & D programs may be designed to attain, and identify the
different types of R & D that are relevant for this particular industry.
Based on this sifting of goals and program types, some preliminary conclusions
are reached about appropriate federal involvement in this area.
3.1 Changing Goals for the Automobile
Considering the importance of the passenger motor vehicle in the daily
life of the country, the automotive industry has operated with very little
government interference over most of its history. Few products have gained
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such universal acceptance or have played such a critical role in developing
the life-style of the nation; yet the major governmental activity in this sector
over the years has been road building. Only recently have the design and
operating characteristics of the vehicles themselves been perceived as
requiring governmental intervention. Regulation began in the early 1960's
as a result of concern about passenger safety. At that time the risk of
death or injury per mile traveled was falling from year to year, but the
total amount of travel was rising faster, and the net result was a rising
toll of human and property loss. Roadway engineers had long been concerned
with safety, of course, and state inspection programs had regulated safety
features such as brakes and lights. For some years the G.S.A. had taken
account of safety in their vehicle purchasing. But until the 1960's there
had not been government regulation of the vehicle itself.
The history of legislation to control air pollutant emissions is similar to
that of safety. So long as the vehicle population was small, automotive emissions
did not create a perceptible problem. But as the automobile fleet grew
following World War II, and population (and thus traffic) concentrated in
cities, automobile air pollution became a public issue. California state
legislation controlling vehicle design was first passed in 1963; Federal
enforcement powers were first established by the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1965. Emission standards were introduced nationwide in 1968 model year vehicles
and have become steadily stricter. The greatest change in the severity of
exhaust emission controls came with the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act.
The new goal was clear: to ensure at. the earliest possible date that no
person's health should be impaired by air pollution. Calculations available.
at the time indicated that approximately 90 per cent reductions in automotive
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emissions of hydrocarbons (HC), carbon monoxide (CO), and nitrogen oxides
(NOx) would be needed to achieve this result. The original deadlines set
by the 1970 Amendments for meeting these targets were model year 1975 for HC
and CO, and 1976 for NO .
With the implementation of the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, the
Noise Control Act of 1972 and the vehicle regulations expected to result
from it, and the strengthening of safety legislation, the automotive industry
has passed into a new status as an industry heavily regulated in the interest
of public health and safety. Naturally, there have been costs to be paid,
including disruption of the industry, increased vehicle cost, lowered vehicle
performance and driveability, and decreased fuel economy.
Recent events in the world petroleum market have further changed this
picture, and now yet another important social goal is being imposed on the
automobile -- energy conservation. To some extent, vehicle efficiency will
increase in response to higher gasoline prices, but there also are active
proposals for federal controls on automotive energy consumption.
3.2 The Influence of Other Federal Programs
A host of policy instruments are being used to achieve these new goals
for the passenger motor vehicle. Some are not directly concerned with
automotive technology (e.g., safety in road design, urban traffic controls
for air pollution abatement) and can be ignored here. The measures applied
directly to the motor vehicle and its technology fall into six categories:
(1) performance standards
(2) "good faith" requirements
(3) financial incentives
(4) labeling
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(5) "jawboning"
(6) Federal expenditure on R & D
To date, performance standards are by far the most important of these
instruments. As noted earlier, the clean air legislation was framed in terms
of the percentage reduction of emissions to be attained by particular deadlines;
the choice of techniques was left to the manufacturers. The same is true of
most safety regulations: vehicles must withstand a crash at a specified
speed, cars must not start without safety belts fastened, etc. Most legislative
proposals for regulating fuel consumption also are stated in terms of
performance standards. In some cases the proposed standards would apply to the
individual vehicle -- e.g., a car must achieve a certain fuel economy to be
acceptable. Other proposals set performance standards for the overall
output of a particular manufacturer so that a goal of reduced energy consumption
may be met by a combination of revisions in vehicle design and shifts in the
mix of vehicle types and sizes.
The requirement of a "good faith" effort to develop technology with
particular performance characteristics is another form of intervention used in
1 An alternative form of government intervention would be the setting of
design standards, which specify the characteristics of the particular
devices to be used to meet some goal. For example, a requirement that passengers
be passively restrained in a crash is a performance standard; the mandating
of seat and shoulder belts is a design standard. Design standards are not
currently an important aspect of Federal intervention in new automotive propulsion
systems. Though design standards are occasionally proposed in response to
a perceived lack of progress in the development of new engine technologies, the
general consensus is that in so complex an area such an approach would be
unwise.
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the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. Under the Act, provision was made for
postponing the emissions deadlines in the event the required technology was
not available. One of the conditions that had to be met before such a
postponement could be granted was a "good faith" effort by the manufacturers
to explore all options for meeting the standards on time. This provision
appears to have provided a significant incentive to research on alternative
engine technologies during the early years under the 1970 Amendments.
As time passes, deadlines are slipped and technology development proceeds,
and the importance of this measure no doubt diminishes. In a new circumstance,
however, it could once again play a significant incentive role.
Other incentive programs also were incorporated in the Clean Air Act.
In particular, the Act included a Low-Emission Vehicle Procurement Program
which offered financial rewards to the manufacturers of alternative technologies
meeting certain provisions of the law. The government would buy unconventional
vehicles for testing and evaluation with R & D funds; if the vehicles were
successfully developed it would pay higher than market prices under the program
for those cars, thus rewarding the developers (see Appendix A). Apparently the
rewards were not commensurate with the magnitude of the task and the risks
involved, for this program has never been the focus of significant activity.
At present, the automotive industry receives pretty much the same treatment as
other manufacturing industries in this regard.
Another type of government activity attempts to influence the vehicle
manufacturer by providing information for consumers to use in their passenger
car purchase decisions. A program of vehicle fuel economy labeling has recently
been introduced by EPA and the Federal Energy Administration (FEA).
By presenting standardized information on fuel economy of each
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vehicle model, the comparison of equivalent models produced by the different
manufacturers is made more explicit , and the relative weight given this
attribute by the purchaser can be increased. The extensive use in adver-
tising of data generated in the labeling program is some indication of
its impact. Harder to evaluate is the technique of "jawboning"--i.e.,
exhortation of industry by public officials to strive for some goal.
Though great political heat may be created in the short-term, it is
only in very special circumstances where this approach seems likely to
have a substantial long-term influence on technical directions in the industry.
The last category of intervention listed above (though not necessarily
the least important) is Federal expenditure on R & D. Federal support
of automotive R&D actually predates much of the regulatory activity of
the early 1970's. Nonetheless, it has become intimately involved in the
regulatory process, and for the foreseeable future the regulatory context
(and in particular the imposition of performance standards) is likely to
have a dominant influence on most Federal programs in this area.
An example of the pervading influence of the regulatory activity is the
effect on technological change of uncertainty about emissions standards. The
1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act were adopted by an overwhelming majority
in Congress, and the emissions constraints written into the law were based
on the best data and analysis available at the time. Unfortunately, the
evidence to justify any particular level of emissions reduction was weak:
health studies were sparse, instrumentation was primitive, and the analysis
of the dynamics of air pollution in urban areas was only partially understood.
By the same token, the deadlines for achievement of the standards were set
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without precise knowledge of which technological solutions were feasible or
how long the process to their implementation would take. Essentially the law
set goals and short deadlines not only for implementation of new technology
but for the process of technology development itself.
As it has turned out, the manufacturers have not been able to meet the
HC and CO standards set for 1975 or the NO standard set for 1976. In 1973
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the manufacturers were granted the one-year extensions in the deadlines
provided under the law; for each pollutant, interim standards were set
which were more stringent than the former standards but considerably more
lenient than the full 1975-76 restrictions. By 1974, it seemed clear that the
original 1975 standard for HC and CO could not be met even by the 1976 date
to which they had been postponed, and Congress passed further amendments to
the Act. The deadline for HC and CO was postponed to 1977 and for NO to
1978, and the EPA Administrator was given the discretion to grant yet
another one-year extension for the HC and CO if needed. Throughout this
period, however, the ultimate standards (3.4 g/mile of CO, 0.41 g/mile of
HC and 0.4 g/mile of NOX) have remained unchanged though all have been
questioned. In the case of the NO standard the EPA itself has called for
a change in the standard because of errors in the measurement technique
used to determine ambient levels of the pollutant. To date, however, no
change has been approved by the Congress.
These dynamic aspects of the Clean Air Act and its implementation
provide the automobile manufacturers with a complicated set of incentives
and disincentives for alternative powerplant R & D. On the one hand, the
uncertainty about standards and deadlines tends to put certain potentially
attractive alternatives into a form of technical limbo (as discussed in
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Section 1). With the adjustments in standards (particularly for NO ) that
may ultimately come, the relative attractiveness of different options may
shift significantly. The manufacturers, however, have little incentive to
gamble on this possibility; they can therefore be expected to concentrate
their R & D expenditures on those alternatives with the best possibility of
meeting the most stringent standards and deadlines now in effect.
On the other hand, the administrative and legislative changing of the
standards in response to the unavailability of the technology provides a
certain amount of security to the manufacturers in case the ICE cannot
meet the goals and these alternatives are not yet available. These changes
point up to a difficulty in the Clean Air Act, i..e. that the threat of
shutting the industry's production lines if the standards are not met is
simply not credible. We need not provide here any details of the impact
such a move would have on the national economy; it is a politically unacceptable
enforcement mechanism. While it is clear that any overt stifling of pollution
control technology by the manufacturers could bring a strong political
reaction, it is also clear that the standards and deadlines will always have
to be responsive to the technology that is available in sufficient quantity
to meet demand. Therefore the Act has not succeeded in internalizing the
costs of pollution to the extent intended, and the overall incentives to the
manufacturer for development of low-pollution powerplants are actually much
less than one might infer from the fixed schedule of standards in the Act.
Thus, these circumstances of changing public goals and evolving government
regulation set the context in which Federally financed R & D would have to
be conducted. Federal expenditure in this area might be an important policy
instrument, but evaluation of programs must take many factors into account.
42
There are diverse reasons for undertaking these Federal expenditures, and the
proper allocation of spending would depend on what Federal authorities hope
to achieve. Moreover, "research and development" is not a single, easily-
identified type of effort. It encompasses a wide range of activities, some
of which may be appropriate for federal support and some not, depending on
program objectives and the level of financial commitment.
3.3 Objectives of a Federal R & D Program
Even given specific emissions or fuel economy goals for the automobile,
there are several program objectives that might be set for the R & D
component of the mix of Federal policies designed to achieve these results.
There are four categories of objectives that lie behind most federal R & D
programs. In many circumstances, one or another of these objectives dominates
program design and administration, although many programs seek multiple
objectives and there are inevitable spillover effects, with contributions
to objectives that are not explicity stated.
(i) Advance the State-of-the-Art. One possible objective of an R & D
program is to advance the state of scientific knowledge and the practical
arts of engineering application, and thus to increase the number of technical
options available for future consideration. This is the traditional goal
of R & D, and is the objective most commonly associated with Federal
expenditures in this area. It is, in fact, the objective of much of the
R & D supported by Federal funds (e.g., through the National Science Foundation
or the National Institute of Health), and it often is the stated goal even
when other considerations are important in program justification. Even where
advancement of the state-of-the-art and knowledge is not a primary stated goal,
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most expenditures on R & D yield some by-products or "spin-offs" of increased
understanding and widened technical opportunities.
There may be justification for programs with this objective even in
relation to an industry and a technology as mature as those involved with
the automobile engine. There are circumstances where the self-interests of
manufacturing corporations do not correspond to the long-run public interest.
Potentially interesting technological developments may remain unstudied
because the time horizons are too long or the risks too great for them to be
of interest to a private company, or because the corporation cannot hope to
realize a return on the R & D investment even though generalized public benefits
may be expected. As discussed in Section 3.2, the costs of air pollution
have not been internalized as completely as the fixed standards and deadlines
in the Clean Air Act imply, resulting in a divergence of industrial and
social interests on this account. The overall financial positions
of the manufacturers also arean important determinant of the level of R & D
on alternative systems. It is reasonable to expect that corporations will
be less willing to take on R & D efforts when business is bad (and the
opportunity cost of the resources may be high) than when business is good and
internal funds are more plentiful.
As suggested above, it is possible for Federal regulations to have the
effect of retarding industry R & D in particular lines of inquiry, leaving
1The logic of the arguments that are found to justify Federal intervention
through R & D is the subject of some controversy. One useful discussion of
the issues from a microeconomics viewpoint is provided by the report
"Energy R & D Proposals," prepared for the Ford Energy Policy Project. [7]
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gaps that Federal programs may need to fill. For example, the short-term
emissions deadlines imposed in the 1970 Clean Air Amendments had the effect
within industry R & D programs of placing an extremely high priority on
technical developments that would pay off within the original 1975-76
deadlines. Attention to other, longer range, options necessarily diminished
in relation to what it might have been with some other set of emissions
constraints. In such a circumstance, there may well be strong justification
for Federal expenditures to fill gaps in ongoing programs and to explore
particular technologies with the intention of making them more available
to the private sector, thereby augmenting the pool of technical options.
(ii) Support Governmental Procurement Programs. Very often government
R & D is undertaken not primarily to increase society's pool of knowledge
but as a step in the procurement process. The bulk of military and space
R & D is usefully viewed in this way. The Department of Defense often has
a demand for a particular piece of equipment or a system to perform a
certain function, yet the technology does not exist, or does not exist in
usable form. A necessary first step in procurement is to finance the work
required to solve engineering and technical problems, or even to establish
the scientific basis for the function to be performed. In the automotive
field, an example of this type of program is provided by the work on
stratified change engines support by the U.S. Army Tank Automotive Command
(see Appendix A).
Naturally, the spin-offs from this procurement-oriented research can
be significant. Often these by-products are offered in justification for
government expenditures, even when this spin-off potential does not determine
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the scale, composition, or longevity of the programs in question.
(iii) Develop Data for Regulatory Decision, Policy Formation, and
Public Information. A separate and distinct justification for Federal R
& D is the provision of background information for government regulatory
efforts. In taking actions that directly influence private industries,
key scientific and technical facts may be of critical importance; without
them costly mistakes are possible. Sometimes the needed knowledge does not
exist at all and the government must develop it. In the case of automotive
air pollution, for example, Federal agencies had to conduct research on
the health effects of pollutants, and on the appropriate driving cycles
and instrumentation for emissions testing. These data were needed as a
basis for setting regulatory constraints. By the same token, regulatory
agencies may need to develop knowledge about the feasibility of achievement
of various forms of regulation, or about the ramifications of expected
industry responses to particular constraints.1
In other situations, the technical knowledge may exist but may not be
available to government authorities due to the proprietary interests of the
industries involved. In such a case, an important objective of Federally-
* sponsored research can be to develop this knowledge and make it available
in the public domain. In the process, cadres of people experienced in the
technology are developed, thus providing a body of expertise that can provide
answers to public officials.
1One situation where such research was sadly lacking was the case of
the sulfate-catalyst problem. Having adopted regulations that
very nearly forced manufacturers to adopt catalyst-controlled vehicles,
the Federal government might well have initiated a research program
to investigate the full range of possible consequences of such a choice.
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More commonly, research results are available from industry sources,
but their credibility is challenged because the companies that generated
them are interested parties to regulatory action or some public
controversy. Without an independent R & D effort, responsible government
officials may have no sources of data other than the regulated industry
itself, and two types of mistakes are possible in such a circumstance.
Either the industry results may be correct but be rejected because there is
no way to establish their credibility; as a result, the benefit of the
knowledge is lost. Or the industry results may be wrong or biased and
be accepted as a basis for government decision. The existence of a federal
program can serve as a focal point for meetings and exchange of data by
government scientists, large manufacturers, small manufacturers, components
suppliers, and inventors. In the process of the government's own work,
and these communications, a basis can be established for accepting or
rejecting the work of the various industries involved.
Aside from the needs of policy analysis and regulatory decision, the
government may have reason to set up research programs to provide information
to the public at large. Often consumer protection is the overall objective,
although in many situations it is not easy to distinguish between a goal
of developing new knowledge and advancing the state-of-the-art (category i),
and this objective of verifying and making public the information and
experience that may already exist in private corporations.
(iv) Provide "Leverage" on Private Sector Activity. The first three
objectives stated above relate to straightforward concerns of government
in its role as purchaser, regulator, and provider of public goods such as
scientific and technical knowledge. This fourth objective, however, is
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political in nature. It is a subtle and often unstated purpose of Federal
R & D efforts. One instance where this objective becomes relevant is in
regulatory situations, where only the regulated industry itself has the
data to determine if particular constraints are reasonable, or if certain
advanced technological solutions are feasible. Whether based on expert
internal judgment or a general resistance to change, corporations may
decide not to expend funds to explore certain technical options, and, as
earlier discussion suggests, there is little that government authorities
can do directly to insure that new or radically different technical options
are seriously considered and fully evaluated.
Federal programs can have an indirect influence, however, in that
1
government R & D may trigger a "defensive" R & D effort from industry. No
company wants to get caught without the technical knowledge to defend
itself against regulatory proposals based on Federal research results or news
releases portraying some dramatic success. This is true particularly where
the industry has argued certain targets could not be achieved. And so a
possible goal of Federal R & D is as an adjunct to the regulatory process --
to goad or threaten industry to undertake parallel R & D efforts of its own,
or to upgrade the priority attached to particular programs.
In other circumstances the objective may be even more overtly political.
For example, instead of trying to encourage R & D expenditures by industry,
a government program may be intended to simply produce results that will
embarrass the industry in the public eye and thereby force it to adopt
changes faster than it otherwise would, or weaken its ability to fight
1As noted earlier, the "good faith" clause probably had a similar indirect
influence on industry efforts.
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against government regulation in general.
As one might suspect, if the political objective is the dominant one
in the design and administration of R & D programs, then there are inherent
dangers as well as advantages associated with Federal involvement. The
temptation can be very great to misuse preliminary research results in an
attempt to arouse media attention and public support for an agency's
position. What is more, the very design of R & D programs in a particular
technical area may be affected if the political objective of "levering"
the industry is paramount -- with programs biased in favor of activities
that are likely to be understood and reacted to by key segments of the public.
As discussed in Section 4 and Appendix A, at one time or another
each of these four sets of goals has been used as a guide to Federal R & D
in the areas of automotive propulsion technology.
3.4 Types of Research and Development
One source of confusion in discussing R & D is the wide range of
activities covered by this single label. It is useful, therefore, to
distinguish several sub-categories of activity that are important to the
automotive industry. Four types of programs may be identified, as shown
in Table 3.1.
Basic Research. The first category includes bench-scale laboratory
work on scientific concepts and the associated theoretical research and
mathematical modeling activities. In the automotive area, for example,
this might include studies of the dynamics of flame propagation or the
fundamental chemistry of catalysis. As shown in column 3 of the table,
it is the type of work that takes place only at the most advanced scientific
and engineering research laboratories.
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Table 3.1
CATEGORIES OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Type
m i , 
Basic Research
Technology
Development
Assessments
and Impact
Studies
Performance
and Emissions
Testing
Nature of Activity
Studies of fundamental
concepts; advancement of
scientific knowledge.
See Table 3.2.
Studies of impact of pol-
icies or technical devel-
opments on the environment,
the economy, or on
particular industries or
labor groups. No direct
involvement with hard-
ware, equipment, vehicles,
etc.
Take existing vehicles,
production models, or
experimental prototypes,
and test their perform-
ance and emission charac-
teristics.
Where Performed
i i i ii i i lml ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .
Universities, private and
non-profit research laboratories,
government laboratories, and
in a few auto industry research
laboratories.
See Table 3.2.
Universities, think tanks,
consulting firms, government
agency staff, and some special
groups within auto industry.
Government laboratories,
private testing laboratories
under contract to government,
auto manufacturers, oil
companies.
.
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Technology Development. Table 3.2 identifies five sub-categories of
R & D that are relevant to technology development in a large-scale manufac-
turing industry. They are ordered in such a way as to indicate the
sequential process by which knowledge and techniques evolve from preliminary
concepts to large-scale commercial production. Naturally, no technical
development (such as a new engine design) actually moves in a purely
sequential fashion, completing one level before proceeding to the next.
But the table does show that these are distinct types of activity, and
that latter stages cannot be carried out effectively (or will not be
justified on economic grounds) without success in the earlier stages.
At one end of the scale is Applied Research, which takes place in a
wide range of organizations. At the other end is Product Improvement,
which encompasses the detailed day-to-day work of monitoring the performance
of a mass-produced item, conducting R & D on minor corrections and improvements,
and preparing them for introduction into the manufacturing process. This
kind of work is carried out only by the production divisions of the
manufacturing organizations themselves.
As a technical development proceeds down this chain, the amounts of
money needed to conduct R & D increase dramatically. For example,
Exploratory Development of a new engine concept might be done with a small
laboratory and staff -- with a cost range per year between several hundred
thousand and a million or so dollars, depending on how radical the concept.
To carry out Advanced Development work, costs immediately jump into the
several million dollars per year; for Engineering Development the costs
jump again an order of magnitude. It has been estimated that to complete
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Table 3.2
LEVELS OF ACTIVITY IN TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
Type
Applied
Research
Exploratory
Development
Advanced
Development
Engineering
Development
Product
Improvement
Nature of Activity
Exploration of scientific
feasibility and problem
solving directly or indirec-
tly related to automotive
technology -- including, for
example, basic engine design
and performance, emissions
control, fuel economy
improvements, alternative
engine systems and alternative
fuels.
Proving technical feasibility
of scientific concepts by
building and testing a few
engines, either on a dynamo-
meter or in a vehicle.
Proving engineering feasibility
by building several engines and
testing in several vehicles; an,
then making engineering changes
in engine design, subsystems,
or components to improve
operating and emissions
characteristics.
Proving manufacturability and
economic feasibility, "soft
tooling" and extensive testing
of prototype vehicles with
special attention to improv-
ing performance characteris-
tics within cost constraints,
making modifications that
reduce production costs, and
evaluating problems of
marketability.
Refinements made in the prod-
uct which may add to marketing
appeal (e.g. improved fuel
economy) and/or and in reduc-
ing production cost.
Where Performed
Government laboratories,
chemical and oil company
laboratories, universities,
R & D firms, vendors, and
in auto industry research
laboratories.
Primarily in R & D divisions
of auto manufacturers, also
by oil companies, vendors,
R & D firms, and to a limited
extent by universities and
government laboratories.
Primarily within the auto
industry, as a necessary
step in transfer of technology
from R & D divisions to
engineering divisions.
Within the engineering
divisions of the auto
manufacturers, with staff
assistance from R & D and
production divisions,
Within the production
divisions of the auto
manufacturers, with staff
assistance from the engin-
eering divisions.
-
.. I I l -
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the Advanced Development stage for a new engine concept would cost about
$10 million; to complete the next stage -- Engineering Development -- would
cost an additional $50 million. As a new engine concept moves through
these different phases, the activity tends to move to different parts of
the manufacturing organization -- from research laboratories to engineering
staff to production divisions. The closer the R & D comes to dealing with
problems of manufacturing and marketability, the more heavily is the work
concentrated within the automotive industry, because, of course, that is where
the required expertise and experience is to be found.
Although a simple chart like Table 3.2 is a crude simplification, the
table does suggest several questions which should be asked of a program in
alternative engine technology: First, where in the chain of research and
development activity should the government program attempt to have its impact?
And what level of resources does it take to make a contribution at that level?
The sums of money required for advanced development or Engineering development
are large, as noted earlier, and what is achievable is therefore ultimately
dependent on the overall size of the Federal R & D program. Another
consideration in evaluating the amounts of resources required is the
existing level of industry expenditure in the area of concern. If the goal
is to move beyond industry efforts in a particular area, or to stimulate
them, then clearly the resource commitments must be commensurate with
existing (or former) industry programs. (On the other hand, even a small
program might add greatly to publicly available knowledge, or help establish
the credibility of industry results.)
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Finally, there was the question of who can carry out the work.
For applied research and exploratory engine development, there are a
variety of competent research institutions; with additional funds the
capacity in these areas could be increased. But when the work comes closer
to the manufacturing process, then tradeoffs with other aspects of overall
system design, the integration of the engine into a vehicle, extensive
field testing, suitability of the design for mass production and marketing
questions become important, and the expertise is more and more the province
of the automobile industry. This means that the latter stages of R & D
can only be done in a cost-effective way by the major automobile manufacturers
themselves, or by other industries with similar close contact with this or
a similar marketplace. This fact presents an inescapable dilemma to Federal
authorities in a circumstance where the R & D activity is closely associated
with regulatory activity, as it is in the automotive case.
Assessments and Impact Studies. As part of the process of technology
development, there always are some accompanying studies of the impact of
a particular technical change on the automobile design as a whole or
on the manufacturing corporation and its organization and financial structure.
Beyond these partial analyses of technical changes, however, there is a
broader range of activity that constitutes a distinct category of R & D. This
includes studies of the economic implications, environmental effects,
energy consumption, and other social costs and impacts that might attend a
particular change in the automotive sector and its technology. This category
of R & D involves the tools of applied economics, econometrics, and systems
analysis as well as engineering; it may include inputs from other branches
of the social and behavioral sciences. Studies of this type often make use
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of cross-sectional and time series analyses of empirical information and
case studies of particular events or decisions; depending on the circumstance
the focus can range from studies of resource availability and the future
supply of fuels to the labor market impact of a particular design change.
Environmental impact studies are an important activity of this kind. As
noted in Table 3.1, much of this R & D is conducted by research institutions,
think tanks, consulting firms, and universities. However, in recent years
the major automobile companies have built up their own in-house analytical
capabilities in this area.
Performance and Emissions Testing. In considering government participation
in research and development, there is still another category of activity
that needs to be identified. This involves the taking of devices or systems
resulting from private sector efforts and simply evaluating them from the
standpoint of their public desirability. For example, the Environmental
Protection Agency tests the emissions characteristics of large numbers of
vehicles as part of the certification process under the Clean Air Act.
As a spin-off of this activity, the EPA Laboratories will test and evaluate
proposed designs on technical ideas that are brought forth by small firms
or individual inventors. (Naturally, the large manufacturers have their own
facilities for doing this kind of evaluation.) Furthermore, recently EPA
has begun to evaluate and publish the fuel economy characteristics of the
vehicles it sees in connection with the certification process.
This form of R & D has its counterpart within the automotive industry.
Certain of the major manufacturers have a long-standing tradition of receiving
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technical ideas from smaller outside component suppliers and inventors, and
testing and evaluating them for possible adoption. The benefits from success
in this process are very large since the automotive market is so big, and
there has been a continuing incentive for outsiders to submit their develop-
ments for evaluation. Many of the technical advances in the industry have been
introduced in this manner rather than being generated within the major
manufacturing organizations themselves.
On occasion governmental agencies have adapted this process for their
own use in a regulatory situation. In 1963 the State of California passed
a law requiring that exhaust control devices be installed on vehicles sold
in the state as soon as two devices were approved by the State Motor
Vehicle Control Board. The state then set up testing standards and certification
procedures and performed evaluations of devices submitted by firms trying
to get access to this large market.
In order to carry out performance and emissions evaluations of this
kind, research must be carried out to identify the key parameters to be
measured and tested (e.g. fuel economy, acceleration, noise, handling,
HC, NOx, and CO emissions, etc.). Efficient and accurate test procedures
and instrumentation must then be developed. A determination must also be
made of the levels of performance and emissions which are to be deemed
desirable or permissible (of course, with passage of the Clean Air Act the
Government has already determined the admissible levels for emissions).
Testing and evaluation procedures are rarely settled once and for all
because consumer preferences, government regulations, and vehicle technology
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are constantly changing; thus research and development on the procedures
themselves are continuing activities. Both the automobile industry, and the
Federal and some state governments support this kind of R & D, obviously
with different levels of effort and relative program emphases.
3.5 Appropriate Directions for Federal R & D Efforts
Based on this description of the context in which Federal programs
must operate, it is possible to draw some preliminary conclusions about the
role that R & D activities might play in the alternative automotive power-
plant area. Table 3.3 summarizes the taxonomy of objectives and R & D
activities developed in this section. Across the top of the table are listed
the four principal objectives of programs in this area; down the left side
are listed the different types of R & D that are relevant to the automobile
industry. The table indicates which of the different objectives are
compatible with the various types of R & D activities. It is not our purpose
to comment on the precise nature or magnitude of appropriate Federal R & D
in each category. Obviously, specific proposed programs would have to be
further justified on their detailed objectives and merits, and in competition
with other uses of Federal funds.
The table is subdivided according to the tentative conclusions we have
reached, where the number in each box refers to a particular conclusion as
discussed below. First, there are several conclusions which follow from the
discussion above, and which are not particularly controversial.
(1) Expanding the frontiers of knowledge is a sound objective
of government programs and basic research has always been a
justifiable activity in this regard. However, basic research
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Table 3.3
APPROPRIATE DIRECTIONS FOR FEDERAL R & D EFFORTS
Types of Research
,m, i .~
Basic Research
Technology Development
Applied Research
Exploratory Development
Advanced Development
Engineering Development
Product Improvement
Assessments and Impact
Studies
Performance and
Emission Testing
OBJECTIVES
Advance
State-of-Art
Appropliate
(10)
May be ap-
priate when
problems or
options are
not being
explored.
(6)
High cost,
questionable
(6)
Not
appropriate
(5)
Not usually
relevant
(4)
Supports
technology
development
Support
Procurement
(2)
All these
types of
research
are
appropriate
to support
procurement
Data for Policy
Regulation and
Public Info.
Not usually
relevant
(3)(9)
Appropriate
when information
not available
or credibility
questioned
(7)
Unlikely to be
appropriate
(7)
Not
approprate
(3)
Appropriate
(3)
Appropriate
"Leverage" on
Private
Efforts
- ~ ~ ~ ~
Not relevant
(8)
Limited impact
on industry
R & D pro-
grams
_~-
ii J
.
_ l: -- I
I
I
I
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is not the real issue in this case, for most research at the
"basic" level is sufficiently unfocused and removed from
'available technology" as to be of only partial relevance
to specific applications such as the automotive propulsion
systems arrayed in Table 2.1.
(2) No one doubts that the Federal Government should be conducting
programs with the objective of meeting procurement needs. All the
various types of R & D activity may be involved in this process.
However, this has little relevance to Federal R & D in alternative
automotive powerplants since procurement needs are minimal. The issue
is new engine technology for private passenger cars.
(3) Given the regulatory responsibility of the Federal Government,
and the continuing requirement for data to support policy decisions,
there is need for Federal investment in R & D on topics specifically
related to these functions. In meeting these responsibilities, all
categories of R & D may be called for, although Basic Research is
likely to be relevant only under very special conditions, and there
are stages of Technology Development which are unlikely to be
justified as a public expenditure (see paragraph (6) and (7) below).
Activities in the areas of Assessments and Impact Studies and Emissions
and Performance Testing are of clear relevance to this objective.
Moreover, in this important area of government regulation it
can be argued that this R & D needs to be put on a regular,
continuing basis and conducted in such a way as to provide
better information support than it has to date. When new
technologies are being introduced, often under pressure of government
regulation, then some agency needs to take responsibility for
being sure that the important implications of the shift are known.
(4) Apart from the regulatory responsibility of the Federal Government,
and the needs for information for policy development, there is
justification for programs of Performance and Emissions Testing on
grounds that they support the technology development objective.
(5) Federal involvement in Assessments and Impact Studies is not
usually relevant to advancing the state-of-the-art of any new engine
technology.
The major policy questions in the automotive powerplant R & D area
center on Federal involvement in the process of Technology Development. The
R & D associated with this process encompasses a set of activities which might
be taken up in an attempt to meet any or all of the objectives outlined above.
(For purposes of this discussion we ignore the procurement function and focus
on the other three basic reasons for conducting work of this kind.) Several
points emerge from our exploration of the issue.
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(6) At the level of Engineering Development, the cost of a serious
effort rises substantially. Moreover, the nature of the work is such
that it can probably only be carried out effectively by the
automobile manufacturers and closely related industries. A major
part of this development stage would be the integration of the
new engine into a vehicle, and extensive testing of the engine-
vehicle combination in simulated consumer use. Thus it can only be
carried out by the firms which manufacture and market the product.
While some stages of Engineering Development might be appropriate
for Federal R & D under special circumstances the next stage,
Product Improvement, is most unlikely to be appropriate. This stage
is dominated by system integration and extensive testing considerations
and thus can only be carried out by the manufacturer and marketer.
(7) For similar reasons, the normal goals of the Engineering Develop-
ment and Product Improvement phases and the objectives of data
generation for regulation and policy formation are not consistent.
Thus, Federal R & D in these phases would be unlikely to provide data
that is relevant to these objectives.
The question thus centers on appropriate Federal activity in the areas of
Applied Research, Exploratory Development, and Advanced Development. How
should Federal programs be set up to advance the state of knowledge, prepare
data for regulatory and policy decision, or apply leverage to the industry
in these areas?
(8) Any substantial research activity in a new technical area will
spur interest and (perhaps) a parallel effort on the part of industries
that have a stake in the area in question. This is a natural aspect
of the competitive process and a normal component of industry-industry
relations. However, government R & D programs which explicitly or
implicitly seek to apply leverage to private sector efforts, while
they may generate political pressures, are not likely to have a great
influence on the level and direction of industry programs on alternative
automotive power systems. As data presented in Section 4 will suggest,
the size of past and existing industry programs is. too large in
relation to Federal efforts, and their coverage too broad, for these
firms to be greatly influenced in their own resource allocations by
the structure of government programs. When such influence is exerted,
it is likely to be because of the inherent value of the research
results rather than the threat of a breakthrough which would compromise
the industry's position.
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(9) The Federal Government often has need to conduct its own R & D in
order to prepare data to support regulatory action or other aspects of
policy formation. Where industry results may be proprietary or subject
to problems of credibility, this need may lead to expenditures on
technology development. This need may be particularly strong in situations
where the Government is considering changes in the external circumstances
in which the industry operates and where public officials need to know
the industry's capacity for adaption. For example, work on alternative
fuels or on technologies that may be of interest only under certain
changes in regulatory restrictions may be called for in this regard.
(10) The greatest controversy in this area of government expenditures
on automotive engine R & D surrounds the appropriateness of government
attempts to advance the state-of-the-art or open new options in
circumstances where no regulatory or procurement functions are directly
involved. The crucial question here is the extent of the divergence
between industrial and social interests. The fact that the standards
and deadlines under the Clean Air Act have had to be adjusted to the
levels achieved by the ICE, and will almost certainly continue to be
adjusted in the future, implies that the incentives to industry to
develop a low-pollution alternative powerplant are not as large as
the potential benefits to society. There may, therefore, be a serious
divergence of interests. On the energy side, the national benefits
are not nearly as clear, but there is no reason to assume that the
forces of the marketplace are commensurate with them. Therefore,
as the preceding analysis has shown, there may be solid grounds for
Federal R & D even in the context of an industry that is committing
significant resources to work of this type.
This last conclusion is discussed in greater detail in Section 4, after a
review of government and industry programs in the automotive powerplant
area.
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4. PRESENT ALTERNATIVE POWERPLANT PROGRAMS AND POLICIES IN INDUSTRY AND
GOVERNMENT
In the previous sections of this report we have laid out the critical
issues concerning Federal. support of R & D on alternative automotive
powerplants, reviewed the relevant technology, and discussed the potential
place for R & ) among other government policies regarding the automobile.
In this section we will concentrate on what government and industry have
done and are doing in this area, to see whether the hypotheses we have
developed can be confirmed by the available data. A very brief history of
the development of government and industry programs will be followed by a
discussion of Federal Agency policies and programs and then industry attitudes
toward Federal programs. An overview and comparison of present programs will
then be given, followed by a brief look at what we can learn from past and
present industry treatment of alternative powerplants and an exploration
of a possible Federal role.
4.1 Evolution of Present Programs1
The history of the passenger car powerplant can be roughly divided into
four periods: (i) from the beginning of the industry in the 19th century
through the end of World War I, (ii) between the World Wars, (iii) after
World War II through the mid-1960's, and (iv) the present period,
beginning in the mid-1960's.
1This section draws heavily on [3] and Appendix A.
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The first phase was one of intense technological competition between
engineers and entrepreneurs who committed themselves to either the steam
engine, the battery-powered electric motor, or the ICE. In the year 1900,
more than three-fourths of the vehicles produced in the United States
were powered by electric or steam systems. All three systems were being
actively developed technologically, but sociological, economic and political
factors and the differences between the personalities involved were also
important in determining their future positions. By about 1920, it was
clear that the ICE had triumphed. Although it is impossible to provide a
set of definitive technological or other reasons why the ICE won, the most
important seem to be: Henry Ford's choice of the ICE for application of
his mass production techniques, the decision by General Motors to compete
with Ford in the production and marketing arenas rather than on engine
technology, the development by Standard Oil of crude oil cracking processes
for making the highly refined gasoline required by the ICE, and the general
lack of interest among the more successful steam advocates in reaching the
mass market with a low-priced vehicle.
The period from about 1920 to 1941 was one of the gradual evolution
of the ICE, with very little interest in alternative powerplants for
passenger car usage. The crucial advance of the period was GM's develop-
ment of tetraethyl lead as an antiknock additive, making easier the
continuous upgrading of the octane rating of gasoline, and thus a continuous
increase in engine compression ratio, which improved the important intensive
figures-of-merit of the engine (specific fuel consumption, power-to-weight
ratio, etc.). The engines also grew in horsepower, number of cylinders
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displacement, etc.
During World War II, American passenger car production was halted.
As major war-time producers of aircraft and other military equipment, however,
the automobile manufacturers gained experience with areas of defense
technology which they continued to use in defense contracts after the war.
Between World War II and the mid-1960's, some attempts were made to apply
some of this and other new technology to automotive powerplants. Most
notably, Ford, GM and Chrysler all built prototype automotive gas turbine
engines, as did a number of other firms in the United States and Europe.
Chrysler went the furthest and received considerable attention for its 50-
car test program during the period 1963-1966, but none of the Big Three
entered even limited mass production with this engine. Spurred by rapid
technological advances in electrical equipment, Ford, GM and numerous smaller
companies also built prototype electric vehicles, and Ford, GM and
others outside the automobile industry started research on advanced batteries.
GM worked on a Stirling cycle automotive powerplant with N.V. Philips of
Holland, starting in 1958. With the possible exception of Chrysler's
turbine effort, however, these programs appear to have been undertaken
on a relatively leisurely basis. The Big Three continued the evolutionary
development of the ICE much as before the war, starting with the introduction
of the overhead-valve V-8 in 1949.
In contrast to the previous periods, since the mid-1960's the development
of the automobile powerplant has been characterized by extensive political
interest and government intervention, first because of the air pollution
problem and more recently due to the energy issue. Regulations controlling
air pollutant emissions became the dominant consideration in the evolution
of the ICE, but the emissions issue also stimulated a considerable increase
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in alternative powerplant programs in industry and caused the initiation of
a program in the Federal Government.
The goal of greatly reduced emissions relative to the mid-1960's
ICE represented a whole new factor which had to be considered in choosing
the optimum powerplant. [8] The possibility of achieving the reductions
by using an alternative powerplant generated a great deal of interest
within the technical community generally, among entrepreneurs and firms
outside the automobile industry looking to market new technologies, and
in Congress. Lesser levels of enthusiasm were generated in the Executive
Branch of the Federal Government and the Big Three. In 1967 and 1968 hearings
held by the U.S. Senate gave all these parties a chance to air their views
and a considerable amount of favorable opinion, especially regarding electric
and steam systems, was expressed. A 1967 study for the Federal Government
by a prestigious expert panel, the "Morse Report," commented favorably on
the gas turbine and Rankine cycle engines. At the same time automotive air
pollution was becoming a political issue on a national scale. By 1969
Senator Edmund Muskie, considered a leading Democratic Presidential contender,
had become popularly identified with the issue, and the Big Three, accused
by the Justice Department of conspiring to suppress air pollution control
technology, came to be popularly regarded as defenders of the ICE. The
State of California, having led the Federal Government in the establishment
of emissions standards, assumed the lead again by beginning a program to
develop and demonstrate steam-powered motor vehicles.
Industry's response to these pressures was, in part, to substantially
expand its alternative powerplant R & D programs, accompanied by a public
relations effort quite unusual for technological developments so far from
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production. The Administration's response, announced in a major Presidential
Message on the Environment [9], included the establishment of the Advanced
Automotive Power Systems (AAPS) Program. Thus the present programs in both
industry and government grew out of a protracted affair in which technology
and politics interacted in the national arena.
These programs have continued to be buffeted by technological and
political developments. The most important was the sudden rise of energy
conservation as a major national goal, adding new strength to the political
spotlight on the automobile and once again changing the relative importance
of the technological attributes of its powerplant. Other agencies besides
EPA (in particular NSF and DOT) developed automotive technology programs,
and EPA received a special funding supplement to extend its efforts outside
of the alternative powerplants area. Agency roles in the area were not well
defined and the proposal for a new agency, ERDA, to absorb the AAPS Program
and possibly the others, introduced another element of confusion into the
picture. That a sufficiently convincing justification for the existence of
the AAPS Program remains to be developed was recently demonstrated when the
House Appropriations Committee cut its Fiscal Year 1975 budget
by more than half; the Committee believed that the Federal Government should
not be developing automotive powerplants. The energy issue, like the air
pollution issue before it, has caused the industry to initiate a massive
engineering effort to improve the ICE in the short-term, and has changed
the relative evaluation of the ICE and the alternative powerplants.
Appendix A is a detailed review of the history of the Federal programs
in the alternative automotive powerplants area. It addresses industry
programs insofar as they were an important part of the environment for the
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development of the government programs. The reader is referred to Appendix
A, therefore, for further discussion of the period from the mid-1960's to
the present.
4.2 Federal Agency Policies and Programs
In this section the present and some of the proposed programs of
the Federal Agencies in the automotive energy area will be riefly described,
along with the policies which underly them. Programs concerning the ICE
will be discussed here to lend some perspective to the discussion of the
alternative powerplant programs. An overview and some analysis of the
Federal programs, and comparison with industry programs in terms of funding
levels and program structure, are provided in section 4.4. A detailed
historical and technological summary of the alternative powerplant programs
is contained in Appendix B.
(a) Environmental Protection Agency
The Federal Government's principal R & D effort in the civilian
automotive powerplant area is EPA's AAPS Program. Appendix A describes
the evolution of the policies and program structure of the AAPS Program
through the present. It remains centered on the demonstration at the
advanced development level of two alternative powerplants, the gas turbine
and Rankine cycle systems, in automobiles in 1976. The other recent
AAPS Division effort on alternative powerplants has been a study of the use
of electric vehicles in several major cities (partially completed). Recently
funded or proposed have been studies of an automotive Stirling system,
a light-weight diesel, and the development of a ceramic piston and liner.
Since December, 1972, the AAPS Division has been funding work on alternative
fuels for automotive use, including availability and applicability studies,
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experiments with methanol and hydrogen injection, and development of on-board
hydrogen storage techniques. Starting in 1974 the AAPS Division has been
funding potential technological advances for conventional powerplants. So
far these have been confined to the design and development of a continuously
variable transmission and Rankine cycle systems to use diesel engine waste
heat. The AAPS Division has also funded a large number of studies in support
of its alternative powerplant efforts, and is presently supporting a
comprehensive review of the technological status of all the alternatives by
the Aerospace orporation.
At the present time the publicly stated purpose of the AAPS program is
to provide a "credible source of public information" on automotive
technologies with reduced environmental impact (an objective discussed in
Section 3 of this report). Where this requires a development effort to
apply available technology and demonstrate it in a vehicle, this will be
undertaken. 110] This self-generated mandate is interpreted quite broadly
by the AAPS management, but considerably less broadly by EPA's Washington
headquarters, IOMB and the Congress, who have held funding levels in close
check and turned back a number of proposed AAPS efforts.
The AAPS program has in fact served as a "credible" source of publicly
available information on alternative powerplant technology. There is little
doubt that the technical community now has a great deal of data available
to it from he AAPS Program which is useful in analyses of government policy,
research program decisions, etc. The data has made a limited reduction in
the uncertainties concerning the technological potential for some powerplant
technologies. For example, the studies of hybrid vehicles showed them not
to be as promising as originally thought, and development of a gas turbine
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combustor with NOx emissions of .4 g/mile proved that it could be done.
Furthermore, the semi-annual contractors' coordination meetings held under
the program's auspices have served as a central public forum for information
exchange in this area, and the mere existence of the AAPS staff as a source
of expertise within the government has been useful.
However, the two vehicle demonstrations, now scheduled for 1976, will
have to be carefully interpreted in order to avoid premature judgments on
the technological potential of the gas turbine and Rankine cycle systems
for passenger car application. The emphasis in these programs has been to
get an operable vehicle on the road on a tight schedule and within a
relatively small budget, pressing the technology only with these strict
limits. With both systems, but especially the gas turbine, there are
foreseeable potential technological developments which may remedy some of
the deficiencies which will be seen in the demonstration vehicles.
EPA's Emissions Control Technology Division is now engaged in
evaluations of a number of potential fuel economy improvements to
current systems, including various improvements to the diesel, system
improvements (e.g. variable displacement) to the ICE, and advanced
fuel-metering concepts for light-duty vehicle use.
(b) Department of Defense
The DOD, through the Army's Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM) conducts
an extensive program for the development of ground vehicles which satisfy
unique military requirements. In Fiscal Year 1973 the Mobility Systems
Laboratory, which performs R & D within TACOM, had a budget of over $36
million, and a professional staff of 422 engineers and scientists. The
TACOM R & D program is justified on a military requirements basis, and thus
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competes for funding with other DOD R & D programs. It is in direct
support of government procurement programs, as discussed in Section 3.
The principal effort with potential civilian application is the stratified
charge engine program. It will continue and complete the engineering
development of an engine for a jeep-type military vehicle. The program is
aimed at fulfilling a military requirement for vehicles which make the best
possible use of the fuels available, in terms of quantity and quality, in
a wartime environment. Because the vehicles are designed for highway use,
the emission standards promulgated under the Clean Air Act are legally
applicable. This program was partially supported by the EPA AAPS Division
during Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972.
The other DOD program with relatively direct automotive civilian
application is funded by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA).
This is an effort to develop and demonstrate ceramic components gas turbine
engines. The principal contractors are Ford, which is developing ceramic
components for an automotive gas turbine, and Westinghouse, which is working
on electric power generation applications. Ford and Westinghouse are working
closely together in what is intended to be a 5-year multi-million dollar
effort; it began in June, 1971. ARPA has chosen to support this high-risk/
high-gain effort to establish the usefulness of ceramics in gas turbines,
which are used in military applications, including engines for aircraft and
ships, auxiliary power units, etc. They expect that this addition to the
technological base will contribute to the development of other high temperature
applications of ceramics as well.
(c) National Science Foundation
The NSF has begun a program to provide the underlying research base
for improvements in operating efficiency and reduction of the air pollution
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emissions of automotive powerplants. Research subjects will ultimately
include heat engine combustion processes, alternate fuel properties and
materials problems. In August, 1974, the first seven grants under this
project were announced. The efforts funded include studies of lean
automotive combustion, prechamber stratified charge engines, emulsified
water-hydrocarbon mixtures, and mixtures of alcohol and hydrocarbons.
The NSF s now sponsoring a major ($0.7 million in Fiscal Year 1973,
$0.9 million in Fiscal Year 1974, and continuing) advanced battery
development by supporting Ford's sodium-sulfur battery program. Other
NSF projects related to the automotive energy issue are a study of the
national gasoline demand, an evaluation of methods for reducing the
aerodynamic drag of trucks, and a technology assessment of alternative
powerplants.
(d) Department of Transportation
DOT has embarked on a major Automotive Energy Efficiency Program.
Funding control for the program rests with the Office of the Secretary but
it is managed by the Transportation Systems Center. It will evaluate
the technology and production means to improve the effectiveness of energy
utilization to decrease the dependence on petroleum resources of the nation's
transportation vehicles and systems. It was begun in Fiscal Year 1973 and
is concentrated on technology which will be available for production in 1980.
It was funded at $0.3 and $2.1 million in Fiscal Years 1973 and 1974,
respectively, and $6.4 million was proposed for Fiscal Year 1975. It is designed
to develop the essential technical information necessary for public discussion
and to support DOT's responsibility for development and implementation of
Federal policy regarding the energy consumption of the transportation sector
(as discussed in Section 3). Present DOT policy is that DOT will not support
hardware development, and that its automotive programs are designed solely
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to provide information. Included in this program are: evaluations of
stratified charge and diesel engines, fuel injection systems, improved
carburetion and ignition systems, improvements to conventional transmissions,
and other components that appear to have promise for improving fuel economy
of production vehicles; evaluation of devices to reduce aerodynamic drag of
large trucks; evaluations of energy storage devices, such as batteries
and flywheels, and non-petroleum-based fuels that appear to be useful in
transportation vehicles and systems (see discussion of AEC battery programs);
establishment of a data base and the development of the simulation models
necessary for assessment of the effects of the present and projected automobile,
truck and bus fleet; evaluation of production capability within the automotive
-industry; and the development of a conceptual framework for analytical
evaluation of the effects of the evolving vehicle fleet.
In the alternative powerplants area, the Office of the Secretary
in DOT supported two very useful and widely circulated studies, one by
International Research and Technology on the impact of introducing an alternative
powerplant, and one by the Aerospace Corp. on possible production schedules
for an automotive gas turbine.
Other parts of DOT are also supporting R & D efforts on automotive
energy consumption. The Transportation University Research Program is
supporting studies of hydrogen as an automotive fuel, methanol as a
gasoline extender, closed loop engine control, automotive energy management
techiques, and an advanced concept for an external combustion engine. The
Federal Highway Administration is funding studies of the energy conservation
potential of carpooling, reduced backhaul by trucks, and improved traffic
control. The Urban Mass Transportation Administration has a program which
will develop, test and install a flywheel energy storage system in a
trolley bus vehicle to evaluate its capability to reduce energy consumption
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through regnerative braking and extension of trolley bus service to areas
without overhead power wires now being served by diesel buses.
(e) Federal Energy Administration
FEA's Office of Energy Conservation has proposed a program it calls
"Automotive Energy Conservation Potential and Policy Analysis," which would
study in detail the present and future characteristics of the motor vehicle
population, the full social costs of its manufacture and operation, and to
use this information to define and evaluate appropriate government policies
in the automotive area. Initial funding in Fiscal Year 1975 of $1.5 million
was proposed.
The Office of Energy Conservation has also proposed a major program
for the development of automotive Stirling systems and heat stores to supply
energy to them. It was initiated within FEA out of concern that a technology,
which the Office of Energy Conservation staff saw as highly attractive but
long-range and high-risk, was being neglected by the other agencies.
(f) Atomic Energy Commission
Since 1965 the AEC has supported a battery development program at the
Argonne National Laboratory. AEC's program has been an exploratory program,
presently aimed at a lithium-sulfur battery for electric utility load-leveling;
studies of automotive uses have at times been supported by other agencies. AEC
is now supporting most of the automotive application work is an important spin-
off from its primary mission-oriented work that might not otherwise be continued.
(g) United States Postal Service
The USPS does not engage in research and development except as it
relates directly to unique USPS responsibilities (e.g. mail handling); so
it does not support R & D on automotive systems. It does, however,
continuously monitor developments in the automotive area and attempt to
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utilize the best available technology in the performance of its mission.
In this context the USPS initiated in 1972 a program to evaluate the
potential for state-of-the-art electric vehicles using lead-acid batteries to
fulfill various USPS vehicle missions. Results were already sufficiently
favorable by April, 1974, for awarding of a procurement contract for 352
vehicles.
4.3 Present Industry Attitudes Toward Federal Programs
Any consideration of Federal automotive R & D must consider industry
attitudes toward such programs. Furthermore these attitudes reveal important
aspects of how the major corporations view their roles in the technology
development process.
Industry's attitudes toward Federal programs are revealed by their past
behavior as reviewed in this report, and in the public and private statements
of its representatives. The differences between the Big Three in this area
are substantial.
In recent testimony before Congress, a GM representative stated:
"We have watched closely the advanced automotive power systems
activity carried out under the auspices of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency. It is our impression that this program, on balance,
has been useful.
"While excessive amounts of money have been spent in areas
where answers to questions were already known or on matters which
were not crucial to evaluation of powerplant potential, in many
instances, government-sponsored R & D has confirmed or supplemented
corresponding R & D in the industry. We naturally are anxious to
pick up any new ideas which might be developed, but we found little
new as yet. Many of the conclusions now being arrived at in the
government program look very much like our own reached several years
ago.
"The program has, of course, been useful to educate a large
number of people in the government and technical community about
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some of the intricacies of automotive powerplants, vehicles and
manufacturing problems. Because of this development, our relations
with those outside the industry have been eased. While this has
been useful to us, it is doubtful that such a spin-off benefit
to private industry was either contemplated or can constitute justi-
fication for the rather substantial public funds expended." [11]
GM apparently also has a policy of not accepting Federal Government funding
for automotive R & D. They have not bid, and have no current intentions of
bidding, on AAPS or other comparable government contracts. Their policy is
that if they judge any technology to be of potential value to their business,
then they will explore it on their own funds; potential loss of proprietary
interest has been a major consideration. Their commitment to research is
substantial; the GM Research Laboratory annual budget is on the order of
$50 million and they are in the process of a 50 percent expansion. The total
extent of their R & D program (including the work of the Engineering Staff)
is obviously much larger. With this technology base, they are quite confident
that little worthwhile automotive technology goes unexploited. They have
followed the AAPS Program quite closely, however; for example over thirty
GM technical personnel were in attendance at the May, 1974, AAPS Contractors
Coordination Meeting.
Ford is less critical of the direct usefulness of government automotive
R & D programs and emphasizes that automotive expertise should be involved
in the programs. [12] In a somewhat more moderate version of GM's policy,
they are quite willing to bid on government contracts when they feel that
their patent rights are adequately protected, as with their ARPA work on
ceramic turbine components. [12] They are negotiating with EPA on several
AAPS contracts, although patent problems have been difficult to overcome.
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They have proposed several efforts to the AAPS management in areas such as
NOx reduction in a light-duty diesel, which although important, fell below
other problems in their evaluation of expected pay-off. Thus they see
government funding as a way for them to extend their options into areas where
they do not feel they can justify corporate expenditures. Ford has also stated
that:
"the AAPS Program, even though they have very limited funds . . .
has had an effect in stimulating activity in the auto industry
and outside the auto industry .. . we are certainly not opposed
to- the incentive that comes from Federal money and Federal support
for such research." [12]
Similarly, in the past (before the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 were passed)
Ford testified that they would participate in Federal Clean Car Incentive
Program. [13]
Chrysler welcomes government support of alternative powerplant developments,
at least through the advanced development stage. This has been the basic thrust
of their testimony [14], and is clearly indicated by the fact that the AAPS
Program is supporting a major part of their gas turbine program. However,
it appears that much of the EPA funding is going to the building of engines
for EPA use, while Chrysler's funds are concentrated on developments in key
problem areas. Through this division of labor they are protecting their
proprietary interests.
The views of the smaller firms on the fringe of the industry tend to be
very favorable to government programs. These firms include automobile
component manufacturers, innovative firms trying to develop and market new ideas,
and aerospace-style technical organizations selling development programs for
a profit margin on sales. Like other groups with a financial interest in
new automotive technology, they tend to consider the Big Three as overly
76
conservative in their innovation and feel that the government has a useful
role in supporting innovations which would not otherwise be supported. Those
firms which are interested in someday selling a product are, however, very
concerned with the patent protection policies of the Federal Government in
R & D in this area.
4.4 Overview and Comparison of Industry and Government Alternative Powerplant
Programs
In this section the overall funding levels and program structure of the
alternative powerplant R & D programs in government and industry will be
reviewed and compared. It must be emphasized once again that these programs
have evolved out of a complicated history of political pressures and
technological developments. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 summarized the general
features of the government programs, and examined the political and
bureaucratic aspects, and along with Appendix A showed how the objectives
for the programs were chosen. Section 3 discussed in general terms how these
objectives influence the type of R & D and, for hardware programs, the level
of development at which government programs can be effective. For the
AAPS Program, the government's major civilian hardware program, the choice f
technologies was made primarily in reaction to the content of the industry
programs which has, in turn, evolved out of continuing experience and development,
in each technology, within the automobile industry and elsewhere. This
experience with each individual technology is addressed in Appendix B, which
also provides descriptions of the present industry and government programs.
Table 4.1 gives overall funding figures for the relevant industry and
government R & D programs. Several features of these data are worth explicitly
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noting. First, industry expenditures in the alternative powerplants area
have risen continuously since 1967. This dramatic increase is clearly
directly related to emission standards, the "good faith" requirement, and the
very high levels of political pressure associated with the Clean Air Act.
Second, they have remained only a fraction of the expenditures on emissions
control R & D for the ICE. This reflects both industry's continuing commitment
to domestic production of the ICE (a response to the time frame for the
emission standards in the 1970 Clean Air Amendments), and relatively higher
cost of engineering development and product improvement as compared with
less advanced stages of R & D. Third, the AAPS program, which remains the
Federal Government's principal civilian alternative powerplant program,
has always been much smaller than industry efforts. However, the bulk of
industry expenditures has been on the stratified charge engine, which has
been at the most advanced stage of development. Industry expenditures on
radical alternatives are probably about 50% of total alternative powerplant
work, e.g. about $25 million in 1973. Thus the $6-8 million which the AAPS
Program has been spending annually on radical alternatives has been about
30% of the industry budget.
Finally, military programs aside, the AAPS program constituted the
principal expenditure of Federal funds in the automotive emissions and energy
areas from its initial funding in Fiscal Year 1969 through 1974. In Fiscal
Year 1975 the cut in AAPS funding and the rise in other agencies reflects
a greater emphasis on shorter term problems, consisting primarily of technology
evaluation and policy development programs, reflecting both the crisis atmosphere
surrounding the energy issue and Congressional disapproval of Government
powerplant development efforts.
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Table 4.2 summarizes, approximately, the program status of each automotive
powerplant within the automobile industry and the government. The regularities
and contrasts reflect the similarities and differences of opinions concerning
the relative merits of the powerplants and the differing roles the relevant
organizations see themselves playing. Comparing organizations' efforts, the
AAPS Program's work on only two systems indicates its strategy of concentrating
its limited resources. Among the Big Three, Chrysler's overall level of
effort stands out as much lower than Ford's or GM's, as also seen in Table 4.1.
Between technologies, the ICE is, of course, the single engine now in
domestic production for automobile use. It is receiving far more attention
in industry than in government, for obvious reasons that have been previously
discussed. The situation is similar in the available alternatives. Each of
these available alternatives is, by our definition, in mass production somewhere
in the world and could, therefore, be mass produced domestically within a
few years. This closeness to mass production has caused a hesitancy within
the government to work on these systems, even though some have potentially
favorable characteristics in the fuel economy and emissions areas. GM's
Wankel program stands out in clear contrast to the lack of interest at Chrysler
and Ford, both of whom have evaluated it in detail. Mass production of GM's
Wankel, once scheduled to begin in the 1974 model year, was recently postponed
indefinitely due to the problems with emissions and fuel economy.
Among the alternatives other than the Wankel, the prechamber stratified
charge engine is the closest to domestic mass production. The Big Three
feel that such an engine, like Honda's CVCC, could be put into mass production
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(at about 500,000 engines per year on one engine line), about four years
after the decision to go ahead. It cannot now meet the 0.4 g/mile NO
standard in a mass production version, but considerable effort is underway,
especially at Ford and GM, to accomplish this. Ford has committed itself,
with some qualifications, to mass production of the engine if the NO standard
were set at 2 g/mile (See Appendix B).
The heavy-weight automotive diesel is already in mass production in
Europe and Japan. It is generally conceded that a new design of a light-weight
diesel would have to be developed for large-scale domestic automobile use.
The heavy-weight diesel engine, like the prechamber stratified charge engine, could be
put into mass production within a few years. There is a high level of interest
in the automotive diesel within government circles due to the good fuel
economy and low HC and CO emissions shown by presently produced diesels
relative to the ICE. Industry feels, however, that the fuel economy advantage
is not nearly as great as this simple comparison indicates, that the diesel
will be expensive, will have great difficulty in attaining the original 1976
NOx standard, and that the diesel's odor and particulates emissions levels
represent a regulatory problem of unknown but potentially serious magnitude.
Thus their level of interest in the diesel is considerably lower than in the
stratified charge. (This is one example of the difference between government
and industry views of the relative levels of importance of various powerplant
attributes.)
Among the radical alternatives, the gas turbine engine stands out
with a consistently high level of interest in both government and industry.
The automotive gas turbine has been under development by each of the Big Three
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intermittently since World War II. In the mid-1960's Chrysler came very
close to commencing limited mass production of a passenger car version,
and Ford and GM will probably be marketing heavy-duty automotive gas turbines
(for buses, trucks, and ships) before the end of the decade. EPA, ARPA,
and each of the Big Three are working hard to overcome the principal problems
now facing the engine: part load fuel economy, cost, and meeting the original
1976 NO standard in a mass-producible engine.
x
The other alternatives are receiving uneven attention. EPA's Rankine
cycle program stands out; Ford and GM have worked on Rankine cycle systems
within the last six years, and feel that their R & D funds are better
spent elsewhere. EPA's Rankine cycle program exists because of this lack
of attention in industry despite the system's potentially very low emissions
levels. Ford's Stirling program stands out as unique at this time. GM
had an active Stirling engine program for 12 years ending in 1970. There are
now several proposals within Government to support Stirling engine R & D
due to its potentially favorable emissions and fuel economy characteristics,
but cost and controls remain problems. Ford, GM, and the Federal Government
are supporting advanced battery work, and there is a high level of optimism
within the technical community that within a decade or two an electrically
powered vehicle will be available utilizing some of this technology. In the
meantime, however, the only production of electric vehicles for street usage
is for the United States Postal Service, whose relatively undemanding routes
can be satisfied by an electric vehicle with lead-acid batteries.
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4.5 Evaluation of Industry Programs
The automotive industry has been widely criticized for "undue conservatism"
both in the extent of its alternative powerplant R & D programs and its
decision not to enter into mass production with a diesel or stratified charge
engine. For example, in April, 1973, in his decision to postpone for one
year the original 1975 emissions standards, the Administrator of EPA stated:
"All the applicants have evidenced a slowness to pursue
alternate technologies that I have found both disturbing and
frustrating. It seems fairly clear now, that if these companies
had begun early in 1971 to develop a capability to produce other kinds
of engines, and particularly the stratified charge type engine
developed by Honda, large numbers of 1975 automobiles could probably
achieve the statutory standards. I recognize, however, that in making
this criticism of the manufacturers' development programs I am aided
by hindsight. For I cannot be certain that the low emission potential
of alternate engine systems such as the stratified charge engine, and
the adaptability of alternate engines to a wide range of automobiles,
could have been foreseen two years ago. Indeed, as I have stated above,
we know relatively little about the stratified charge engine at this
time.
"The manufacturers generally may have demonstrated undue
conservatism and lack of foresight in not pursuing alternate systems
more vigorously. However, I cannot conclude that their present
state of progress in these areas is a result of bad faith on their
part." 4]
Similarly, in an October, 1973, report the staff of the Senate Air and
Water Pollution Subcommittee stated:
"The staff was not able to determine from the available
information why, if the auto manufacturers other than General
Motors believe that the catalyst is unacceptable, and involves
the great risks suggested, those manufacturers do not take a few
risks and begin producing one of these available alternative systems.
Such systems can be produced and the evidence indicates they could
have been introduced within the four years which the Clean Air Act
allowed from enactment to the date when new cars must meet the 1975
standards.
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"The argument has been raised that the problems in meeting
the NO standards make the risk of adopting an alternative engine
too great. But if so, then the same risk that the manufacturers allege
has barred commitment to clean engines should also have barred G.M.'s
commitment to the rotary in 1972 or Ford's commitment to a new V-6
engine in 1971. If there is no such NO risk for these engines, why
is there a risk for the stratified charge or the diesel?" [15, p. 99]
These criticisms essentially reflect the controversy, discussed in
Section 1.5, over the appropriate level of risk the automobile industry
should be willing to absorb in order to achieve the potential gains available
from alternative powerplants. We certainly feel no obligation to defend
the industry's behavior in this or any other area; on the contrary there
may be indeed much to criticize in the industry's handling of the air
pollution and energy issues. However, it does appear that this particular
criticism reflects expectations for the behavior of the automobile industry
unlike those usually made of American industry. We have not performed any
detailed analyses of the industry's R & D or production decisions, and, indeed,
such an evaluation would be very difficult given the industry's reticence
to discuss the details of its programs. These are investment decisions,
however, and, following the-usual pattern are evaluated on a return-on-
investment basis, i.e. analysis or judgment of internal costs and benefits.
When viewed in this ight, the inc.stry's approach appears to us, on the
whole, a reasonable one. It is also one which is unlikely to change unless
the internal costs and benefits are changed.
As discussed in the previous section, the industry is conducting
substantial R & D programs on alternative powerplants. These efforts are
concentrated on systems which will probably be able to meet the legislated
emission standards, be attractive to automobile consumers, and not introduce
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any significant new elements of risk into the industry's dealings with
the regulatory process. The diesel is one example, which we have cited
previously in this report, of a potentially attractive powerplant not
presently exciting much industry interest. Facing an imminent NOx standard
which it is generally felt cannot be met by a diesel engine without a
technical breakthrough, and unknown but potentially stringent particulate
and odor standards, the industry has quite reasonably chosen to concentrate
its R & D efforts on other systems.
With regard to the production decision, the industry's programs show
a similar pattern. GM has come very close to marketing a Wankel engine
domestically (and may still do so), GM's Opel subsidiary is marketing a
diesel in Europe, Chrysler came very close to establishment of a limited
gas turbine assembly line in 1966, and Ford has made a qualified commitment
to mass produce a stratified charge engine, all of which indicate that,
under the right conditions, the Big Three are willing to produce alternative
powerplants.
Each of these R & D or production investment decisions was a complex
one. In each case the expected return from the investment was strongly
affected by questions involving air pollutant emissions as well as the many
other factors the industry must consider. The industry's approach has been
conservative but, it seems to us, no more conservative than might be expected
given the environment its consumers and the Government have made for it. From
the existence of substantial R & D programs and several instances of close
approach to production, it does appear that the manufacturers will pursue
an alternative powerplant technology once they have decided that it is in
their economic self-interest to do so.
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4.6 Appropriate Federal Programs
In Section 3.5 we concluded that Federal R & D programs on alternative
automotive powerplants in the technology development area might be appropriate
in certain circumstances. With regard to the objective of supporting regulation
and policy development, it would be appropriate where the ability of the
industry to modify its product and the full impact of any government-
induced modifications needed to be better understood. With regard to
advancing the state-of-the-art, there might be solid grounds due to the
divergence of societal and industrial interests.1 Our examination of
industry programs has shown that the technological and regulatory uncertainties
associated with the air pollution regulations are one important determinant
of the level of interest in industry in a given technology. If there is
a system which is potentially attractive from an air pollution and/or
fuel economy standpoint, then the appropriate roles for government R & D
converge toward clarifying the costs and benefits, i.e. reducing the risks,
to industry in investing in that technology. Essentially, then, the Government
programs would adjust the regulations and change the status of the technology
so that the normal market decision-making mechanism would give results more
closely aligned to society's interests. This might or might not mean that
the industry would proceed with further development.
In Section 4.5 we reviewed industry programs and concluded that the
industry's approach was a reasonable one, on the whole, and unlikely to
change unless external conditions were changed. The question then remains
1The other types and objectives of Federal R & D are not reviewed here.
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as to whether there are projects which seem appropriate for public funding;
either "gaps" in industry programs or areas where a parallel or additional
effort would significantly add to reduction of technological uncertainty
or provide important public information. We have made no quantitative
cost-benefit studies, nor has our analysis been sufficiently detailed to
allow us to make a comprehensive or well documented list. However, we
do feel that we can offer several examples to make the point.
The development of a light-weight diesel will once again serve as
an example. A well-run government program on a light-weight automotive
diesel would serve, at a minimum, to define the lower bounds of NOx,
particulate and odor emissions (although odor presents continuing measurement
problems), and the tradeoffs between these and other attributes, including
fuel economy. If the program were able to attain NOx emission levels meeting
the presently promulgated standards in an otherwise competitive engine,
it can be assumed that industry interest in the technology would pick up
dramatically. The principal remaining problems would be the particulate
and odor emissions, but by then the government would have enough information
to understand what was technologically possible, and would therefore be
in a position to compare this data with air quality impact studies and
determine the necessity for and effects of emission standards for these
pollutants. One way or the other, regulatory action could be taken to
resolve the uncertainty involved with these standards. If, as now appears
more likely, the program did not attain the required NO level, then at least
this fact would have been confirmed by a credible source and a decision
could be made as to whether it was worth raising the standard in order to
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encourage interest in the diesel. The crucial point is that a government
program could help reduce both the technological and regulatory uncertainty
regarding the diesel. With the information gained, the benefits to the
industry would more nearly coincide with those to society as a whole, and
industry's own self-interest would be directed toward a socially desirable
goal.
Other areas of justifiable government support might be the "barrier"
problems associated with some systems. The Stirling cycle engine offers
potentially substantial benefits in the emissions and fuel economy areas;
it is unlikely to ever be mass produced, however, unless a suitably
inexpensive design for the heater head is developed. An effort to supplement
the Ford-Philips-United Stirling program should be considered. The use
of ceramic components in the automotive gas turbine appears to be a
similarly attractive area. We could, of course, list numerous projects
with expected benefits not adequate to justify their costs, however, our
analysis has not addressed the project evaluation procedures or selection
criteria except in the most general terms.
We have previously mentioned the secrecy with which the industry tends
to shield its technological developments, especially concerning the details
of its programs. This makes it difficult to assess the status of the
programs, but it also denies the use of much of this information in the
public process of policy and regulation development. Furthermore, because
the industry has such a stake in this area of policy, and has in any case
lost much of its credibility with regard to technical information, industry
data on alternative powerplants would be of limited usefulness. Thus the
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use of information on alternative powerplants for policy development is
a benefit which can best be obtained from government programs of this type.
Each of these programs carries a price tag of $2-7 million per year;
we would expect them to result in prototype engines or improved components
in 3-5 years and probably to continue on with further development for a
number of years beyond that. We list these three programs as examples,
and are confident that a more careful, exhaustive, and detailed examination
will develop others and provide a more detailed justification in terms of
social costs and benefits. Four to eight such programs might cost from
$15 to $35 million per year. This would represent a two-to-fivefold increase
over the present AAPS Program, and a sixty to one hundred and fifty per cent
addition to present industry programs on radical alternatives.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
In this section the discussions of the previous four sections
are focused on the central issue of this report: Is it appropriate
for the Federal Government to support research and development on
alternative automotive powerplants? The most controversial aspect of
such Federal support is in the area of hardware development.
Behind this central issue are a number of broader areas of
controversy relating to alternative engines -- the future of the ICE,
the relative weighting of different engine attributes, the different types
and degree of risk the automobile manufacturers can be expected to assume.
It is argued that attitudes towards these factors significantly influence
expectations of appropriate levels of R & D activity in industry and
government. Particularly important to the central issue is the process by
which an alternative powerplant would be introduced into the present passenger
car distribution and maintenance system; the experience with the Manhattan
and Apollo projects has led to unwarranted expectations for rapid changes
in the impacts of the passenger car fleet. Because of the long times needed
to replace the inventory of manufacturing equipment and then of the in-use
vehicles, successful alternative powerplant R & D, whether in industry or
government, would not substantially affect the average characteristics
of the passenger car fleet until at least a decade after its completion.
In Section 2 the alternatives to the ICE are discussed and compared
with each other, and with the ICE. The comparison shows that there are a
number of candidates whose emissions and fuel consumption characteristics
are potentially superior to those of the present ICE, but that each alternative
92
has at least one important attribute in which it is inferior. There is no
powerplant which currently stands out as broadly superior to the present ICE,
and the uncertainties regarding the future attractiveness of the more promising
alternatives will not be resolved until substantial further development
efforts take place. The ICE, moreover, has considerable remaining potential
for development. We therefore conclude that one cannot now forecast whether
the optimum passenger car powerplant of the medium-term future will be the
ICE, an alternative, or whether it will even be a single engine for all
passenger cars. However, because the passenger car powerplant has such a
significant influence on the national air pollution and energy problems,
it is important that economically justifiable efforts in attaining the optimum
not go unattended.
The review in Section 3 of national goals with regard to air pollutant
emissions and energy consumption of the automobile, and the possible policy
instruments for achieving these goals, suggests that only certain objectives
of Federal R & D are appropriate. Federal R & D in support of government
procurement has long been accepted, but is not the issue here, since the
market for automobiles is almost entirely a private one. We also argue
that although Federal R & D had been used in the past to "lever" the industry,
it is unlikely to be effective in the future in that role either politically
or technologically. With regard to the central issue, we conclude that for
the purpose of supporting regulation and policy development, and for advancing
the state-of-the-art, Federal R & D might have an important role to play
depending on the extent of activities within the industry. To be effective,
Federal R & D would be confined to the earlier stages of hardware development,
where the cost would not be prohibitive, and where manufacturing and consumer
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acceptance considerations would not be overriding.
We point out that, in spite of the apparently fixed standards and
deadlines in the Clean Air Act, the emission standards are in reality
coupled to the available technology. The standards have been and in the
near future will continue to be adjusted to levels which the dominant ICE
technology can meet. Thus, in our judgment, the incentives to the manufacturers
are probably not sufficient to cause them to perform all the alternative
powerplant R & D which can be justified on the basis of the potential net
social benefits from reduction in emissions. On the energy side, the
national policies and goals are less clear, but it similarly appears that
the advantages of a reduced dependence on foreign petroleum supplies result
in a similar incentive for R & D, beyond that provided by the marketplace.
Furthermore, the benefits to public policy development are even more unlikely
to be fully accounted for in industry R & D budget decisions. With these
hypotheses in mind, it was necessary to examine the present industry programs
to see whether there are projects which have not been undertaken but appear
to be justifiable when the larger social benefits are included, and to look
at the government programs to see what benefits have been obtained.
The principal government program in the civilian alternative automotive
powerplants area has been the AAPS Program. We find that the goals and
structure of the program have never been widely accepted, nor very well
justified, and that they have been unstable and generally of a short-term
nature. The AAPS Program has not contributed significantly to advancing
the state-of-the-art, but this has never really been implemented as a major
program goal. The program has, however, been of significant value in
providing a public focal point for alternative powerplant activities. It has
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fostered the exchange of information among activities outside of the Big ThreEL
and even some inside, and served as a relatively impartial source of
expertise to government, academia and innovators. The technical information
provided from the program has contributed significantly to long-range policy
planning, a program role that would not and could not have been undertaken
by industry.
We find substantial alternative powerplant programs in industry,
especially at Ford and GM. These efforts cover a number of the important
alternative engines, but leave significant gaps. However, the details of
the technology tend to be closely guarded and thus it is difficult to
assess their progress. The information generated is not really available
for development of public policy and, given industry interest in that policy,
would be questioned as to credibility in any case.
The industry programs have been developed primarily in response to
the air pollution emission standards and the "good faith" requirements
of the Clean Air Act, but the standards and the uncertainty in their future
levels have also made some otherwise potentially attractive projects too
risky for industry funding. In our judgement the industry programs reflect
a reasonable approach to the allocation of internal funds to this area,
given the potentials of the different engine technologies and the current
environment for alternative powerplant development that the Government
and the public have created. However, we conclude that there are projects
which, because some of the risks applicable to industry projects are not
relevant for the Federal Government, and because there are social benefits
not counted by the industry, appear to be economically justifiable from a
public policy standpoint.
95
A review of industry experience in dealing with alternative powerplants
is presented. Although we would have preferred to perform an analysis
with considerably more depth, it now appears to us that the manufacturers
will develop alternative powerplants and offer them in the marketplace when
the risk in doing so is at a sufficiently low level to justify such programs
economically. This risk depends on the uncertainty as to whether sufficiently
attractive technological characteristics can be attained for a given powerplant
and on the uncertainty in what levels of certain attributes will be required
by Federal regulations. The minimum risk is clearly associated with
continued emphasis on the further development of the ICE, and the industry
can certainly be counted on, in the present environment, to press that
technology as far as it will reasonably go.
We therefore conclude that there is a convincing justification for
Federal support for R & D on alternative automotive powerplants. Our
reasoning can be summarized as follows. Some of the alternative powerplants
have the potential for significant long-term contributions to national air
pollution abatement and fuel conservation goals. However, given the
current uncertainty in these alternative engine technologies and the context
within which the automobile manufacturers must operate, there is a divergence
of industry and public interests. Some of these alternatives are not
receiving adequate attention within the automobile industry for sound reasons
which are unlikely to change. There are, therefore, substantial contributions
that a well thought out and carefully executed government-funded program can
make towards meeting these national goals by advancing the state-of-the-art
in selected engine technologies, and in producing the technical data necessary
for developing long-term regulatory and other policies. The goal of such a
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program would be to reduce the risks inherent in developing and introducing
those alternative engines which may have long term economic and public
benefits and which are not now receiving adequate attention, by reducing the
current technological and regulatory uncertainties to the point where normal
market decision-making mechanisms would be in better alignment with societal
objectives.
We have only addressed in general terms the many important structural
aspects such a Federal program would entail. For example, we have not
attempted to compile a comprehensive list of important technical projects.
Nor have we developed a firm recommendation for overall program magnitude,
although a rough estimate of number of projects and project costs suggests
that a two to fivefold increase above current alternative powerplant funding --
to between $15 and $35 million annually -- would be required. Our analysis has
concentrated on the central issue: Is it appropriate for the Federal Government
to support research and development on alternative automotive powerplants?
We conclude -- yes it is.
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Appendix A
REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
OF FEDERAL ALTERNATIVE AUTOMOTIVE POWER
SYSTEMS PROGRAMS
In order to understand the present Federal programs in the alter-
native automotive power systems area, it is necessary to understand the com-
plex set of forces which resulted in the initiation of these programs and
their evolution over time to the present. The development of these programs
has been a halting, waivering affair, with important actors at many levels
of government, and in industry and academia. Strongly held positions have
been hotly contested, and, in general, these programs have probably received
as much attention per dollar expended as any other Federal programs in
recent years.
This short history will focus on the Advanced Automotive Power
Systems (AAPS) Program. The AAPS Program was begun in the National Air
Pollution Control Administration (NAPCA) of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare in early 1970, was moved with NAPCA to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in December, 1970, and, in February, 1975, most of
it will be transferred from EPA to the new Energy Research and Development
Administration (ERDA). It was the first Federal R & D effort directly
concerned with civilian motor vehicle powerplants, and today remains the
central development program in this area. Military programs, whose
beginnings well predate the civilian programs, will be discussed only where
direction interaction between these two types of programs has occurred.
Actually the first Federal R & D programs directly concerned with civilian
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passenger car technology were in the safety area; they were authorized by
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, and began shortly
after its signature into law on September 9, 1966. The most notable of
these have been the Experimental Safety Vehicle (ESV) Program, now completed,
and its follow-on, the Research Safety Vehicle (RSV) Program. Powerplant
technology has not been an important factor in these programs, however, so
they will not be discussed here.
Pre-1970 Events
The recent active concern with civilian automotive propulsion technology
within the Federal Government had its beginnings in the air pollution issue.
After a decade of contention between the County of Los Angeles, the State
of California, the Federal Government, and the automobile manufacturers,
Congress in 1963 amended the Clean Air Act to provide for (among other
things) research on motor vehicle pollutant emissions, and in 1965 amended
the Act again to provide for national air pollutant emission standards.
As expertise on the issue began to be developed and the magnitude of the
required reductions in emissions levels began to be preceived, the idea of
looking into the possible advantages of alternatives to the ICE1 gained
respectability, at least outside Detroit. The political climate regarding
the automobile industry at that time had taken a strong anti-industry turn
in 1965 with such events as the disclosure of the investigation of Ralph
Nader by General Motors and charges by the Los Angeles County Board of
Supervisors that the industry was suppressing pollution control technology.
This atmosphere supported investigations into relatively radical solutions
to the motor vehicle air pollution problem.
1
"ICE" here refers to the carbureted, spark-ignited, reciprocating internal
combustion engine used worldwide for passenger car propulsion. "Alternative"
will refer to any other potential passenger car propulsion system.
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Interest in the Congress began to "gather steam" in 1966; four bills
were introduced, two each in the Senate and the House, which would have
specifically authorized studies or R & D efforts to examine alternatives
to the ICE. In February, 1967, the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution
of the Senate Public Works Committee (headed by Senator Edmund S. Muskie)
held a set of hearings on "Problems and Progress Associated with Control
of Automobile Exhaust Emissions," which included tours of GM and Ford's
research and development facilities. [1] Gas turbine engines, advanced
batteries, and electric vehicles were proudly demonstrated and discussed
as potential solutions to the air pollution problem, but only in the distant
future.
In the spring of 1967 and one year later in 1968, in response to more
proposed legislation, joint hearings were held by the Muskie Committee and
the Commerce Committee specifically dealing with the need for Federal R & D
on alternative powerplants. [2,3] The various interests which testified
at these hearings reflected diverse attitudes, many of which are very much
present today. Mr. Harry F. Barr, Vice President, Engineering, at GM, could
have been speaking for all the Big Three (i.e. GM, Ford and Chrysler) when
he stated "While we believe our industry can attain further substantial
air quality improvements with our internal combustion engines at much less
cost than any other proposals to date, we will continue to pursue vigorously
the development of all potential sources of power having improved efficiency
and lower pollutant levels." [2, p. 255] This and other Big Three testimony
indicated their view that the ICE looked like the best engine for the future,
but that in any case they were on top of all the alternative technologies
and that thus no government program was needed.
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A number of scientists and managers from universities, small companies,
and other organizations not connected with the Big Three, however, had very
different opinions. Dr. Robert U. Ayres, with Resources for the Future,
stated, in answer to a question from Senator Muskie, that "So far as I can
judge, it (the ICE) has been developed about as far as it can be. It looks
as though it is inherently an inappropriate engine for the purposes that it
is being used for. And from the standpoint of the user, the public, it is
my belief that an external combustion engine would satisfy our needs
better." 3, p. 13] Dr. S. William Gouse, then of Carnegie-Mellon University,
asserted that, at the low emission levels forecast as future requirements,
the steam engine would be "simpler and less costly" than the ICE, and that
the principal problems holding up its development were the question "Will
someone invest to develop the reliability necessary?" [3, p. 87] and the
fact that 'Resistance (to) change is enormous and that the capital requirements...
would be very large." 13, p. 81] Mr. J. A. McIlnay, Vice President of the
Electric Storage Battery Co., (now ESB, Inc.) testified, in regard to an
electrically powered vehicle which his company could develop: "the public
is not only ready for it,...the public is asking for it," and that "here is
a role for the Government...to make some funds available for development." [2, p.56]
Thus by mid-1967, a significant school of thought was developing which held
that the available alternative engine technology was not being exploited by
the Big Three, and that, in light of the potential public benefit of cleaner
air, government-funded R & D was appropriate.
The key officers of the Executive Branch did not yet share this belief.
Stuart Udall, Secretary of the Interior, stated in the 1967 hearings: "I
think the Administration view at this point is that industry ought to bear
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the main burden, and that we are not convinced that Federal input into the
research effort on electrically powered automobiles would be advantageous
at this time." [2, p. 311] They suggested that the committees not take any
action before the completion of a study then underway. In January, 1967, a
Panel on Electrically Powered vehicles, chaired by Mr. Richard S. Morse of
MIT, had been formed under the U.S. Department of Commerce Technical Advisory
Board. The "Morse Report," 4] published by the Panel in August, 1967, became
a widely-quoted document addressing almost every aspect of the automotive
air pollution issue. Its recommendation no. 14 stated:
"The Federal Government should initiate a five-year program, in
total amount of approximately 60 million dollars, to support
innovative developments useful in the establishment of future
emission standards in the following areas:
a) Energy sources for vehicles;
b) Vehicular propulsion systems;
c) Emission controls;
d) Special-purpose urban cars; and
e) General-purpose cars," [4, p. 45]
i.e., it proposed a modest development effort, whose principal purpose
was to support the regulatory program. It further recommended that "Federal,
State, and local governments should incorporate low emission performance
criteria as factors in the purchase of vehicles for their requirements," [4, p. 46]
i.e. that government purchasing powcr be used to subsidize low emission
systems development by providing a well defined market.
Also in mid-1967, the National Air Pollution Control Administration,
through the Public Health Service laboratory in Cincinnatti, let two con-
tracts for studies of the technological and economic characteristics of
the various alternatives to the ICE and their potential for competing with
it in the 1980 time frame or sooner. A study by the Battelle Memorial
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Institute, covering all the alternatives to the ICE except electric drive,
noted the low emissions of external combustion systems for Rankine or
Stirling cycle applications, relative to the uncontrolled ICE, and recommended
the development of an advanced technology Rankine cycle engine and research
programs on the problems associated with the Stirling and gas turbine
engines. [5] The other study,by Arthur D. Little, Inc., was more
equivocal concerning the electric vehicle's place in the future, stating
that its disadvantage in life-cycle costs "would have to be regarded as a
social cost for the elimination of air pollution,' but that a coordinated
Federal program could probably bring battery technology to the point of
giving an electric vehicle performance equivalent to an ICE-powered vehicle. [6]
While the formal final reports of these two studies were not published until
October, 1969, the reports were submitted to NAPCA in March, 1968.
These hearings and studies had no concrete impact as, through mid-1969,
no significant legislative or administrative actions were taken by the
Federal Government concerning the alternative powerplant issue. It was during
this period, however, that the "environmental movement" became a political
force worth courting. Vanishing Air [7], written by a team from Ralph Nader's
Center for Study of Responsive Law, attacked both Congress and the Administration,
as well as the automobile industry, for laxity on the air pollution issue.
Such attention intensified the competition between President Nixon and
Senator Muskie for leadership on this issue. The Nader report developed at
some length the thesis that the automobile industry was committed to resisting
1
technological change. The potential air pollution benefits of the steam
engine were extolled, and the industry was chastised for not taking it
1
For example, the titles of Chapters 2 and 3 of Vanishing Air are "The
Automobile Industry: Twenty Years in Low Gear," and "The Automobile
Industry: Nothing New Under the Hood," respectively.
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seriously. The 1969 consent decree between the automobile manufacturers
and the Department of Justice, ending a technology-sharing agreement between
the manufacturers which the Government had claimed was part of a conspiracy
to suppress air pollution control technology, also contributed to the public
feeling that the industry was not serious in its development efforts.
In industry, activities on alternative systems expanded during this
period. GM, in particular, built a number of demonstration vehicles and
accompanied their debuts with a major public relations effort. On
May 7, 1969, GM held a symposium called the "Progress of Power Show" at the
GM Technical Center with these vehicles on display for both the trade and
national media. The following August, a number of these vehicles, along
with those of other firms, were demonstrated before the President's Environmental
Quality Council,l which had been meeting with President Nixon at San Clemente.
Of particular significance in this technological public relations
campaign was GM's handling of a Rankine cycle-powered car built by the GM
Research Laboratories. The vehicle was a 1969 Pontiac Grand Prix, in
which GM's "SE-101" steam powerplant was mounted. The NOX and HC emission
levels of this vehicle were reported as being well above the 1980 HEW
goals (which later became the original 1976 standards), and in fact inferior
to those of "recent developments with experimental manifold reactors in
spark ignition engines," and its fuel economy a factor of 2 1/2 to 3 times
worse than that of an equivalent ICE-powered vehicle. [8] Several other
significant problems were prominently reported. GM's efforts were severely
criticized in the Nader report as an effort to discredit Rankine cycle
technology. An anonymous GM researcher was quoted in the report as saying
1
This was a designated group of Cabinet officers; it was renamed the
Cabinet Committee on the Environment after the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 created the present Council on Environmental Quality.
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"There was no attempt (by senior management) to control our research. They
didn't have to. We were given less than one year to come up with something.
With that kind of time limit, we had to take the most conservative engineerin-
approaches." [7, p. 26-7] According to the Nader report: "The results
inevitably underscored the disadvantages of the steam engine." This incident
left the impression with many people of more moderate persuasion than the
Nader group that the automobile industry, and GM in particular, was purposely
not giving alternative systems a fair chance to compete with the ICE, and
the affair is still cited today as a motivating factor for the AAPS Program.
One result of these well publicized charges of industry suppression
of technology was that the ICE itself became something of a lasting symbol
for industry reticence in dealing with the air pollution issue. At a later
Congressional hearing, an EPA official defending the moderate funding level
of the AAPS program was forced to state: "There is nothing immoral about
the internal combustion engine. It really doesn't matter from the public's
point of view whether the combustion takes place in the expander or outside.
What the country needs is fuel-efficient (and, of course, low-emissions)
vehicles."l9, p. 96]
In mid-1969, the Executive Branch was beginning to respond, piecemeal,
to some of these pressures. NAPCA let two small contracts for detailed
studies of passenger car Rankine cycle systems, and the Urban Mass Transportation
Administration made a grant to the California State Assembly for a joint
demonstration project on Rankine cycle-powered buses. In August,
Dr. Lee DuBridge, the President's Science Advisor discussed a possible Federal
alternative powerplant R & D program at a press conference on motor vehicle
emissions.
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Finally, in December, 1969, the Office of Science and Technology, of
the Executive Office of the President, formed an Ad Hoc Panel on Unconven-
tional Vehicle Propulsion, chaired by Dr. David V. Ragone, then of Carnegie-
Mellon University, and consisting in all of seven scientists and engineers
(four from universities, John J. Brogan of NAPCA and Dr. Richard L. Strombotne
of DOT, one from a non-Big Three company). Dr. S. William Gouse, by then
of OST, was the panel's secretary. The panel visited the Big Three and
several smaller companies, weighed the technological status and potential
attractiveness of the principal alternative systems against the development
efforts underway in industry and concluded that a Federal R & D program was
"urgent". [10] The panel's preliminary conclusions were a crucial input to
the decision to embark on a major program.
Meanwhile, a "Federal Low-Emission Vehicle Procurement Act" was (again)
introduced in the Senate; the Act would provide for the Federal Government
to pay premium prices for low-emission vehicles. In January, 1970, Federal
officials testified before some irritated members of the Public Works and
Commerce Committees that they could not endorse the proposal because the
President was planning a major message on the environment and they were
not sure what he would say. [11]
Establishment of the AAPS Program
In his message to Congress on the Environment on February 10, 1970,
President Nixon announced the establishment of the AAPS program:
"I am inaugurating a program to marshal both government and private
research with the goal of producing an unconventionally powered
virtually pollution-free automobile within five years. I have
ordered the start of an extensive Federal research and development
program in unconventional vehicles, to be conducted under the
general direction of the Council on Environmental Quality." [12]
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He also issued an order for what became the Federal Clean Car Incentive
Program (FCCIP), where the Government would buy unconventional vehicles
for testing and evaluation, and endorsed the Federal Low-Emission Vehicle
Procurement Act then before Congress.
The principal justification for the establishment of the AAPS program
was for "insurance". This is more-or-less explicitly stated in both the
OST report and the President's message. At that time there was a proposed
set of emission standards for the 1975 model year (which corresponded
roughly to the model year 1973 standards later actually implemented) and a
less official set of "HET Research Goals" for the 1980 model year (which
corresponded roughly to the "original 1976 standards" under the 1970
amendments to the Clean Air Act, at this writing applicable to model year
1978). The OST panel report stated:
'In spite of intensive industry efforts, there is a probability
that the gasoline engine (i.e. the ICE) will not be clean enough
to meet long-term air quality requirements (i.e. the 1980 HEW
Research Goals). This probability is sufficiently high to warrant
serious attention to alternative powerplants.
"The present level and quality of efforts (i.e. the industry efforts)
is not consistent with the importance of the automotive air pollution
problem and the uncertainty surrounding future emission levels from
gasoline piston engines. It is urgent that Federal action be taken
now, because the development of automotive powerplants to the
production stage is a long process." [10, p. 1]
In other words, the panel felt that it was necessary for the Government to
take out "insurance" against the possibility that, because of their
commitment to modifying the ICE, the industry might not have an engine
ready for production in 1980 to meet the research goals. In the President's
words:
"I hope this will not happen. I hope the automobile industry's presently
determined effort to make the internal combustion engine sufficiently
pollution-free succeeds. But if it does not, then unless motor vehicles
with an alternative, low-pollution power source are available, vehicle-
caused pollution will once again begin an inexorable increase." [12]
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Aside from the stated "insurance" motivation, there were several other
contributing factors to the establishment of the AAPS program. A very
important one was the desire by the Nixon Administration to take a new
initiative in its competition on the automotive emissions issue with
Presidential-hopeful Muskie (this thesis is more fully developed by Jacoby
and Steinbruner [13]). A second factor was the supreme confidence in American
technology, developed by the space program (Neil Armstrong had walked on the
moon only seven months before the President's message) and the associated,
widely felt, desire for utilization of some of the aerospace engineers,
recently laid off with much publicity from the space program, on a "socially
relevant" problem.
An important aspect of the AAPS Program, as initially conceived, was to
be the direct involvement of the automobile industry. The OST report stated
"'The Panel also believes that strong efforts should be made to involve
the automotive companies in these programs right from the start." [10, p. 8]
It was recognized that this was a necessary prerequisite for an early
introduction of the alternative powerplants into production. This industry
involvement was to be accomplished in two ways. First, the Government
would buy industry-developed vehicles through the FCCIP and Low-Emission
Vehicle Procurement Program as mentioned in the President's Environmental
Message. Second, it was expected that the Big Three would be successful
bidders on many of the AAPS development contracts.
In the spring of 1970, the CEQ assigned NAPCA the responsibility for
management of the AAPS Program. In order to assist CEQ in its overview
function, the Advisory Committee on Advanced Automotive Power Systems (ACAAPS)
was formed. The ACAAPS consisted of experts from the academic community and
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representatives of the Big Three. It was initially chaired by Prof.
Ernest S. Starkman, then of the University of California at Berkeley. The
Big Three were included in an initial attempt to coordinate AAPS efforts
with ongoing industry projects. ACAAPS meetings were also intended to
serve as a mechanism for coordinating the AAPS Program with the efforts in
other agencies (principally, at that time, the Army).
Immediately after the delivery of the President's message and the
subsequent designation of NAPCA to run the program, a detailed AAPS program
plan was developed. It was based on NAPCA's interpretation of the President's
directive and the recommendations of the OST Panel. The basic technical goal
of the program became the demonstration of a minimum of two different
unconventional powerplants in standard size automobiles by February, 1975,
making possible the production and public sale by industry of such vehicles
by 1980. 114] To meet this goal, the program plan developed by AAPS
management (in Ann Arbor) incorporated the following elements [15]:
1. Initial evaluation of seventeen candidate systems: gas turbine,
organic-based Rankine with reciprocating and turbine expanders,
water-based Rankine, hybrid systems with either electrical or
flywheel energy storage and one of six heat engines (gas turbine,
one of three Rankine, ICE and diesel), and all-electric. The
evaluation would be based primarily on contracted design studies.
2. Selection, by mid-1972, of three candidates for development into
"first-generation" hardware. Three engines of each successful
candidate would then be produced; two of each would be used for
dynamometer testing and one saved for a spare.
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3. Two systems would then be selected, by July, 1973, for development
into second generation hardware. A minimum of five vehicles would
be powered by each engine, and four months of road testing would be
completed by the target date of February, 1975.
The all-electric vehicle schedule did not quite follow the above outline;
rather, it was intended to fund basic research on several advanced battery
concepts which, if proven feasible, could be used in a vehicle in place of
one of the systems selected above. It should be noted that, in accordance
with the definitions used by the OST panel, neither the stratified charge or
diesel engines were considered unconventional enough to fall within the scope
of the program. The Stirling engine, rated last of the five alternatives
discussed by the OST Panel (after the gas turbine, hybrid, Rankine and
electric, in that order) was not directly addressed by AAPS; rather, it
was intended to monitor the development program of the N.V. Philips Company
of Holland, which was already well underway. As can be seen, a key concept
was that at all times during the program at least two different types of
powerplants would be investigated in parallel, thus providing an element of
redundancy to increase chances of success.
Implementation of this program plan was well underway by late 1970.
$2 million had been allocated to AAPS from Fiscal Year 1970 NAPCA funds, and
levels of $6, $11, and $18 million were programmed by NAPCA for Fiscal Years
1971, 1972, and 1973, respectively. The plan was approved by the ACAAPS and the
NAPCA Washington headquarters, which, from an early date, gave considerable
leeway to the AAPS management in Ann Arbor. Contracts for the design of
several different hybrid systems were let, advanced battery development was
being supported (at Argonne National Laboratory), and work on external combustion
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components and the organic-based reciprocating Rankine cycle system was well
underway. On December 2, 1970, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
was created, and the AAPS program was transferred with the bulk of NAPCA
regulatory operations into EPA's Office of Air Programs (most of NAPCA's
R & D effort was transferred in the EPA Office of Research and Monitoring).
The AAPS management was also assigned responsibility for the FCCIP
and the technical aspects of the implementation of the Federal Low-Emission
Vehicle Procurement Act, which had passed the Senate and was expected to
become law. The two programs were designed to be complimentary. The FCCIP
was designed to provide an interim market for experimental vehicles: if a
developer could successfully pass through successive stages, the Government
would buy up to 500 vehicles for field testing. If still satisfactory,
the General Services Administration would then, under the Act, buy the vehicle
for normal Government use, at a premium price if necessary. Of course, low-
emission vehicles not developed under the FCCIP would also be eligible for
GSA procurement under the Act. In October, 1970, a Request for Proposals
under the FCCIP was released by NAPCA, and a total three-year budget of $20
million was approved within the Administration for the FCCIP. Preliminary
indications were that about 30 proposals would be received, including several
from U.S. and foreign automobile manufacturers.
Two other important policies in the initial AAPS management plan should
be mentioned, both of which have been followed to date. First, it was
never intended that NAPCA would develop any significant in-house hardware
development capability. The AAPS Program was intended to be, and has remained,
strictly a contracted affair (although some testing of engines is performed
by EPA at Ann Arbor). Second, since early in the program there have been
regular public briefings by AAPS management and contractors, held about twice
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a year. The purpose of these "Contractor Coordination Meetings" has been
to bring the contractors for each system together regularly to facilitate
technical coordination, and to make the information developed in the program
available to all interested parties, including other Federal agencies,
the automotive industry, the academic community, etc. The proceedings of the
meetings have been published and widely circulated.
Impact of the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments
On December 31, 1970, President Nixon signed into law the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970. This legislation required rapid acceleration of virtually
all aspects of the Federal air pollution control program and extended its
regulatory coverage into several new areas. The crucial provision concerning
motor vehicles was that ninety percent reductions in new vehicle emissions
(resulting in emission levels corresponding more or less to the 1980 HEW
Research Goals) were written into law for the 1975/6 model year (the CO and
hydrocarbon standards were effective in model year 1975, the NOx in 1976; the
Administrator of EPA was authorized to grant,if necessary,a one year
extension for each standard). The Amendments thus demolished the "insurance"
justification for the existence of the AAPS Program: it was recognized by
all concerned that none of the "radical" alternatives being considered
by the program could possibly be brought into mass production in time to
meet the legislated standards.
In response to the Amendments, officials in the Executive Office of the
President proposed a budget cut in the program, starting in Fiscal Year 1972.
EPA resisted and a set of meetings and memoranda followed, involving senior
A-16
EPA management, and OST, OMB and White House personnel. The issue was
resolved in July, 1971, by drastic changes in the justification, program
plan and overall funding level for the AAPS Program. The crucial aspects
of the settlement were [14]:
1. The ':insurance" justification for AAPS was dropped. AAPS became
an integral, but subservient part of EPA's automotive regulatory
program. At that time tempers in the automobile industry were
still very hot over passage of the 1970 Amendments. Disaster
to the national economy was threatened by industry spokesmen, who said
that the standards could probably not be met. To support EPA in
this contest, "the AAPS Program became a lever with which to put
maximum pressure on industry to meet the 1976 emission standards
with conventional engines, by seeking to provide a demonstrated
technology for alternative power systems that can." [14]
2. In order to implement the new ':lever" role, AAPS funding was
concentrated on the two of their alternatives which appeared,
at that time, to have the best chance for meeting the standards
in a realistic vehicle by the February, 1975, goal. These were
the Rankine cycle and gas turbine systems. Furthermore the
stratified charge system was brought into the program because
of its potentially low emissions and because it was the subject
of an ongoing development effort by the Army, to which EPA could
contribute at a relatively small cost and test in hardware at an
early date. Funding of hybrid and all-electric systems, whose
potential value appeared (at that time) high but long range, was
stopped, in order to maximize the probability for early success with
the three chosen systems.
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3. Approved Fiscal Year 1972 funding remained at the $11 million
planned by EPA, but Fiscal Year 1973 funding approval was held
to $11 million rather than EPA's planned $18 million.
These revisions to the AAPS Program were presented to the ACAAPS, and
both academic and industry members objected to each of the three changes.
Shortly thereafter, however, the new program scored what EPA officials
consider a major success in its "lever" role when, on September 24, 1971,
President Nixon announced to an audience in Detroit that a jeep powered by
an Army-developed stratified charge engine, tested under the support provided
by the AAPS Program, became the first motor vehicle to meet the 1976 emission
standards.
The "lever" role continued to be the official justification for AAPS
for the next two years or so. For Fiscal Years 1972 and 1973 total AAPS
funding was settled at $9.7 million and $9.8 million, respectively, of
which $9.1 million and $8.7 million were devoted to the gas turbine and
Rankine systems, and $0.4 million and $0.2 million to the stratified charge.
The AAPS management proposed broadening the program into work on the all-
electric and light-weight diesel systems, with increased overall funding
levels, but was turned down by its Washington headquarters. Basic questions
concerning the program's role continued to be asked, but as long as the
program remained at a stable, relatively low, funding level it did not provoke
any serious controversy over its continued existence.
There were, however, two changes made in the program. In response to
the slowly rising national concern on the energy issue, the AAPS management
announced in December, 1972, that fuel economy was being given "coequal"
status with emissions reductions as an objective of the program's development
efforts. Somewhat later, but in support of this, initial steps were taken
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to change the demonstration vehicles for the gas turbine and Rankine systems
from the standard to compact weight class.
The second change was made at about the same time when Washington
approval was sought and received to support studies in two new areas. One
study was to determine the potential applicability and environmental impact of
the use of electric vehicles in the Los Angeles area. The objective of this
effort was to see whether, in the urban area with the worst automotive air
pollution problem, electric vehicles could realistically be a significant
part of an air pollution control plan. If so, then presumably Federal support
for further battery development would be justified. The other "new mission"
study, conducted by two contractors, was on potential alternatives to gasoline
as automotive fuels. These two contracts were considered to be in support
of long-range AAPS Program planning.
The "lever" role for the AAPS Program was never widely appreciated outside
of EPA management and those very familiar with EPA's internal policies. From
the very existence of the hardward development programs many people drew the
conclusion that EPA intended to be and was in fact engaged in actually
advancing the state-of-the-art and in attempting to induce the industry to
do likewise. Dissatisfaction within the EPA with the "lever" role led to
encouragement of this conclusion. For example, in a September, 1972, technical
paper, AAPS personnel stated:
"Although the overt goal of the AAPS Program is to demonstrate the
hardware of alternate power systems, the covert goal is to stimulate
the industry to absorb the technology developed in the program and
then to further develop the candidate systems into production engines." [16]
The Clean Air Amendments had another, unintended, impact on the AAPS
program. The Amendments wrote the previously proposed Federal Low-Emission
Vehicle Procurement Act into law as Section 212 of the Clean Air Act.
This "covert" goal of stimulating industry R & D is a part of "technological
lever" as compared with the "political lever" role discussed above.
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However, the tight new emission standards absorbed resources that the
automobile manufacturers would have used for entering the FCCIP. The
remaining potential entrants, small companies not involved in vehicle pro-
duction, were, for the most part, never able to raise sufficient capital
to develop vehicles adequate to enter the program.1 Through Fiscal Year 1973
EPA had been able to spend only $25,000, on one vehicle, out of the initially
budgeted $20 million for the program. The Section 212 program proved to
be a similar failure. To date only two applications have been made under
the program; both were for electric vehicles whose performance was
unacceptable to the Federal Agencies involved. Thus, between the manufacturers'
unhappiness with the AAPS Program's new lever role and their concentration
on meeting the new emission standards, the Clean Air Amendments had an
inhibitory effect on the joint industry-government effort originally
envisioned.
On the positive side, the Clean Air Amendments were at least partially
responsible for two efforts by Federal Agencies with special vehicle needs
to venture into low-emission alternative powerplant programs. The Army's
program was mentioned above. Since the early 1960's the Army's Tank-
Automotive Command had been supporting the development of stratified charge
engines to provide its jeeps with an efficient powerplant with a multi-
fuel capability. A legal determination that the emission standards of the
Clean Air Act applied to jeeps forced the Army to work toward meeting the
tight new goals. With some EPA funding assistance they in fact met the
original 1976 standards with their engines. The other effort was a program
for the testing and procurement of electric vehicles by the U.S. Postal
1
See testimony in [17] of V. Wouk of Petro-Electric Motors, one of the
small firms which tried to enter the program.
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Service. This program was initiated in response to a Government-wide effort
to demonstrate leadership in pollution control, which included motor vehicle
emissions.
1973 AAPS Role Change
By early 1973 it appeared that the "lever" role for the AAPS Program
was no longer valid. EPA's Washington management felt that EPA had achieved
a sufficiently strong position in its ongoing struggle with the automobile
industry over the legislated emissions standards. Furthermore, since the
Honda CVCC engine, the Mazda Wankel and the Mercedes diesel, all alternatives
to the ICE, had met the original 1975 standards, several had come close to
the original 1976 NO standard, and that the 1976 NOx standard would probably
be raised anyway, it appeared that further demonstrations along these lines
would not significantly support EPA's regulatory role.
In response, the AAPS management in Ann Arbor developed a case for
the continuation of the AAPS Program as a provider of "correct and factual
information from a credible source regarding the availability of technologies
which can be applied to reduce the negative impact of the automobile on the
U.S. consumption of natural and energy resources and on the environment."
The information would, of course, also be used by Federal Government policy
makers in the development of national policies related to the automobile.
The gasoline shortage which began in the summer of 1973 and reached "crisis"
dimensions during the Arab oil embargo had generated a host of proposals
within the Congress and the Executive Branch for reducing the fuel consumption
of the national automobile fleet, significantly raising the level of interest
in automotive technology and thus, in the opinion of the EPA management, the
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requirements for technical information developed outside of the industry.
Thus EPA's Washington headquarters accepted the new "public information"
role for the AAPS Program, and it remains the principal publicly stated
justification for AAPS today. [9]
By this time the AAPS Program appeared to be the subject of wide
interest as the technical community involved in automotive technology programs
grew. From the first AAPS contractor coordination meeting to the most
recent attendance has grown from 20 to 500.
Impact of the Energy Crisis
The latest event which has'been an important force shaping Federal
R & D programs in the automotive area has been, of course, the "energy
crisis." The existence of an energy "situation" began to receive the active
attention of high level Federal policy makers sometime during 1971. The
issue received an increasing amount of publicity through the following
year. The first important impact on the automobile fleet was the development
of spot shortages of gasoline in the summer of 1973. In October, 1973, the
Arab oil embargo was initiated, raising the energy crisis to the top of
the Nation's concerns. Partly due to its position as a major consumer of
petroleum products, and partly due to the decision by the Federal Government
to emphasize the production of fuels for home and industrial use rather than
gasoline, the motor vehicle was particularly affected by the embargo. The
long lines at some service stations, the public appeals by Government officials
for eliminating unnecessary driving, and the lowering of the interstate highway
speed limit, all received considerable attention in the media and had
personal impact on the American public. Improving the fuel economy
of the national motor vehicle fleet became a national priority, and
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government-sponsored R & D seemed to many people to be an obvious implementing
measure.
Through Fiscal Year 1973, the impact of the energy crisis on Federal
funding of automotive R & D was not a significant addition to the ongoing
efforts aimed at emissions. Beginning in Fiscal Year 1974, however, auto-
motive energy R & D drew funding within the budgets of several agencies
which had not been previously involved in a significant way, in particular
DOT and NSF. With the announcement by President Nixon of a 5-year, $10 billion
energy R & D program, and the development under Dr. Dixy Lee Ray of the
initial integrated plan for the R & D program [18], OMB made available to
the agencies specially earmarked energy R & D budget supplements for Fiscal
Years 1974 and 1975. The automotive propulsion area remained a controversial
one, receiving special attention within the Executive Office of the President.
The "Ray Report" recommended $53 million for advanced auto propulsion R & D
in Fiscal Year 1975; OB approved only $33 million. Even so the increase
(from $23 million in Fiscal Year 1974) encouraged further development of
automotive energy R & D projects by the Federal agencies. The expertise
available in EPA's AAPS Division attracted new funds from this pool for work
in automotive technology other than the ongoing Rankine cycle and gas turbine
efforts, lending a de facto approval to an aggressive expansion into the
automotive energy area. One EPA official described these efforts as
"bureaucratic soonerism." In some specific areas, however, EPA's Washington
management has halted proposed AAPS programs which they did not see as part
of the EPA mission.
Also causing confusion was the President's proposal for the establishment
of an Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA). Initially it
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was planned to move the AAPS Division into ERDA. For a while there was
considerable uncertainty as to whether Congress would agree to this transfer,
but, on October 11, 1974, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 became law.
ERDA will come into existence 120 days later and will incorporate the
hardware development activities of the AAPS Division; the analysis and
assessment function will remain with EPA. The move, strongly supported by
most of the responsible Administration officials and especially the AAPS
management, has important implications for the AAPS mission. As part of an
agency devoted to R & D, it is widely presumed that the AAPS management
will be given a freer hand to engage in R & D for the explicit purpose
of advancing the state-of-the-art, rather than being constrained under an
"insurance," "lever," or "public information" role. The uncertainty of
the place of AAPS and other Federal automotive R & D efforts within ERDA,
while the legislation was under consideration, motivated the expansion of
various agency programs as a mechanism for protecting R & D "territory."
As preparation for the move to ERDA, the AAPS management has
considerably broadened their conception of the future role of the program.
They have tried to analyze future issues of public policy which will require
government automotive R & D efforts, and have concluded that the questions
of depletion of scarce materials and dependence on foreign resources
(besides petroleum), both in terms of the possibility of supply disruption
and impact on balance of payments, will be important. [19] In an even broader
context, the model of the government-industry relationship in aircraft
development, where the bulk of the major technological advances have been
funded by the Federal Government, has been proposed as analogous to the
relationship between the automobile industry and a future AAPS Program. [20]
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The continuing questioning and the weak political base of the AAPS
program was amply demonstrated as late as June, 1974, when the House
Appropriations Committee cut the Administration's proposed $17 million
Fiscal Year 1975 budget back to $7 million, and questioned their R & D
role. Their report stated:
"The Committee recommends that instead of EPA developing
new systems, the $7.2 million...be used to test new systems as
they are developed by private industry. These funds should be
used by the Agency to bring together information on all new dev-
elopments, both foreign and domestic, for the purpose of making
available to the public information on new developments and to
support the American automobile industry in the production of the
best possible vehicles for the American consumer." [21, p. 64]
The proposed funding increase had brought the program to the Committee's
attention, and their belief that powerplant R & D was a job for industry
led them to the cut. The restriction to testing and information gathering
was modified by remarks on the House floor, but the $7 million budget level
was sustained in conference, effectively eliminating any efforts other than
the continuing Rankine cycle and gas turbine projects. Thus the future
of the AAPS Program remains as cloudy today as it has been since a Federal
alternative automotive powerplant R & D program was first proposed about
eight years ago.
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Appendix B
GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY PROGRAMS
ON ALTERNATIVE AUTOMOTIVE POWER SYSTEMS
In this appendix the history and present status of each of the major
potential alternatives to the ICE for automotive use will be discussed.
An overview of the history, including the political aspects, is given
in Section 4 of the report. Also contained there are discussions of overall
funding levels of alternative powerplant R & D programs, and a summary and
comparative analysis of the magnitude of each powerplant program within the
Big Three (Ford, CGM, and Chrysler), EPA, and other industry and government
organizations. The purpose of this appendix is to supplement the report
with more detailed data in two areas: industry's historical treatment
of each alternative to the ICE, which has led to the present industry and
government programs; and present industry and government programs and
plans, both R & D and production, for alternative powerplants. The emphasis
will be programmatic rather than technological; Section 2 of this report
contains technical descriptions, and detailed technological analyses and
comparisons are available elsewhere. [1,2,3]
As discussed in Section 1, this report is concerned primarily with power-
plants for passenger car propulsion. In that context, the following
definitions have been used here (as elsewhere in the report): "ICE" --
the carbureted, reciprocating, spark-ignition, internal combustion engine
used worldwide for passenger car propulsion; "alternatives" -- those power-
plants other than ICE which have been seriously discussed for passenger
car application; "radical alternatives" -- those alternatives not now in
mass production. The term "available alternatives" will occasionally be
used to refer to those alternatives now in mass production.
A central factor dominating this discussion is that these powerplants
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are, in fact, alternatives, i.e., there exists a single engine technology
which now completely dominates the passenger car application. While there
are substantial R & D (and even production) programs for some alternatives,
their total magnitude is considerably smaller than the level of effort now
being applied to studying and improving the ICE. This is true in both
industry and government and has been so since the ICE's rise to dominance
before World War I. This is a crucial aspect of the environment within
which alternative powerplant R & D exists: the attributes of the alter-
natives are measured relative to those of the ICE, and the attributes of
the ICE have been and are continually improving. This Appendix will not
discuss the past or present work on the ICE, but, where relevant, the
evolution of the alternatives will be discussed in light of the continued
evolution of the ICE.
Finally, it is worth repeating a note of caution. As discussed in
the Preface, this appendix is based on information provided largely by the
organizations whose work is being discussed. The area of alternative
automotive powerplant R & D remains a controversial one, and there are
incentives for distortion of information. Use of independent sources,
and cross-checking of data have been attempted wherever possible, but
the opportunities have been limited. Thus, especially in the areas of
unwritten organizational policies, judgements, and motivations, this
Appendix may contain some inaccurate statements.
Diesel Engine
The potential applicability of the diesel engine to the American
passenger car market has been the subject of considerable controversy.
As is well known, the diesel engine is widely used in many heavy-duty
applications, automotive and otherwise. Since 1936 it has also been in
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mass production for light-duty motor vehicles; over a million have been
manufactured in Europe and Japan [1], and the Mercedes-Benz, and more
recently the Peugeot, have been marketed in the United States. One of
the European manufacturers, Opel, is a GM subsidiary. GM and Ford have
considerable manufacturing experience with diesel technology, ranking first
and second, respectively, in worldwide diesel engine production. [4]
The diesel engines presently in mass production for light-duty automotive
applications do not provide vehicle performance comparable to that typically
expected in American passenger cars. They can meet the original 1975
emission standards without add-on devices and do have superior fuel economy,
but also smoke, particulate, odor, noise, and low-temperature starting
problems and relatively high weight and initial cost. Because of these
problems, they have not sold well in the United States: diesel-powered
vehicles have typically constituted about 14% of Mercedes' U.S. sales in
recent years. [5] Even in Europe, where fuel economy has always been more
of a significant factor in sales, diesels have constituted less than 20%
of combined Peugeot and Mercedes sales [1], and less than 3% of overall
sales. [6] Based on these considerations, the Big Three have never offered
a domestically produced diesel-powered passenger car. [7]
It is possible that with a substantial redesign from presently used
concepts a diesel with a significantly improved power-to-weight ratio could
be designed and manufactured as a suitable competitor to the ICE in the
American passenger car market. Such a "light-weight" diesel could cost less
than the "heavy-weight" diesels now in use in both the passenger car and truck
markets, at a sacrifice of some durability, which is now very high relative
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to that of the ICE. EPA has funded a study with Ricardo and Company
Engineers of England to examine a wide range of design alternatives to
the presently used configuration, but it is generally felt that a redesign
of the substantial magnitude required puts the light-weight diesel in
the "radical" alternative category.
The odor and particulate emissions of the diesel constitute a
formidable disadvantage. As used here, "particulate" emissions refers
to the solid content of the exhaust, while "smoke" refers to the
characteristic of exhaust visibility. While the exhaust of a diesel
may be invisible, it may still have a particulate content considerably
higher than that of a comparable ICE. Particulate emissions of electric
powerplants and other stationary sources are heavily regulated. Smoke
from heavy-duty vehicles is regulated by a visibility standard, which can
be met by light-duty diesels as well.
It is widely assumed that, if the diesel were to be installed in a
significant fraction of new American vehicles, then EPA would set motor
vehicle emission standards for its odor and particulate emissions. The
industry, operating on this assumption, does not know what to expect in
the level of the standards relative to present emissions. A commitment
to mass produce in the face of this uncertainty is obviously very risky.
EPA is conducting an "impact" study of the effects of widespread use of
diesel-powered passenger cars, but is clearly not close to setting any
standards in anticipation of American mass production. In fact it is
possible that, due to the press of shorter-term business, EPA would
not set standards before plans for such production are at least announced,
whereas such plans might never be made without established standards. This
dilemma is clearly an inhibitory factor for the Big Three against significant
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commitments of resources to diesel technology. Although not an
uncertainty in the same sense as the odor and particulate emissions, NOx
emissions are also a problem with the diesel. NOx reduction techniques
proposed for use on the ICE are not applicable to the diesel due to the
different combustion process and chemical composition of its exhaust; there
is considerable pessimism in the industry concerning the attainment of
the original 1976 standard.
In spite of all this, with the recent increased emphasis on fuel
economy the Big Three's interest in the diesel has picked up
somewhat. There seems to be little doubt that the diesel can be mass-
produced, though at higher cost than the ICE. At GM, the Research Laboratories
are looking at NO, reduction techniques, there is an effort on the Engineering
Staff to reevaluate the diesels which are presently available, and several
of the passenger car divisions are testing diesels in their vehicles.
Ford's total diesel effort is funded at less than $1 million per year; they
presently rate it a poorer short-term prospect than the stratified charge
and a poorer long-term prospect than the Stirling or gas turbine. Chrysler
has been doing some single-cylinder experiments aimed at NOx reduction
and testing some commercially available engines in passenger cars. On
the whole, though, the Big Three's programs can be described as being in a
"holding pattern," primarily due to uncertainties with likely but unknown
emission standards and difficulty in attaining a known one.
There is a high level of interest in the diesel within government
circles, because of the good fuel economy and inherently low CO and hydro-
carbon emissions. Due to the wide familiarily with the technology, however,
there has been a resistance within the Government to funding R & D projects
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other than studies. EPA's impact study was mentioned above; EPA has also
commissioned a design optimization for the heavy and light-duty truck
applications and the passenger car. DOT has funded several projects which
have analyzed the potential impact of widespread diesel usage on the
national automotive fuel demand.
Wankel Spark-Ignition Engine
Unlike the other systems discussed here, industry consideration of
the Wankel has not been based on air pollution or fuel economy consider-
ations. The Wankel's advantage over the ICE lies in its relatively small
size and weight per unit of power, and this has stimulated interest among
the automobile manufacturers.
There have been many rotary piston engine concepts explored in the
past century. Attention is now centered on a rotary piston configuration
based on the Otto cycle (like the ICE), that was invented by Felix Wankel
in 1953. The first prototype of this engine was successfully run in NSU
Motor Werke in Germany in 1957. NSU owns the basic Wankel patent, having
bought it from Felix Wankel, and began marketing the engine in Europe in
a passenger car in 1964. [1] By 1967, a number of motor vehicle manufacturers,
including Citroen, Toyo Kogyo, Daimler-Benz, Alfa Romeo, and Rolls Royce, had
obtained licenses, but no American automobile manufacturer. [8] The
Japanese firm Toyo Kogyo began production of Wankel-powered passenger cars
in 1967 and exporting them to the United States several years later. GM
bought a license for U.S. Wankel engine production in November, 1970,
and Ford of Germany bought one in November, 1971, for production in Germany.
Active development for uses other than the passenger car has been
pursued in the United States primarily by Curtiss-Wright. Engines with
power outputs from 0.6 hp to 780 hp have been built, with potential uses
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in model airplanes, lawnmowers, snowmobiles, boats, and aircraft, as well
as automobiles. [1]
Along with its weight and size advantage relative to the ICE, the
Wankel also has somewhat lower NOx emissions, but its hydrocarbon and CO
emissions are higher. Its fuel economy is unfavorable, however, and the
recent rise in importance of this attribute has diminished the interest
in the Wankel, among all parties. Toyo Kogyo's Wankel-powered vehicle,
the Mazda, rose continuously in U.S. monthly sales after its introduction,
reaching a peak of 11,000 in March, 1973, and was forecast to go considerably
higher. EPA's widely publicized fuel economy data came out and showed
the Mazda's fuel economy to e substantially poorer than that of other
vehicles in its weight class. [9] With the gasoline shortages in the
summer of 1973 and the Arab oil embargo that fall, the Mazda's sales
dropped off sharply. In March, 1974, 5,300 were sold. [10] After considerable
controversy over the testing procedure, EPA and Toyo Kogyo agreed on a
more complete testing program, which reaffirmed the Mazda's relatively
high fuel consumption [11], and Mazda sales have not recovered.
GM believed that by using an exhaust catalyst for hydrocarbon and CO
emission control, rather than the thermal reactor used on the Mazda, they
could reach a fuel economy that, with the engine's size and weight
advantages, would make it a successful product. [6] Because its emissions
characteristics are basically similar to those of the ICE, there would be
no new risk associated with having to meet the pending tighter standards.
They therefore planned to introduce the engine in a subcompact during the 1974
model year. Their investment in the Wankel has included $50 million in
license rights for the period 1970-75 [12], $50-60 million in production
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tooling, and a substantial development and engineering effort. Some work
on rotary engines remains in the Engineering Staff and GMRL, but Chevrolet
Division has principal responsibility, along with Hydramatic Division which
was assigned production responsibility.
With the rise of the energy issue, GM postponed introduction of the
engine to the 1975 model year to do further work on its fuel consumption. [6]
On September 24, 1974, GM announced that mass production was postponed
'indefinitely," due to difficulties in attaining a sufficiently high fuel
economy while still meeting the 1975 emission standard for hydrocarbons. [13]
The 1977 standard for hydrocarbons was also apparently a major concern. [14]
Ford explored the Wankel, but, in early 1974, after an investment of
approximately $10 million, the program was terminated due to their
pessimistic evaluation of the engine's fuel economy characteristics. [15]
Chrysler also evaluated the engine and decided not to pursue it.
Because its primary advantages have been commercial there have been
no government programs on the Wankel (other than the EPA testing mentioned
above).
Stratified Charge Engine
Of the many modifications to the ICE combustion process which can be
termed "stratified charge," only a few have received serious attention in
American industry. In the United States, the first important effort was
Texaco's invention of a "knockless" engine in the 1940's. In 1965 the U.S.
Army Tank-Automotive Command began funding a number of concepts, reached
the engine demonstration stage with both the Ford PROCO and Texaco TCCS
systems (both open-chamber) and, in 1972, selected the Texaco system over
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Ford's for engineering development. [1] Ford's program is continuing in-house
without Army support. It was an Army jeep powered by a Ford PROCO engine
that, in September, 1971, became the first motor vehicle to meet the
original 1976 standards. The prechamber concept has long been used in
diesel engines; it is now being actively developed as a stratified charge
technique for spark-ignition engines by a number of companies. The Honda
Motor Company of Japan has begun mass production of vehicles with their
CVCC engine (a prechamber engine). In the spring of 1972, a CVCC in a
small car met the original 1975 emission standards without the use of an
exhaust catalyst or exhaust gas recirculation. [16] The dramatic developments
by Ford (for the Army and EPA), and Honda's developments, received a great
deal of publicity and generated considerable interest in the automobile
industry in the stratified charge concept. The Honda development, especially,
resulted in some feeling that automotive technology was not being as
aggressively pursued in the U.S. as it was overseas, and some embarrassment
to American industry.
There are two basic classes of stratified charge engine that are today
considered alternatives to the ICE. The fuel-injected open-chamber engine,
exemplified by the Texaco TCCS and Ford PROCO engines, combines some aspects
of the diesel and of the ICE. The use of fuel injection may allow significant
improvements in fuel economy, multi-fuel capability, and substantially reduced
emissions, but it is a major departure from the ICE, is not close to mass
production, and must be considered a radical alternative. The prechamber
stratified charge engine uses two separate fuel-air mixtures, at different
fuel air ratios, to achieve stratification. The richer stream enters
through a small prechamber, off the main chamber, where it is ignited. The
jet from the rich mixture ignites the leaner mixture in the main chamber.
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The configuration requires a second carburetion system and a redesigned
cylinder head with a second set of intake valves, but is much closer to the
ICE than the open-chamber system, and is in mass production. While it
offers some advantage in emission levels relative to the ICE, it does not
have the potential fuel economy or multi-fuel advantages of the open-
chamber systems.
Honda, long a motorcycle manufacturer, entered the 4-wheeled vehicle
market in 1962 with a line of very light trucks. In 1967 they produced
their first passenger car. [17] Their CVCC program began in 1969 when,
according to Honda, they completed a review of the available pollution
control technology, and decided that an approach aimed at modifying the
basic combustion process in the ICE would best satisfy their requirements.
By early 1971 the CVCC concept was completed, by the spring of 1972 they
had a prototype engine, and between then and May, 1973, they built 150
engines and accumulated 1 million miles of road experience. In late 1972
they committed themselves to mass production, [18] and in December, 1973,
the first CVCC-equipped cars rolled off the production line. [17]
As of May, 1973, they planned to build 500,000 CVCC-powered automobiles.
in 1975, of which about 250,000 would be committed to the US market. [18]
The CVCC RP & D program cost about $50 million; they also spent $20 million
to convert one engine line to the CVCC, and planned an additional $80
million for a new CVCC line. [18]
Ford appears to have the most aggressive stratified charge engine
program of the Big Three. On May 23, 1973, the President of Ford stated
to the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate's Public Works
Committee that, if an NOx standard in the neighborhood of 2.0 g/mile wereX
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established on a long-term basis by the end of 1973, and if Ford's
development efforts went as expected, then Ford would put some variant of
a stratified charge engine into mass production on one engine line at
the rate of about 500,000 per year, for the 1977 model year. [4] In June,
1974, a Ford spokesman reaffirmed and updated the statement, stating that
production could begin about three model years after the NOx standard was
changed, and that the engine would probably be the CVCC concept. [19] Aside
from GM's plans for the Wankel, which has no significant emissions or fuel
economy advantage over the ICE, Ford's statement is the closest an American
manufacturer has come to committing themselves to mass production of an
"alternative" passenger car engine. It is clear that such a commitment
could not have been made without a substantial program through
engineering development of a specific engine. Although these programs were
initiated in the Product Planning and Research Staff, the Engine Division
has become heavily involved. Through May, 1973, Ford had invested about
$6.5 million of its own funds in the PROCO system and had received $1.3
million from the Army. [4, p. 1037] Ford has also negotiated an agreement
with Honda for CVCC technology (they have reportedly paid Honda $5 million
to date) 118] and at this time the PROCO and CVCC concepts are competing
with the ICE for late 1970's production. They have estimated that it would
cost about $70 million to build a new engine line for stratified charge
engine production, if only the cylinder head were radically changed from
the ICE. [4, p. 1056]
Although they do not have Ford's long history of stratified charge
engine development work and do not appear to be as close to possible
production, GM does presently have an active program in this area. Their
work on the "torch ignition" engine, a prechamber concept somewhat different
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from the CVCC, is being handled primarily on the Engineering Staff, where
50-75 people are involved in applying the concept to the 140 and 350 CID
Chevrolet engines. About 30 prototype engines have been built. Some
directly related combustion work is also being done at GMRL. Their much
smaller program on open-chamber stratified charge concepts is entirely
at GMRL, and is presently confined to single-cylinder studies. GM has had
some limited interaction with Honda, but they state that their work is
based on literature which was published in the U.S. and the Soviet Union in
1960. [6]
Chrysler's stratified charge development program seems to be at a
much lower level of effort than GM's or Ford's. They have worked with
Texaco on utilizing the TCCS concept, since the early 1950's, but at the
present time they are only working with a single four-cylinder TCCS engine
in a Cricket. [20] In the fall of 1973 Chrysler signed an agreement with
Honda (like Ford, they have reportedly paid $5 million to date) 17] to
study the CVCC engine on two Honda Civics and on two 350 CID Chrysler V-8's.
[20]
Among the other industry efforts to bring the stratified charge
concept to fruition, it appears that Volkswagen's is probably the most
significant; it appears to be a small effort using several single and
multi-cylinder engines modified to the prechamber concept. [21]
The Army's stratified charge engine program has been previously
mentioned. It began in 1962 with a review at TACOM of all the potential
systems which might combine the fuel economy and versatility of the diesel
with the light weight and manufacturability of the ICE. The fuel economy
and versatility requirements are aimed at reducing the necessary logistical
B-13
support and minimizing the impact of refined fuel unavailability during
war-time. As the program proceeded these aspects developed well, and the
engine also appeared to have very low emissions. The NAPCA Cincinnatti
laboratory tested an Army engine as early as 1968. With the passage of
the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, EPA's AAPS program turned its attention
to the stratified charge as a short-term alternative, and contributed a
total of $550,000 in FiscalYears 1971 and 1972 to the TACOM program to
further support the low emissions aspects and then to buy several engines.
Because the vehicles intended to receive the engine were designed for
highway use, they are subject to emission standards, so meeting the
relevant emission standards was one of the Army's goals already. In
Fiscal Year 1975 TACOM is supporting the building and shock testing of
fifteen 90 hp engines; White Motor Co. is building the engines to Texaco
designs. Besides the White-Texaco contracts there are a number of supporting
efforts examining the details of the combustion process and other aspects
of the TCCS concept. As of February, 1974, Fiscal Year 1974 and 1975 funding
for stratified charge work was budgeted at $1.8 million and $1.9 million,
respectively.
EPA's investment in the Army program paid off handsomely toward EPA's
"lever" goal when, in September, 1971, an Army jeep with a Ford PROCO engine
developed by TACOM with some EPA support and tested under EPA funding, was
announced by President Nixon to a Detroit audience as the first vehicle to
meet the original 1976 standards. EPA stopped development funding of the
Army stratified charge after fiscal year 1972 as the Army proceeded to
engineering development. They have, however, continued testing and
evaluation of the PROCO and TCCS engines they bought and also three Honda
CVCC engines in Civics. [22]
B-14
Gas Turbine Engine
The gas turbine engine has been the object of the largest R & D programs,
and come the closest to mass production of any radical alternative since
the rise to dominance of the ICE. With the use of the jet engine in air-
craft after World War II, each of the Big Three began development programs.
Interest fluctuated until the rise of the air pollution issue. EPA and
each of the Big Three now have substantial programs.
Chrysler's automotive gas turbine program has been the most publicized.
[23] Design studies begun in 1939 were interrupted by World War II and did
not pick up again until the early 1950's, under the direction of the Product
Planning and Development Staff. An engine was laboratory-tested, and, in
late 1953, a gas turbine-powered Plymouth was driven in Detroit. Continued
development was supported by vehicle testing in traffic, cross-country
trips, consumer reaction tours, etc. Finally a "Fourth Generation" engine
was installed in fifty specially designed vehicles and, from October, 1963,
to January, 1966, these vehicles were driven by 203 drivers for three months
each. Chrysler felt that the gas turbine had a number of inherent advantages
that would make it a valuable product: smoothness, easy cold starting with
instant heat for passengers and immediate defrosting of windows, longer
life and lower maintenance, reduced oil consumption, elimination of the
cooling system, etc. [14, p. 2760] By 1963 they felt they had reached the
point in their development when extensive consumer evalution was required.
Chrysler received a great deal of favorable publicity for the
consumer test program, and the corporate management was quite pleased with
it. Most of the sample drivers were "enthusiastic" about their vehicles,
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but there were some problems in the areas of low-speed fuel consumption,
noise, engine braking and acceleration lag. High manufacturing costs
remained a problem, but Chrysler seems to have had confidence that, in the
long run, it could be made competitive. A fifth generation engine was
designed and preliminary plans were made for production of 500 engines for
sale in Dodge vehicles. However, for a number of reasons, these plans
were never implemented. The technological problems mentioned above were
given as the reason in September, 1967. [24, p. 2762] A more recent
publication mentions "prevailing economic conditions" and required burner
development to meet forecast NO emission requirements. [23, p. 39] It
has been estimated that to repeat the fifty vehicle test program today
would cost one to two hundred million dollars (including engine development).
Chrysler's gas turbine program fell to a much lower level of funding
after 1966. A sixth generation engine was developed, with work on reduction
of NOx emmissions receiving increased attention. However, 1970 alternative
powerplant expenditures were reported as only $100,000 [12], as engineers
were assigned to ICE emissions control tasks. In December, 1972, Chrysler
was awarded a $6.5 million, multi-year contract by EPA's AAPS Division to
serve as their gas turbine systems contractor. Chrysler is now funding its
own parallel work at the level of $1-2 million per year.
EPA's AAPS program had, from its inception in 1970, considered the
gas turbine a prime candidate as a low-emissions alternative to the ICE.
In mid-1971, along with the Rankine cycle engine, it was chosen for full
support and demonstration. In contrast to the Rankine cycle case, however,
gas turbine engines incorporating modern technology were available in vehicles.
EPA therefore decided to follow a problem-solving approach, concentrating its
resources in key areas. Because virtually all the modern automotive gas
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turbines used the same regenerative split shaft system, EPA also decided
to determine whether or not this was the best long-term approach. A battery
of contracts were therefore let for cost studies, cycle optimizations and
low-emission burner development. An interagency agreement with NASA was
concluded to provide technical assistance from the Lewis Research Center.
EPA then chose Chrysler as their systems contractor, to provide a baseline
engine and integrate into it the developments of the component contractors.
Besides the combustor work, important developments continue on substitution
of a ceramic regenerator for the metallic one used in the baseline engine
(to improve fuel economy), development of a reasonably inexpensive control
system (by AiResearch Div. of Garrett Corp. on subcontract from Chrysler),
development of variable inlet guidevanes for the compressor, and the
development (by Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Co. and AiResearch) of low
manufacturing cost turbine wheels (which may or may not be used in the
upgraded engine). Demonstration of the upgraded engine in a compact vehicle
is scheduled for 1976. EPA is confident that the vehicle will meet its
goal of one-half the original 1976 emission standards, and have competitive
fuel economy. Through Fiscal Year 1973 EPA had invested $7.3 million in
its gas turbine program.
GM's first automotive turbine was announced in January, 1954. Different
versions were installed in a passenger car and a bus. By 1958, an improved,
regenerative engine, the "GT-305", was announced, and was installed in a
passenger car and a truck tractor. Up to this point the work had been
performed in the GM Research Laboratories (GMRL)! The GT-305 was modified
by GM's Allison Division (now part of Detroit Diesel Allison) and sold to
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a limited number of customers for various applications for evaluation
purposes. Subsequently, responsibility was returned to GMRL, where the
GT-309 was developed. [25, 26] Further evolution has resulted in the GT-404.
This engine, in the 325 hp range, is a regenerated split-shaft system for
heavy-duty application. A Detroit Diesel design is now in pilot production
and a number are in the field being evaluated. [6 & 26, p. 4-33] GM has
stated that they expect gas turbine engines to be 25% of Detroit Diesel
Allison's production by 1980. [26, p. 4-33]
Work on a passenger car gas turbine engine apparently waned while the
GT-309 and GT-404 were the center of attention, but passage of the Clean
Air Amendments of 1970 caused GM to take another look. [27] In about mid-1971,
a Passenger Car Turbine Development Division was formed on the Engineering
Staff, and it has been supplemented by a task force of personnel from Detroit
Diesel Allison, GMRL, Manufacturing Staff, the car divisions, etc. It has
been reported that 300 people from 23 GM divisions were involved as of early
1973. [26, p. 4-33] GM claims to have met the .4 gm/mi NO standard with a
gas turbine vehicle on a dynamometer, but with a very complex combustor
configuration.
Ford's automotive gas turbine program began in 1952, [28] and, like
GM's, has culminated in a heavy-duty turbine which is close to production.
In 1971 a plant in Toledo, Ohio, was converted to produce annually 1000 of
these engines, in the 400-500 hp range, for truck bus, marine, generator, and
other applications, automotive and otherwise. [26] Production was stopped
after the first 200, however, due to corrosion problems with the ceramic
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regenerator. They hope to have the problem soved by late 1975, with a $2-3
million per year development program now underway.
In 1970, as part of their evaluation of all potential alternatives to
the ICE, Ford concluded that with the turbine inlet temperature limited by
the use of a metal turbine, the fuel economy of a gas turbine passenger car
would not be competitive. They determined through laboratory burner tests
that they could probably meet the .4 g/mile NOx standard. In contrast to
GM and Chrysler, they therefore decided that rather than proceed with a
prototype vehicle development and demonstration program, they would concentrate
on developing ceramic components.
Later that year, in something of a coincidence, their experience
and expertise in the development of ceramic compments for gas turbine
engines attracted the attention of the Army and ARPA. ARPA was interested
in developing and demonstrating the use of ceramics in gas turbine engines.
They worked out contracts with Ford, for the passenger car application,
and Westinghouse, for electric power generation. ARPA is funding a 5-year
program; it began in June, 1971 with the letting of a $10.3 million contract
to Ford with Westinghouse as subcontractor.
The goal of the Ford effort is to demonstrate a gas turbine engine with
uncooled ceramic high temperature components at turbine inlet temperatures
of 25000°F for 200 hrs. on an appropriate duty cycle. Such an engine should
achieve an efficiency improvement of 20-30% and approximately a doubling of
power-to-weight ratio (relative to a state-of-the-art 1800°F engine) as well
as significantly reduced manufacturing costs. Eventually, of course, a more
appropriate passenger car- lifetime (3500 hrs.) would have to be demonstrated.
Ford is funding a parallel in-house effort at about $2 million per year.
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There has been, and continues to be, considerable work outside of the
Big Three in this area. The world's first turbine-powered passenger car
was built by Rover in England in 1950. This effort has ultimately resulted
in a heavy duty truck engine at British Leyland. In the early 1950's Boeing
demonstrated a truck powered by a gas turbine engine of their design. [25]
More recently, Caterpillar Tractor and International Harvester have
reportedly been developing heavy-duty automotive turbine engines, and Fiat
and Volkswagen (in Europe) passenger car turbine engines. [24, p. 2758] The
Williams Research Corp., a manufacturer of small gas turbine engines for
aerospace applications, has been working on passenger car turbine
engines for 18 years, often in conjunction with the major car companies. [29]
Rankine Cycle Engine
Programs for the development of automotive Rankine cycle systems presently
exhibit the greatest disparities between the activity levels of the different
sectors involved in automotive R & D. At the present time none of the Big
Three is investing significantly in Rankine cycle technology. The Federal
Government, through the AAPS Program, invested $14.4 million dollars during
Fiscal Years 1969-1973, is continuing to fund the program at $2-3 million per
year, and will demonstrate its system in a vehicle in 1976. Among the innovators
and entrepreneurs, the last decade has seen a flurry of activity, which
is actually just a peak in the stream of activity which, every five or
ten years for the last century or so, has resulted in a demonstration
vehicle.
These disparities result from the fact that the technology to build a
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Rankine cycle vehicle whose road performance approximates that of the
modern passenger car, but with lower emissions, is readily accessible to
any good machine shop (unlike the Stirling or gas turbine systems, for
example). However, to achieve competitive "packageability," easy start-ups,
freeze protection, and acceptable fuel economy requires a substantial
investment in the latest mechanical technology. The Big Three have reached
the conclusion that their investments on alternative powerplants are better
made in other systems. The Federal Government, partly in response to this
Big Three neglect, has disagreed. The innovators and entrepreneurs have,
so far it seems, over-estimated the market for the vehicles with low
emissions, but with one or more non-competitive features, which they have
been able to demonstrate to date. The highly polticial atmosphere surrounding
the air pollution issue, the feeling that the Big Three were not giving the
technology a "fair shake," faith in the application of the available modern
technology, and a certain amount of nostalgic feeling toward the old "steamers"
all contributed to this optimism.
GM's recent automotive Rankine cycle program took place during the years
1968-1970. Ricardo and Co. of England were hired to perform a design study;
Besler Developments Co. designed, built, and installed a modern version
of the old Doble engine in a Chevelle for GM; and GMRL built the SE-101 and
mounted it in a Pontiac. [30, 31] The SE-101 program cost on the order of
$10 million. As previously discussed, the performance of the two water-
based, reciprocating, systems built was disappointing (see Appendix A).
Beginning in 1970 GM began providing technical assistance and some hardware
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to Lear Motors. At the present time GM's only activity in the Rankine field
is to "maintain cognizance of developments outside of GM." [30]
Ford's principal effort on the automotive Rankine cycle was in
partial support of the work of the Thermo Electron Corp. on an organic-
based system in this area. The relationship began in about 1968 and
terminated in late 1973, after a total investment by Ford of over $5 million.
Thermo Electron has been and remains a principal AAPS contractor, receiving
$3.4 million for Fiscal Years 1969 through 1973, and they also had invested
about $3.5 million of their own funds through May 1973. Ford has indicated
that cooling, packaging, weight, and, most importantly, fuel economy were
the limiting problems. [19]
Chrysler has apparently never had a significant Rankine cycle
development effort, but they now have a subcontract from Scientific Energy
Systems, the AAPS Program's principal Rankine cycle contractor, to assist
them in vehicle integration.
The Rankine cycle program that has probably received more attention
than any other has been Bill Lear's. Lear founded Lear Motors, Inc., at
Reno, Nevada, in 1968, with the intention of developing and marketing an
alternative to the ICE. By May, 1973, he had invested about $15 million
of his personal funds (by his own account) and had received $500,000 from
the DOT (UMTA)-State of California program for a Rankine cycle bus demonstration.
[33] During 1]973 Lear Motors held a $900,000 contract from the AAPS Program,
but they could not meet the performance they had promised, and EPA has made
efforts to recover the funds. [34] As of late 1973, Lear's system used
water and a turbine expander. Lear's program has apparently fallen to a
low level of effort (see hybrids section).
1 For example, see [32].
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Two other private efforts worth mentioning are those of Jay Carter
Enterprises and the Williams Engine Co. The Williams vehicle was a
partially open cycle, water-based system with a reciprocating expander.
Engines were built in several size ranges, and vehicles were built and
demonstrated using the system, during the 1950's and 1960's, and received
alot of publicity. In 1966 they offered, through the Steam Automobile
Club of America, to sell engines and install them in vehicles, at $10,250
apiece; [35] they received ten orders but were never able to deliver due
to unexpected costs. [36]
The Carter car was recently tested by EPA; it was found to be the first
vehicle to meet the original 1976 standards without any catalytic converters
or other exhaust gas treatment devices, but the fuel economy was termed a
'major problem." Its fuel economy was 15 mpg over EPA's Federal Driving
Cycle, as compared with 22 mpg for the same vehicle, a Volkswagen Station
Wagon, with the standard engine. [37] The Carters subsequently stated: "We
are working on our second system, it will be unquestionably superior to the
ICE engine [sic] and it will just flat blow the lid off this thing." [38]
An AAPS official stated that EPA had provided some technical advice to
Carter, that it looked like the engine was a "good piece of work", and that,
even though they had made extensive efforts to contact everyone working on
automotive Rankine cycle technology, there seemed to be a reservoir of
back-yard mechanics working on automotive steam engines.
The only vehicle manufacturer now actively engaged in automotive
Rankine cycle development is Saab Scania in Sweden. Theirs seems to be
a comprehensive but small program, very far from production. [39]
1No relation to Sam Williams of Williams Research Corp.
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The first Federal R & D effort on automotive Rankine cycle systems
was supported by the Urban Mass Transportation Administration of the
Department of Transportation. Grants were made to the State of California
and the City of Dallas for Rankine cycle-powered buses. Four different
buses were designed (one was Lear's), built, and tested in local transit
service. The program was completed in December, 1972. In general, the
results were very disappointing, especially in fuel economy as compared to
the conventional diesel systems. [1] The California State Assembly has
followed the bus program with the California Clean Car Project. The
Aerojet Liquid Rocket Co. and the Steam Power Systems Co. have contracts
under the project to design and build Rankine cycle-powered passenger cars.
Testing of the vehicles by State Agencies was scheduled to begin in
July, 1974, and be completed several months later.
The EPA Rankine cycle program is presently the major effort in
this area. The Government's interest was attracted in the late 1960's
by the obvious potential for low emissions from the continuous, atmospheric
pressure, external combustion used in Rankine cycle systems. The first
contract was let in 1969 to Thermo Electron Corp. for a preliminary design
study. With the establishment of the AAPS program and its concentration on
shorter-term systems, the Rankine cycle joined the gas turbine as the focus
of EPA's development efforts. Because there was neither a generally agreed
upon choice of key design parameters nor an acceptable "baseline" engine
(in contrast to the gas turbine) EPA chose to fund four competing system
contractors: Lear with a water-based turbine system, Scientific Energy Systems
(SES) with a water-based reciprocating system, Aeroject Liquid Rocket Corp. with
an organic-based turbine system,and Thermo-Electron Corp. with an organic-
based reciprocating system. In late 1973 the SES system was
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chosen for development through the vehicle demonstration, with support
of Thermo Electron continued at a lower level through engine prototype,
as a back-up. The SES engine will be demonstrated in a compact car in 1976.
[40] It will incorporate the work of a number of EPA's component contractors.
The emissions target of one-half the original 1976 standards will be met,
but the fuel economy will be somewhat lower (10-30%) than comparable ICE-
powered vehicles. Through Fiscal Year 1973 EPA had invested $14.4 million
in its Rankine cycle program.
Stirling Cycle Engine
The Stirling cycle engine offers possibly the best long-term prospects
for low emissions and high fuel economy. It uses external combustion
like the Rankine cycle, but has a theoretical thermal efficiency as high
as the maximum thermodynamically possible. It has a number of very
important engineering problems, however, which have limited interest in
it for mass production applications. Most important among them are the
cost of the heater head which consists of many small tubes of expensive
metal alloy, the lack of a simple mechanism for controlling the power
output while maintaining thermal efficiency, and difficulties in containing
the gaseous working fluid.
The modern development of Stirling cycle power systems has principally
been accomplished at the Philips Research Laboratories, Eindhoven, Netherlands,
the main part of the research arm of N.V. Philips.1 Their program began in
1938; it was initially intended to meet a demand for quiet generation of
electric power for radios at remote sites, but the invention of the
1 N.V. Philips is the eighth largest industrial corporation in the world
according to the August, 1974, Fortune rankings. They are known in the
U.S. for their Norelco line of electrical appliances.
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transistor virtually eliminated the demand. The automotive application is
only one of a large number that Philips has explored in its continuing
efforts. [41] Estimates of Philips' total investment in Stirling technology
range up to $100 million. United Stirling, a Swedish firm, half privately
and half government-owned, bought a license from Philips and has also been
actively developing an automotive Stirling engine. Two German licensees
MAN and MWN have built heavy-duty engines and demonstrated one in a bus.
Philips (at their Aachen, Germany, laboratory) has also worked on an electrically
charged heat storage system for use with its Stirling engine.
GM was a licensee of Philips from 1958 to 1970, and invested $10-15
million in Stirling technology during that time. [30] The analysis, design,
construction and testing of a number of engines was involved, including
25,000 hours of operating experience. [42] The program was terminated by
top management when it appeared that several key problem areas could not be
overcome within the then-forseeable future. "GM believes the Stirling engine
to be unsuitable for passenger car use." [30]
In about 1970, Ford conducted an in-house review of Stirling technology.
Philips at this time was actively seeking a licensee in the American automobile
industry to replace GM. [41] After considerable technical dialogue and some
in-house testing at Ford, Ford management became optimistic with respect
to the key problem'areas and proceeded to negotiate an agreement with Philips,
in 1971, and another with United Stirling, in 1972. [19] At the present time
there is a three-way set of coordinated agreements, giving Ford access to
all the relevant technology at United Stirling and Philips, and, subject
to some minor limitations, an exclusive license for worldwide application
B-26
of the technology to passenger cars. With Philips, Ford is jointly
engineering a 170 hp engine for installation in a Torino late this year.
The United Stirling effort will develop a 55 hp engine and will mount it
in a Pinto. The program is being managed by the Product Planning and Research
Staff at Ford.
In mid-1975 Ford will reach a major decision point on its Stirling
program. If "proof of principle" has been demonstrated in the vehicle
tests then a second four-year effort aimed at a pre-production version
will be undertaken. Here the emphasis would be on optimizing the fuel
economy and other performance characteristics, and the manufacturing
costs, while meeting the emission standards. Should this effort reach
a satisfactory conclusion, the responsibility would be transferred from
the Product Planning and Research Staff to the Engine Division, and
mass production could begin as early as four years later. It appears at
this time that the key technical "barrier problem" is the cost of the heater
heads. If it appears that a major advance is needed, then the engine program
would probably be stopped and Ford would consider approaching the Government
for support of basic work in the area.
The Ford program is presently the only significant automotive Stirling
program in the United States. Like the case of the gas turbine, the
modern Stirling engine may be considered "high technology," requiring a
substantial resource commitment in order just to put a presentable vehicle
on the road. Unlike both the gas turbine and Rankine cycle engines, it
is clearly a high risk item, involving several problems for which an incremental
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development approach will probably not be adequate, and, furthermore,
there is little experience with the system in the United States. The
features have resulted in a situation where, similar to the gas turbine,
there are no American "innovators" demonstrating vehicles or even selling
technology and only the automobile manufacturers have had significant
continuing programs.
Because of the potentially low emissions and high fuel economy a
number of Government programs have been recently proposed by EPA and
FEA, but none have been implemented. EPA's is aimed at a passenger car
engine along the lines of Philips'. FEA has proposed the development,
in stages, of a passenger car using a Stirling engine powered by a heat
store. Heat would be transferred from the store to the engine by a heat
pipe, eliminating the need for an on-board combustion system. The store
could be "charged" at the owner's residence either electrically, or from
a combustion system or solar heat. The first prototype would be a 10 hp
engine in a '"minicar." FEA has also proposed the development of heavy-duty
engines, in the 400 hp range for trucks and in the 3600 hp range for locomotives.
FEA estimated the cost of these programs at about $32 million over five years.
Battery-Powered Electric System
There is a long history of electrically driven vehicles,as there is
with steam engines. Since the early days of the automobile industry it
has been relatively easy, using lead-acid batteries and off-the-shelf
electric motors, to build a vehicle which looks and behaves more-or-less
like the commercial passenger cars of the day. And since the early
days the fundamental problem has been the same: the total energy that can
be stored in a reasonable weight of batteries limits the vehicle's range,
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and the rate at which batteries can be drawn down without significantly reducirg
the total available energy limits the vehicle's speed and acceleration.
Other batteries besides the lead-acid system are available and can somewhat
alleviate either the power or the range limit, at considerable cost, but
it remains the battery which is the key technological defect of the electric
car.
The air pollution and energy issues focused renewed interest on
electric vehicles. However, in neither area would the widespread replacement
of ICE-powered passenger cars be the panacea that has sometimes been suggested.
It would, however, change the impact of personal transportation in ways that
might ease both problems. An electric vehicle does not emit air pollutants,
but does cause an increase in load and thus emissions from the powerplant
which was the source of electricity for its battery. Thus NOx, CO and
hydrocarbons on the street are traded for NOx, SO2, particulates and heat,
or radiation and heat, at the powerplant. Similarly, a requirement for
gasoline is replaced by a requirement for electricity. There are some
complicated trade-offs which must be made. EPA has funded a detailed
examination by the General Research Corp. of these tradeoffs for the Los
Angeles, St. Louis and Philadelphia areas.
There have been two main trends in the development efforts on the
electric vehicle. The first has consisted of the many attempts to develop
a vehicle using lead-acid or other off-the-shelf batteries and market it
for some specialized use, usually involving short trips in urban areas,
e.g. mail or retail delivery, or the "urban car" for short-range commuters
or urban housewives. A large number of companies, including all the Big
Three, have worked on this approach; among them have been the firms now
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involved in production of golf carts, fork lifts, coal mine equipment,
and the like. In no case has anything like mass production been approached
in the U.S. It is, however, generally agreed that electric vehicles using
lead-acid or other currently available batteries can never satisfy more than
a negligible fraction of the passenger car demand. EPA has suggested the
possibility that such vehicles could be brought into use in areas with
major air pollution problems through government regulation. [43]
The other major R & D thrust has been on advanced batteries, which
would make an electric vehicle competitive in performance and, hopefully,
cost. A number of companies involved in manufacturing batteries, for one
use or another, are engaged in R & D in this area,including Ford and GM.
It is possible, if not even likely, that this reasearch will result in a
viable passenger car prototype within a decade or two. It has been
estimated that a total of $4-6 million per year of public and private funds
are now being invested in battery research in the United States and a slightly
smaller amount in Western Europe and Japan. [44]
A thirds less important, area which has been considered as part of an
electric drive system is the fuel cell. A fuel cell would convert the
chemical energy of on-board fuels directly to electricity, much like a
continuously replenishing batter. However, while fuel cell technology
continues to be developed for space and several other uses, due to a number
of formidable problems there are no programs to apply it to motor vehicles.
GM has been involved in electric vehicle development for over a
decade. In the early 1960's studies in the Engineering Staff on the
1
In 1967, however, it was estimated that there were approximately 40,000
electrically powered urban delivery trucks in Great Britain, although
this corresponds to a production rate of only several thousand a year.
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potential for motor vehicles of electric power technology developed in the
space program led to the building of a prototype in a Corvair body in 1964.
They refer to it as "Electrovair I"; it used silver-zinc batteries supplied
by Yardney Electric Co. A second prototype, with improved controls, was
built in 1966. [45] "Electrovair II" was designed to perform like a
contemporary passenger car except in range, which was 40-80 mi. on a single
charge. [46] "Electrovan," a light delivery van-type vehicle was also built
in 1966 using a hydrogen-oxygen fuel cell supplied by Union Carbide. [46]
The purpose of these vehicles was to confirm that, in fact, power source
performance and cost were the limiting factors in electric vehicle
development and to better define the requirments on an electric power source
in this application. These objectives being completed [47] responsibility
for GM's electric vehicle activities was returned to GMRL.
GM has been active in battery development since 1959. [30] Aside
from an interest in electric vehicles, GM also is a major producer and
marketer of batteries through its Delco-Remy Division. The battery research
program at GMRL now involves about 20 professionals. Until about one year
ago, the principal effort was on the lithium-chlorine battery which showed
excellent performance but required the storage of chlorine gas at 6500C,
causing obvious problems. Attention now centers on the lithium-sulfur cell.
Ford also has a long-standing interest in electric vehicles and
advanced batteries. In 1967, Ford and its subsidiary, Ford of Britain,
designed and built the "Comuta," a 1200 lb., 6 ft. long vehicle, with a
top speed of 40 mph, designed for inner city use. [4&, 49] This was
followed in 1970 by an electrically powered "Cortina Estate Car," which
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weighed 3100 lbs. and had a top speed of 60 mph. 100 lb. of nickel-
cadmium batteries gave the vehicle a range of 40 mi. at a constant speed
of 25 mph, or 18 mi. on the Ford City Economy Route. Above 30 mph its
acceleration and passing ability were limited. [49] Since these exercises,
Ford's vehicle work has been primarily concerned with computer simulations
and design studies optimizing the characteristics of electric vehicles
to satisfy various markets. [19, 50]
In the battery area, Ford's Scientific Research Staff has developed
the sodium-sulfur cell. Although this system does not match the potential
performance of the lithium-chlorine system, its performance could be adequate
for passenger car usage, and it does not involve the safety hazard of
compressed chlorine. It still needs to be kept at 3000C, however. Small
laboratory cells and batteries of cells have been demonstrated, but a
substantial effort over the next fifteen years or so is likely to be required
before a marketable product will be ready. [19, 51] Ford's program is now
under partial NSF sponsorship ($700,000 in Fiscal Year 1973, $900,000 in
Fiscal Year 1974, and continuing).
Chrysler has no significant electric vehicle programs, although they
have been actively following a number of the other programs with
consultations and visits.
Outside of the Big Three, a large number of companies have fielded
an electric vehicle of some sort within the last decade or so. Among them,
Battronic Truck applied to the Federal Government's Low Emission Vehicle
Certification Board for designation as a low-emission vehicle under the
Clean Air Act, which would allow the Government to buy their vehicles at
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a premium price. They were refused once because their vehicles did not
meet the performance requirements of the Federal agencies, but have
applied again.
The U.S. Postal Service is now conducting the largest American program
on vehicles with lead-acid cells. In 1972 the USPS initiated a program
to evaluate the potential for state-of-the-art electric vehicles using
lead-acid batteries to fulfill various USPS vehicle missions. The typical
USPS delivery mission profile, for example, appears quite favorable to
electric vehicles as it is a short range, multi-stop, closed cycle with
a lot of idle time and only moderate speeds and accelerations. The USPS
paid for the design and fabrication of three different quarter-ton capacity
electric vehicles, which were built and went into testing in early 1973.
Subsequently thirty vehicles of a single, different, design were leased.
Testing of these vehicles in various areas of the country, under different
weather conditions, and on various types of routes, continues at this
writing. However, the results have been sufficiently favorable that the
USPS decided to proceed with an initial procurement; in April, 1974, AM
General was awarded a contract for delivery of 352 electric vehicles.
In the advanced battery area there are a number of efforts underway
aside from those at GM and Ford. TRW, Dow Chemical, General Electric,
Gould, Exxon and Atomics International each have programs with four or more
professionals at work. The largest program, however, is at the Argonne
National Laboratories, under Federal Government support, with a staff of
about 25. [52] The AEC has supported the ANL program since 1965. It has
been an exploratory program, presently aimed at a lithium-sulfur battery
for electric utility load-leveling. At various times the AEC funding has
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been supplemented by other agencies to examine the application of the ANL
Li-S system to automotive uses. ANL received $350,000 and $480,000 from
EPA's AAPS Division in Fiscal Years 1970 and 1971, respectively. The
NSF then picked up the automotive application program and carried it through
November, 1973, when the AEC became the major supporter with some
contribution from DOT. Total Fiscal Year 1975 funding of the ANL battery
program is $3.3 million, consisting of $2.7 million from the AEC for the
basic and utility work, $500,000 from the AEC for development of an Li-S
battery for automotive application, and $100,000 from DOT for design and
testing of automotive Li-S batteries.
Heat Engine Hybrid System
The potential advantages of hybrid systems have been the subject of
much debate over the past decade. In the automotive context, the term
hybrid is usually used in reference to a combination of a heat engine
1
with some other sort of drive which runs off an energy storage system.
The potential advantage is that the heat engine can be sized at less than
the peak vehicle power requirement, and then operated in an on-off mode,
either running at a single optimum setting or not running at all. In the
simplest configuration, the vehicle would be powered only off the storage
system; the heat engine would come on and recharge the storage system
whenever its energy content got below a specified level. The advantages
1 The Army uses the term "hybrid" in reference to stratified charge engines.
B-34
of small size and single-point operation could significantly reduce the
fuel consumption, emissions, and cost of the heat engine. These potential
advantages must be larger than the weight, cost, and inefficiencies of
the other drive, the energy storage unit, and the associated transmission
and controls.
GM built two hybrid vehicles in the mid-1960's. Both used batteries
and an electric drive; one used an ICE and the other used a Stirling
cycle powerplant for the heat engine. GM found them inefficient, heavy,
costly and disappointly high in emission levels. [30]
At the outset of the AAPS program, EPA commissioned a number of studies
and experiments with hybrids, considering various types of heat engines,
and either batteries with an electric drive or a flywheel and a mechanical
drive. A total of $1.8 million of Fiscal Year 1970 and 1971 funds were
invested. Before the work was completed, EPA had changed its program
structure and concentrated its money on less risky systems. However, the
results generally indicated that hybrid vehicles were not very promising.
Two private companies have recently invested in hybrid systems. Petro-
Electric Motors, Ltd., of New York City designed and built a hybrid using
an ICE and batteries. [53] After investing several hundred thousand dollars
of their own money (according to one estimate) they submitted their vehicle
to EPA for testing under the Federal Clean Car Incentive Program. The
results were mixed and are not yet completed, but they received about
$25,000 from EPA under the program.
The other company is Lear Motors. Their latest venture is a design
for a bus using a Rankine cycle heat engine and a flywheel, for which they
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are soliciting further support. [54]
There is little other interest or programs on hybrids at this time.
A related project, however, is now being supported by DOT's Urban Mass
Transportation Administration. They are supporting the development of a
"flywheel trolley," which would use electric power from its lines to
energize a flywheel, allowing it to travel beyond the routes covered by
its electricity supply. $610,000 of Fiscal Year 1974 funds have been
allocated to the project.
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